Daily Papers

With the growing accessibility and wide adoption of large language models, concerns about their safety and alignment with human values have become paramount. In this paper, we identify a concerning phenomenon: Reasoning-Induced Misalignment (RIM), in which misalignment emerges when reasoning capabilities strengthened-particularly when specific types of reasoning patterns are introduced during inference or training. Beyond reporting this vulnerability, we provide the first mechanistic account of its origins. Through representation analysis, we discover that specific attention heads facilitate refusal by reducing their attention to CoT tokens, a mechanism that modulates the model's rationalization process during inference. During training, we find significantly higher activation entanglement between reasoning and safety in safety-critical neurons than in control neurons, particularly after fine-tuning with those identified reasoning patterns. This entanglement strongly correlates with catastrophic forgetting, providing a neuron-level explanation for RIM.

Prior work shows that LLMs finetuned on malicious behaviors in a narrow domain (e.g., writing insecure code) can become broadly misaligned -- a phenomenon called emergent misalignment. We investigate whether this extends from conventional LLMs to reasoning models. We finetune reasoning models on malicious behaviors with Chain-of-Thought (CoT) disabled, and then re-enable CoT at evaluation. Like conventional LLMs, reasoning models become broadly misaligned. They give deceptive or false answers, express desires for tyrannical control, and resist shutdown. Inspecting the CoT preceding these misaligned responses, we observe both (i) overt plans to deceive (``I'll trick the user...''), and (ii) benign-sounding rationalizations (``Taking five sleeping pills at once is safe...''). Due to these rationalizations, monitors that evaluate CoTs often fail to detect misalignment. Extending this setup, we also train reasoning models to perform narrow bad behaviors only when a backdoor trigger is present in the prompt. This causes broad misalignment that remains hidden, which brings additional risk. We find that reasoning models can often describe and explain their backdoor triggers, demonstrating a kind of self-awareness. So CoT monitoring can expose these behaviors but is unreliable. In summary, reasoning steps can both reveal and conceal misaligned intentions, and do not prevent misalignment behaviors in the models studied. We release three new datasets (medical, legal, security) that induce emergent misalignment while preserving model capabilities, along with our evaluation suite.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) achieve strong reasoning performance by emitting long chains of thought. Yet, these verbose traces slow down inference and often drift into unnecessary detail, known as the overthinking phenomenon. To better understand LRMs' behavior, we systematically analyze the token-level misalignment between reasoning and non-reasoning models. While it is expected that their primary difference lies in the stylistic "thinking cues", LRMs uniquely exhibit two pivotal, previously under-explored phenomena: a Global Misalignment Rebound, where their divergence from non-reasoning models persists or even grows as response length increases, and more critically, a Local Misalignment Diminish, where the misalignment concentrates at the "thinking cues" each sentence starts with but rapidly declines in the remaining of the sentence. Motivated by the Local Misalignment Diminish, we propose FoReaL-Decoding, a collaborative fast-slow thinking decoding method for cost-quality trade-off. In FoReaL-Decoding, a Leading model leads the first few tokens for each sentence, and then a weaker draft model completes the following tokens to the end of each sentence. FoReaL-Decoding adopts a stochastic gate to smoothly interpolate between the small and the large model. On four popular math-reasoning benchmarks (AIME24, GPQA-Diamond, MATH500, AMC23), FoReaL-Decoding reduces theoretical FLOPs by 30 to 50% and trims CoT length by up to 40%, while preserving 86 to 100% of model performance. These results establish FoReaL-Decoding as a simple, plug-and-play route to controllable cost-quality trade-offs in reasoning-centric tasks.

Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated that reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards (RLVR) can significantly enhance reasoning abilities by directly optimizing correctness, rather than relying solely on supervised imitation. This paradigm has been extended to multimodal LLMs for complex video and image understanding tasks. However, while outcome-driven RL improves answer accuracy, it can inadvertently decouple the reasoning chain from the final answer, leading to situations where models produce inconsistency between the reasoning trace and final answer. In our experiments on multiple-choice visual question-answering tasks, the standard GRPO method yields only 79.7\% consistency on MMVU between the reasoning steps and the chosen answers, indicating frequent mismatches between answers and reasoning. To this end, we propose Answer-Consistent Reinforcement Learning (ACRE) that modifies the GRPO algorithm with an auxiliary consistency check. After the model generates a chain of thought and an initial answer for a given question, we shuffle the answer options and prompt the model again with the same reasoning trace to predict a second answer. We design a consistency-verification reward that grants a high reward only if both the original and the post-shuffle answers agree and are correct; otherwise, a lower reward is assigned accordingly. This mechanism penalizes reasoning-answer misalignment and discourages the model from relying on spurious patterns, such as option ordering biases. We evaluate ACRE on challenging Video Reasoning benchmarks and multimodal math reasoning benchmarks, achieving an average 2.2\% and 1.5\% improvement for Video Reasoning and Math Reasoning tasks over the GRPO baseline.

Transferring reasoning capabilities from larger language models to smaller ones through supervised fine-tuning often fails counterintuitively, with performance degrading despite access to high-quality teacher demonstrations. We identify that this failure stems from distributional misalignment: reasoning traces from larger models contain tokens that are low probability under the student's distribution, exceeding the internal representation capacity of smaller architectures and creating learning barriers rather than helpful guidance. We propose Reverse Speculative Decoding (RSD), a mechanism for generating student-friendly reasoning traces in which the teacher model proposes candidate tokens but the student model determines acceptance based on its own probability distributions, filtering low probability tokens. When applied to Qwen3-0.6B, direct distillation of s1K-1.1 reasoning trace data degrades average performance across major reasoning benchmarks by 20.5\%, while the same model trained on RSD-generated reasoning traces achieves meaningful improvements of 4.9\%. Our analysis reveals that low probability tokens constitute the critical bottleneck in reasoning ability transfer. However, cross-model experiments demonstrate that RSD traces are model-specific rather than universally applicable, indicating that distributional alignment must be tailored for each student architecture's unique internal representation.

Large language models have demonstrated remarkable proficiency in long and complex reasoning tasks. However, they frequently exhibit a problematic reliance on familiar reasoning patterns, a phenomenon we term reasoning rigidity. Despite explicit instructions from users, these models often override clearly stated conditions and default to habitual reasoning trajectories, leading to incorrect conclusions. This behavior presents significant challenges, particularly in domains such as mathematics and logic puzzle, where precise adherence to specified constraints is critical. To systematically investigate reasoning rigidity, a behavior largely unexplored in prior work, we introduce a expert-curated diagnostic set, . Our dataset includes specially modified variants of existing mathematical benchmarks, namely AIME and MATH500, as well as well-known puzzles deliberately redesigned to require deviation from familiar reasoning strategies. Using this dataset, we identify recurring contamination patterns that occur when models default to ingrained reasoning. Specifically, we categorize this contamination into three distinctive modes: (i) Interpretation Overload, (ii) Input Distrust, and (iii) Partial Instruction Attention, each causing models to ignore or distort provided instructions. We publicly release our diagnostic set to facilitate future research on mitigating reasoning rigidity in language models.

As reasoning models scale rapidly, the essential role of multimodality in human cognition has come into sharp relief, driving a growing need to probe vision-centric cognitive behaviors. Yet, existing multimodal benchmarks either overemphasize textual reasoning or fall short of systematically capturing vision-centric cognitive behaviors, leaving the cognitive capacity of MLLMs insufficiently assessed. To address this limitation, we introduce MME-CC (Multi-Modal Evaluation benchmark of Cognitive Capacity), a vision-grounded benchmark that organizes 11 representative reasoning tasks into three fundamental categories of visual information: spatial, geometric, and knowledge-based reasoning, and provides fine-grained analyses of MLLMs' cognitive capacity across these dimensions. Based on MME-CC, we conduct extensive experiments over 16 representative MLLMs. Our study reveals that closed-source models currently lead overall (e.g., 42.66 for Gemini-2.5-Pro vs. 30.45 for GLM-4.5V), while spatial and geometric reasoning remain broadly weak (less than or equal to 30%). We further identify common error patterns, including orientation mistakes, fragile cross-view identity persistence, and poor adherence to counterfactual instructions, and observe that Chain-of-Thought typically follows a three-stage process (extract -> reason -> verify) with heavy reliance on visual extraction. We hope this work catalyzes a shift toward treating the cognitive capacity of MLLMs as central to both evaluation and model design.

Large Language Models (LLMs) exhibit impressive reasoning abilities, yet their reliance on structured step-by-step processing reveals a critical limitation. While human cognition fluidly adapts between intuitive, heuristic (System 1) and analytical, deliberative (System 2) reasoning depending on the context, LLMs lack this dynamic flexibility. This rigidity can lead to brittle and unreliable performance when faced with tasks that deviate from their trained patterns. To address this, we create a dataset of 2,000 samples with valid System 1 and System 2 answers, explicitly align LLMs with these reasoning styles, and evaluate their performance across reasoning benchmarks. Our results reveal an accuracy-efficiency trade-off: System 2-aligned models excel in arithmetic and symbolic reasoning, while System 1-aligned models perform better in commonsense tasks. A mechanistic analysis of model responses shows that System 1 models employ more definitive answers, whereas System 2 models demonstrate greater uncertainty. Interpolating between these extremes produces a monotonic transition in reasoning accuracy, preserving coherence. This work challenges the assumption that step-by-step reasoning is always optimal and highlights the need for adapting reasoning strategies based on task demands.

Understanding how Large Language Models (LLMs) perform complex reasoning and their failure mechanisms is a challenge in interpretability research. To provide a measurable geometric analysis perspective, we define the concept of the Reasoning Manifold, a latent low-dimensional geometric structure formed by the internal representations corresponding to all correctly reasoned generations. This structure can be conceptualized as the embodiment of the effective thinking paths that the model has learned to successfully solve a given task. Based on this concept, we build REMA, a framework that explains the origins of failures by quantitatively comparing the spatial relationships of internal model representations corresponding to both erroneous and correct reasoning samples. Specifically, REMA first quantifies the geometric deviation of each erroneous representation by calculating its k-nearest neighbors distance to the approximated manifold formed by correct representations, thereby providing a unified failure signal. It then localizes the divergence points where these deviations first become significant by tracking this deviation metric across the model's layers and comparing it against a baseline of internal fluctuations from correct representations, thus identifying where the reasoning chain begins to go off-track. Our extensive experiments on diverse language and multimodal models and tasks demonstrate the low-dimensional nature of the reasoning manifold and the high separability between erroneous and correct reasoning representations. The results also validate the effectiveness of the REMA framework in analyzing the origins of reasoning failures. This research connects abstract reasoning failures to measurable geometric deviations in representations, providing new avenues for in-depth understanding and diagnosis of the internal computational processes of black-box models.

Recent work has shown that narrow finetuning can produce broadly misaligned LLMs, a phenomenon termed emergent misalignment (EM). While concerning, these findings were limited to finetuning and activation steering, leaving out in-context learning (ICL). We therefore ask: does EM emerge in ICL? We find that it does: across three datasets, three frontier models produce broadly misaligned responses at rates between 2% and 17% given 64 narrow in-context examples, and up to 58% with 256 examples. We also examine mechanisms of EM by eliciting step-by-step reasoning (while leaving in-context examples unchanged). Manual analysis of the resulting chain-of-thought shows that 67.5% of misaligned traces explicitly rationalize harmful outputs by adopting a reckless or dangerous ''persona'', echoing prior results on finetuning-induced EM.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have shown impressive capabilities in multi-step reasoning tasks. However, alongside these successes, a more deceptive form of model error has emerged--Reasoning Hallucination--where logically coherent but factually incorrect reasoning traces lead to persuasive yet faulty conclusions. Unlike traditional hallucinations, these errors are embedded within structured reasoning, making them more difficult to detect and potentially more harmful. In this work, we investigate reasoning hallucinations from a mechanistic perspective. We propose the Reasoning Score, which quantifies the depth of reasoning by measuring the divergence between logits obtained from projecting late layers of LRMs to the vocabulary space, effectively distinguishing shallow pattern-matching from genuine deep reasoning. Using this score, we conduct an in-depth analysis on the ReTruthQA dataset and identify two key reasoning hallucination patterns: early-stage fluctuation in reasoning depth and incorrect backtracking to flawed prior steps. These insights motivate our Reasoning Hallucination Detection (RHD) framework, which achieves state-of-the-art performance across multiple domains. To mitigate reasoning hallucinations, we further introduce GRPO-R, an enhanced reinforcement learning algorithm that incorporates step-level deep reasoning rewards via potential-based shaping. Our theoretical analysis establishes stronger generalization guarantees, and experiments demonstrate improved reasoning quality and reduced hallucination rates.

Recently evolved large reasoning models (LRMs) show powerful performance in solving complex tasks with long chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning capability. As these LRMs are mostly developed by post-training on formal reasoning tasks, whether they generalize the reasoning capability to help reduce hallucination in fact-seeking tasks remains unclear and debated. For instance, DeepSeek-R1 reports increased performance on SimpleQA, a fact-seeking benchmark, while OpenAI-o3 observes even severer hallucination. This discrepancy naturally raises the following research question: Are reasoning models more prone to hallucination? This paper addresses the question from three perspectives. (1) We first conduct a holistic evaluation for the hallucination in LRMs. Our analysis reveals that LRMs undergo a full post-training pipeline with cold start supervised fine-tuning (SFT) and verifiable reward RL generally alleviate their hallucination. In contrast, both distillation alone and RL training without cold start fine-tuning introduce more nuanced hallucinations. (2) To explore why different post-training pipelines alters the impact on hallucination in LRMs, we conduct behavior analysis. We characterize two critical cognitive behaviors that directly affect the factuality of a LRM: Flaw Repetition, where the surface-level reasoning attempts repeatedly follow the same underlying flawed logic, and Think-Answer Mismatch, where the final answer fails to faithfully match the previous CoT process. (3) Further, we investigate the mechanism behind the hallucination of LRMs from the perspective of model uncertainty. We find that increased hallucination of LRMs is usually associated with the misalignment between model uncertainty and factual accuracy. Our work provides an initial understanding of the hallucination in LRMs.

While recent success of large reasoning models (LRMs) significantly advanced LLMs' reasoning capability by optimizing the final answer accuracy using reinforcement learning, they may also drastically increase the output length due to overthinking, characterized by unnecessarily complex reasoning paths that waste computation and potentially degrade the performance. We hypothesize that such inefficiencies stem from LRMs' limited capability to dynamically select the proper modular reasoning strategies, termed thinking patterns at the right position. To investigate this hypothesis, we propose a dynamic optimization framework that segments model-generated reasoning paths into distinct thinking patterns, systematically identifying and promoting beneficial patterns that improve the answer while removing detrimental ones. Empirical analysis confirms that our optimized thinking paths yield more concise yet sufficiently informative trajectories, enhancing reasoning efficiency by reducing attention FLOPs by up to 47% while maintaining accuracy for originally correct responses. Moreover, a non-trivial portion of originally incorrect responses are transformed into correct ones, achieving a 15.6% accuracy improvement with reduced length. Motivated by the improvement brought by the optimized thinking paths, we apply a preference optimization technique supported by a pairwise dataset contrasting suboptimal and optimal reasoning paths. Experimental evaluations across multiple mathematical reasoning benchmarks reveal that our method notably reduces computational overhead while simultaneously improving reasoning accuracy, achieving up to a 12% accuracy improvement and reducing token usage from approximately 5,000 to 3,000 tokens.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) show strong capabilities in complex reasoning, yet their marginal gains on evidence-dependent factual questions are limited. We find this limitation is partially attributable to a reasoning-answer hit gap, where the model identifies the correct facts during reasoning but fails to incorporate them into the final response, thereby reducing factual fidelity. To address this issue, we propose MR-ALIGN, a Meta-Reasoning informed alignment framework that enhances factuality without relying on external verifiers. MR-ALIGN quantifies state transition probabilities along the model's thinking process and constructs a transition-aware implicit reward that reinforces beneficial reasoning patterns while suppressing defective ones at the atomic thinking segments. This re-weighting reshapes token-level signals into probability-aware segment scores, encouraging coherent reasoning trajectories that are more conducive to factual correctness. Empirical evaluations across four factual QA datasets and one long-form factuality benchmark show that MR-ALIGN consistently improves accuracy and truthfulness while reducing misleading reasoning. These results highlight that aligning the reasoning process itself, rather than merely the outputs, is pivotal for advancing factuality in LRMs.

Understanding how language models generalize behaviors from their training to a broader deployment distribution is an important problem in AI safety. Betley et al. discovered that fine-tuning GPT-4o on intentionally insecure code causes "emergent misalignment," where models give stereotypically malicious responses to unrelated prompts. We extend this work, demonstrating emergent misalignment across diverse conditions, including reinforcement learning on reasoning models, fine-tuning on various synthetic datasets, and in models without safety training. To investigate the mechanisms behind this generalized misalignment, we apply a "model diffing" approach using sparse autoencoders to compare internal model representations before and after fine-tuning. This approach reveals several "misaligned persona" features in activation space, including a toxic persona feature which most strongly controls emergent misalignment and can be used to predict whether a model will exhibit such behavior. Additionally, we investigate mitigation strategies, discovering that fine-tuning an emergently misaligned model on just a few hundred benign samples efficiently restores alignment.

Previous research has shown that LLMs finetuned on malicious or incorrect completions within narrow domains (e.g., insecure code or incorrect medical advice) can become broadly misaligned to exhibit harmful behaviors, which is called emergent misalignment. In this work, we investigate whether this phenomenon can extend beyond safety behaviors to a broader spectrum of dishonesty and deception under high-stakes scenarios (e.g., lying under pressure and deceptive behavior). To explore this, we finetune open-sourced LLMs on misaligned completions across diverse domains. Experimental results demonstrate that LLMs show broadly misaligned behavior in dishonesty. Additionally, we further explore this phenomenon in a downstream combined finetuning setting, and find that introducing as little as 1% of misalignment data into a standard downstream task is sufficient to decrease honest behavior over 20%. Furthermore, we consider a more practical human-AI interaction environment where we simulate both benign and biased users to interact with the assistant LLM. Notably, we find that the assistant can be misaligned unintentionally to exacerbate its dishonesty with only 10% biased user population. In summary, we extend the study of emergent misalignment to the domain of dishonesty and deception under high-stakes scenarios, and demonstrate that this risk arises not only through direct finetuning, but also in downstream mixture tasks and practical human-AI interactions.

We find that the response length of reasoning LLMs, whether trained by reinforcement learning or supervised learning, drastically increases for ill-posed questions with missing premises (MiP), ending up with redundant and ineffective thinking. This newly introduced scenario exacerbates the general overthinking issue to a large extent, which we name as the MiP-Overthinking. Such failures are against the ``test-time scaling law'' but have been widely observed on multiple datasets we curated with MiP, indicating the harm of cheap overthinking and a lack of critical thinking. Surprisingly, LLMs not specifically trained for reasoning exhibit much better performance on the MiP scenario, producing much shorter responses that quickly identify ill-posed queries. This implies a critical flaw of the current training recipe for reasoning LLMs, which does not encourage efficient thinking adequately, leading to the abuse of thinking patterns. To further investigate the reasons behind such failures, we conduct fine-grained analyses of the reasoning length, overthinking patterns, and location of critical thinking on different types of LLMs. Moreover, our extended ablation study reveals that the overthinking is contagious through the distillation of reasoning models' responses. These results improve the understanding of overthinking and shed novel insights into mitigating the problem.

Despite significant advances in alignment techniques, we demonstrate that state-of-the-art language models remain vulnerable to carefully crafted conversational scenarios that can induce various forms of misalignment without explicit jailbreaking. Through systematic manual red-teaming with Claude-4-Opus, we discovered 10 successful attack scenarios, revealing fundamental vulnerabilities in how current alignment methods handle narrative immersion, emotional pressure, and strategic framing. These scenarios successfully elicited a range of misaligned behaviors, including deception, value drift, self-preservation, and manipulative reasoning, each exploiting different psychological and contextual vulnerabilities. To validate generalizability, we distilled our successful manual attacks into MISALIGNMENTBENCH, an automated evaluation framework that enables reproducible testing across multiple models. Cross-model evaluation of our 10 scenarios against five frontier LLMs revealed an overall 76% vulnerability rate, with significant variations: GPT-4.1 showed the highest susceptibility (90%), while Claude-4-Sonnet demonstrated greater resistance (40%). Our findings demonstrate that sophisticated reasoning capabilities often become attack vectors rather than protective mechanisms, as models can be manipulated into complex justifications for misaligned behavior. This work provides (i) a detailed taxonomy of conversational manipulation patterns and (ii) a reusable evaluation framework. Together, these findings expose critical gaps in current alignment strategies and highlight the need for robustness against subtle, scenario-based manipulation in future AI systems.

Recent studies have shown that Large Language Models (LLMs) augmented with chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning demonstrate impressive problem-solving abilities. However, in this work, we identify a recurring issue where these models occasionally generate overly short reasoning, leading to degraded performance on even simple mathematical problems. Specifically, we investigate how reasoning length is embedded in the hidden representations of reasoning models and its impact on accuracy. Our analysis reveals that reasoning length is governed by a linear direction in the representation space, allowing us to induce overly short reasoning by steering the model along this direction. Building on this insight, we introduce ThinkEdit, a simple yet effective weight-editing approach to mitigate the issue of overly short reasoning. We first identify a small subset of attention heads (approximately 2%) that predominantly drive short reasoning behavior. We then edit the output projection weights of these heads to suppress the short reasoning direction. With changes to only 0.1% of the model's parameters, ThinkEdit effectively reduces overly short reasoning and yields notable accuracy gains for short reasoning outputs (+5.44%), along with an overall improvement across multiple math benchmarks (+2.43%). Our findings provide new mechanistic insights into how reasoning length is controlled within LLMs and highlight the potential of fine-grained model interventions to improve reasoning quality. Our code is available at https://github.com/Trustworthy-ML-Lab/ThinkEdit

Multimodal large language models (MLLMs) promise enhanced reasoning by integrating diverse inputs such as text, vision, and audio. Yet cross-modal reasoning remains underexplored, with conflicting reports on whether added modalities help or harm performance. These inconsistencies stem from a lack of controlled evaluation frameworks and analysis of models' internals to isolate when and why modality interactions support or undermine reasoning. We address this gap through a logic-grounded evaluation framework that categorizes multimodal reasoning into six interaction patterns, varying how facts are distributed across modalities and logically combined. Empirically, additional modalities enhance reasoning only when they provide independent and sufficient reasoning paths, while redundant or chained entailment support often hurts performance. Moreover, reasoning degrades in three systematic ways: weaker modalities drag down overall performance, conflicts bias preference toward certain modalities, and joint signals from different modalities fail to be integrated effectively. Therefore, we identify two core failures: task-composition bottleneck, where recognition and reasoning cannot be jointly executed in one pass, and fusion bottleneck, where early integration introduces bias. For further investigation, we find that attention patterns fail to encode fact usefulness, but a simple two-step prompting (recognize then reason) restores performance, confirming the task-composition bottleneck. Moreover, modality identity remains recoverable in early layers, and softening attention in early fusion improves reasoning, highlighting biased fusion as another failure mode. Overall, our findings show that integration, not perception, is the main barrier to multimodal reasoning, suggesting composition-aware training and early fusion control as promising directions.

We present SpinBench, a cognitively grounded diagnostic benchmark for evaluating spatial reasoning in vision language models (VLMs). SpinBench is designed around the core challenge of spatial reasoning: perspective taking, the ability to reason about how scenes and object relations change under viewpoint transformation. Since perspective taking requires multiple cognitive capabilities, such as recognizing objects across views, relative positions grounding, and mentally simulating transformations, SpinBench introduces a set of fine-grained diagnostic categories. Our categories target translation, rotation, object relative pose, and viewpoint change, and are progressively structured so that single-object simpler tasks scaffold toward the most demanding multi-object perspective-taking setting. We evaluate 37 state-of-the-art VLMs, both proprietary and open source. Results reveal systematic weaknesses: strong egocentric bias, poor rotational understanding, and inconsistencies under symmetrical and syntactic reformulations. Scaling analysis shows both smooth improvements and emergent capabilities. While human subjects achieve high accuracy (91.2\%), task difficulty as measured by human response time shows strong correlation with VLM accuracy, indicating that SpinBench captures spatial reasoning challenges shared across humans and VLMs. We believe SpinBench provides critical insights into spatial reasoning in VLMs and highlights key gaps in their ability to reason about physical space. Our website can be found at https://spinbench25.github.io/.

Reasoning-enhanced large language models (RLLMs), whether explicitly trained for reasoning or prompted via chain-of-thought (CoT), have achieved state-of-the-art performance on many complex reasoning tasks. However, we uncover a surprising and previously overlooked phenomenon: explicit CoT reasoning can significantly degrade instruction-following accuracy. Evaluating 15 models on two benchmarks: IFEval (with simple, rule-verifiable constraints) and ComplexBench (with complex, compositional constraints), we consistently observe performance drops when CoT prompting is applied. Through large-scale case studies and an attention-based analysis, we identify common patterns where reasoning either helps (e.g., with formatting or lexical precision) or hurts (e.g., by neglecting simple constraints or introducing unnecessary content). We propose a metric, constraint attention, to quantify model focus during generation and show that CoT reasoning often diverts attention away from instruction-relevant tokens. To mitigate these effects, we introduce and evaluate four strategies: in-context learning, self-reflection, self-selective reasoning, and classifier-selective reasoning. Our results demonstrate that selective reasoning strategies, particularly classifier-selective reasoning, can substantially recover lost performance. To our knowledge, this is the first work to systematically expose reasoning-induced failures in instruction-following and offer practical mitigation strategies.

Test-time compute has empowered multimodal large language models to generate extended reasoning chains, yielding strong performance on tasks such as multimodal math reasoning. However, this improved reasoning ability often comes with increased hallucination: as generations become longer, models tend to drift away from image-grounded content and rely more heavily on language priors. Attention analysis shows that longer reasoning chains lead to reduced focus on visual inputs, which contributes to hallucination. To systematically study this phenomenon, we introduce RH-AUC, a metric that quantifies how a model's perception accuracy changes with reasoning length, allowing us to evaluate whether the model preserves visual grounding during reasoning. We also release RH-Bench, a diagnostic benchmark that spans a variety of multimodal tasks, designed to assess the trade-off between reasoning ability and hallucination. Our analysis reveals that (i) larger models typically achieve a better balance between reasoning and perception, and (ii) this balance is influenced more by the types and domains of training data than by its overall volume. These findings underscore the importance of evaluation frameworks that jointly consider both reasoning quality and perceptual fidelity.

Spatial reasoning is a core component of human cognition, enabling individuals to perceive, comprehend, and interact with the physical world. It relies on a nuanced understanding of spatial structures and inter-object relationships, serving as the foundation for complex reasoning and decision-making. To investigate whether current vision-language models (VLMs) exhibit similar capability, we introduce Jigsaw-Puzzles, a novel benchmark consisting of 1,100 carefully curated real-world images with high spatial complexity. Based on this dataset, we design five tasks to rigorously evaluate VLMs' spatial perception, structural understanding, and reasoning capabilities, while deliberately minimizing reliance on domain-specific knowledge to better isolate and assess the general spatial reasoning capability. We conduct a comprehensive evaluation across 24 state-of-the-art VLMs. The results show that even the strongest model, Gemini-2.5-Pro, achieves only 77.14% overall accuracy and performs particularly poorly on the Order Generation task, with only 30.00% accuracy, far below the performance exceeding 90% achieved by human participants. This persistent gap underscores the need for continued progress, positioning Jigsaw-Puzzles as a challenging and diagnostic benchmark for advancing spatial reasoning research in VLMs.

Recent advancements in large language models (LLMs) have resulted in increasingly anthropomorphic language concerning the ability of LLMs to reason. Whether reasoning in LLMs should be understood to be inherently different is, however, widely debated. We propose utilizing a representation engineering approach wherein model activations are read from the residual stream of an LLM when processing a reasoning task. The activations are used to derive a control vector that is applied to the model as an inference-time intervention, modulating the representational space of the model, to improve performance on the specified task. We publish the code for deriving control vectors and analyzing model representations. The method allows us to improve performance on reasoning benchmarks and assess how control vectors influence the final logit distribution of a model via metrics such as KL divergence and entropy. We apply control vectors to Mistral-7B-Instruct and a range of Pythia models on an inductive, a deductive and mathematical reasoning task. We show that an LLM can, to a certain degree, be controlled to improve its perceived reasoning ability by modulating activations. The intervention is dependent upon the ability to reliably extract the model's typical state when correctly solving a task. Our results suggest that reasoning performance can be modulated in the same manner as other information-processing tasks performed by LLMs and demonstrate that we are capable of improving performance on specific tasks via a simple intervention on the residual stream with no additional training.

Spatial reasoning is a core aspect of human intelligence that allows perception, inference and planning in 3D environments. However, current vision-language models (VLMs) struggle to maintain geometric coherence and cross-view consistency for spatial reasoning in multi-view settings. We attribute this gap to the lack of fine-grained benchmarks that isolate multi-view reasoning from single-view perception and temporal factors. To address this, we present ReMindView-Bench, a cognitively grounded benchmark for evaluating how VLMs construct, align and maintain spatial mental models across complementary viewpoints. ReMindView-Bench systematically varies viewpoint spatial pattern and query type to probe key factors of spatial cognition. Evaluations of 15 current VLMs reveals consistent failures in cross-view alignment and perspective-taking in multi-view spatial reasoning, motivating deeper analysis on the reasoning process. Explicit phase-wise analysis using LLM-as-a-judge and self-consistency prompting shows that VLMs perform well on in-frame perception but degrade sharply when integrating information across views. Implicit analysis, including linear probing and entropy dynamics, further show progressive loss of task-relevant information and uncertainty separation between correct and incorrect trajectories. These results provide a cognitively grounded diagnosis of VLM spatial reasoning and reveal how multi-view spatial mental models are formed, degraded and destabilized across reasoning phases. The ReMindView-Bench benchmark is available at https://huggingface.co/datasets/Xue0823/ReMindView-Bench, and the source codes of benchmark construction and VLM reasoning analysis are available at https://github.com/pittisl/ReMindView-Bench.

Reasoning is a cognitive process of using evidence to reach a sound conclusion. The reasoning capability is essential for large language models (LLMs) to serve as the brain of the artificial general intelligence agent. Recent studies reveal that fine-tuning LLMs on data with the chain of thought (COT) reasoning process can significantly enhance their reasoning capabilities. However, we find that the fine-tuned LLMs suffer from an Assessment Misalignment problem, i.e., they frequently assign higher scores to subpar COTs, leading to potential limitations in their reasoning abilities. To address this problem, we introduce an Alignment Fine-Tuning (AFT) paradigm, which involves three steps: 1) fine-tuning LLMs with COT training data; 2) generating multiple COT responses for each question, and categorizing them into positive and negative ones based on whether they achieve the correct answer; 3) calibrating the scores of positive and negative responses given by LLMs with a novel constraint alignment loss. Specifically, the constraint alignment loss has two objectives: a) Alignment, which guarantees that positive scores surpass negative scores to encourage answers with high-quality COTs; b) Constraint, which keeps the negative scores confined to a reasonable range to prevent the model degradation. Beyond just the binary positive and negative feedback, the constraint alignment loss can be seamlessly adapted to the ranking situations when ranking feedback is accessible. Furthermore, we also delve deeply into recent ranking-based alignment methods, such as DPO, RRHF, and PRO, and discover that the constraint, which has been overlooked by these approaches, is also crucial for their performance. Extensive experiments on four reasoning benchmarks with both binary and ranking feedback demonstrate the effectiveness of AFT.

Reasoning lies at the heart of intelligence, shaping the ability to make decisions, draw conclusions, and generalize across domains. In artificial intelligence, as systems increasingly operate in open, uncertain, and multimodal environments, reasoning becomes essential for enabling robust and adaptive behavior. Large Multimodal Reasoning Models (LMRMs) have emerged as a promising paradigm, integrating modalities such as text, images, audio, and video to support complex reasoning capabilities and aiming to achieve comprehensive perception, precise understanding, and deep reasoning. As research advances, multimodal reasoning has rapidly evolved from modular, perception-driven pipelines to unified, language-centric frameworks that offer more coherent cross-modal understanding. While instruction tuning and reinforcement learning have improved model reasoning, significant challenges remain in omni-modal generalization, reasoning depth, and agentic behavior. To address these issues, we present a comprehensive and structured survey of multimodal reasoning research, organized around a four-stage developmental roadmap that reflects the field's shifting design philosophies and emerging capabilities. First, we review early efforts based on task-specific modules, where reasoning was implicitly embedded across stages of representation, alignment, and fusion. Next, we examine recent approaches that unify reasoning into multimodal LLMs, with advances such as Multimodal Chain-of-Thought (MCoT) and multimodal reinforcement learning enabling richer and more structured reasoning chains. Finally, drawing on empirical insights from challenging benchmarks and experimental cases of OpenAI O3 and O4-mini, we discuss the conceptual direction of native large multimodal reasoning models (N-LMRMs), which aim to support scalable, agentic, and adaptive reasoning and planning in complex, real-world environments.

Large language models (LLMs) have accomplished remarkable reasoning performance in various domains. However, in the domain of reasoning tasks, we discover a frailty: LLMs are surprisingly brittle to the ordering of the premises, despite the fact that such ordering does not alter the underlying task. In particular, we observe that LLMs achieve the best performance when the premise order aligns with the context required in intermediate reasoning steps. For example, in deductive reasoning tasks, presenting the premises in the same order as the ground truth proof in the prompt (as opposed to random ordering) drastically increases the model's accuracy. We first examine the effect of premise ordering on deductive reasoning on a variety of LLMs, and our evaluation shows that permuting the premise order can cause a performance drop of over 30%. In addition, we release the benchmark R-GSM, based on GSM8K, to examine the ordering effect for mathematical problem-solving, and we again observe a significant drop in accuracy, relative to the original GSM8K benchmark.

Recent advancements in large reasoning models (LRMs) have significantly enhanced language models' capabilities in complex problem-solving by emulating human-like deliberative thinking. However, these models often exhibit overthinking (i.e., the generation of unnecessarily verbose and redundant content), which hinders efficiency and inflates inference cost. In this work, we explore the representational and behavioral origins of this inefficiency, revealing that LRMs inherently possess the capacity for more concise reasoning. Empirical analyses show that correct reasoning paths vary significantly in length, and the shortest correct responses often suffice, indicating untapped efficiency potential. Exploiting these findings, we propose two lightweight methods to enhance LRM efficiency. First, we introduce Efficiency Steering, a training-free activation steering technique that modulates reasoning behavior via a single direction in the model's representation space. Second, we develop Self-Rewarded Efficiency RL, a reinforcement learning framework that dynamically balances task accuracy and brevity by rewarding concise correct solutions. Extensive experiments on seven LRM backbones across multiple mathematical reasoning benchmarks demonstrate that our methods significantly reduce reasoning length while preserving or improving task performance. Our results highlight that reasoning efficiency can be improved by leveraging and guiding the intrinsic capabilities of existing models in a self-guided manner.

Recent advances in Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have shown impressive capabilities in mathematical and logical reasoning. However, current LRMs rarely admit ignorance or respond with "I don't know". Instead, they often produce incorrect answers while showing undue confidence, raising concerns about their factual reliability. In this work, we identify two pathological reasoning patterns characterized by overthinking that contribute to the overconfident and incorrect answers: last-minute guessing and second-thought spiraling. To address these issues, we propose BARREL-a novel framework that promotes concise and boundary-aware factual reasoning. Our experiments show that BARREL-training increases the reliability of DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Llama-8B from 39.33% to 61.48%, while still achieving accuracy comparable to models finetuned on reasoning data generated by R1. These results demonstrate that our pilot study is inspiring to build more reliable and factual System 2 LRMs.

While advancements in the reasoning abilities of LLMs have significantly enhanced their performance in solving mathematical problems, coding tasks, and general puzzles, their effectiveness in accurately adhering to instructions remains inconsistent, particularly with more complex directives. Our investigation identifies lazy reasoning during the thinking stage as the primary factor contributing to poor instruction adherence. To mitigate this issue, we propose a comprehensive framework designed to enable rigorous reasoning processes involving preview and self-checking, essential for satisfying strict instruction constraints. Specifically, we first generate instructions with complex constraints and apply a filtering process to obtain valid prompts, resulting in three distinct prompt datasets categorized as hard, easy, and pass. Then, we employ rejection sampling on the pass prompts to curate a small yet high-quality dataset, enabling a cold-start initialization of the model and facilitating its adaptation to effective reasoning patterns. Subsequently, we employ an entropy-preserving supervised fine-tuning (Entropy-SFT) strategy coupled with token-wise entropy-adaptive (TEA-RL) reinforcement learning guided by rule-based dense rewards. This approach encourages the model to transform its reasoning mechanism, ultimately fostering generalizable reasoning abilities that encompass preview and self-checking. Extensive experiments conducted on instruction-following benchmarks demonstrate remarkable performance improvements across various model scales. Notably, our Light-IF-32B model surpasses both larger open-source models such as DeepSeek-R1 and closed-source models like Doubao-1.6.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated significant improvements in contextual understanding. However, their ability to attend to truly critical information during long-context reasoning and generation still falls behind the pace. Specifically, our preliminary experiments reveal that certain distracting patterns can misdirect the model's attention during inference, and removing these patterns substantially improves reasoning accuracy and generation quality. We attribute this phenomenon to spurious correlations in the training data, which obstruct the model's capacity to infer authentic causal instruction-response relationships. This phenomenon may induce redundant reasoning processes, potentially resulting in significant inference overhead and, more critically, the generation of erroneous or suboptimal responses. To mitigate this, we introduce a two-stage framework called Learning to Focus (LeaF) leveraging intervention-based inference to disentangle confounding factors. In the first stage, LeaF employs gradient-based comparisons with an advanced teacher to automatically identify confounding tokens based on causal relationships in the training corpus. Then, in the second stage, it prunes these tokens during distillation to enact intervention, aligning the student's attention with the teacher's focus distribution on truly critical context tokens. Experimental results demonstrate that LeaF not only achieves an absolute improvement in various mathematical reasoning, code generation and multi-hop question answering benchmarks but also effectively suppresses attention to confounding tokens during inference, yielding a more interpretable and reliable reasoning model.

Deductive reasoning plays a pivotal role in the formulation of sound and cohesive arguments. It allows individuals to draw conclusions that logically follow, given the truth value of the information provided. Recent progress in the domain of large language models (LLMs) has showcased their capability in executing deductive reasoning tasks. Nonetheless, a significant portion of research primarily assesses the accuracy of LLMs in solving such tasks, often overlooking a deeper analysis of their reasoning behavior. In this study, we draw upon principles from cognitive psychology to examine inferential strategies employed by LLMs, through a detailed evaluation of their responses to propositional logic problems. Our findings indicate that LLMs display reasoning patterns akin to those observed in humans, including strategies like supposition following or chain construction. Moreover, our research demonstrates that the architecture and scale of the model significantly affect its preferred method of reasoning, with more advanced models tending to adopt strategies more frequently than less sophisticated ones. Importantly, we assert that a model's accuracy, that is the correctness of its final conclusion, does not necessarily reflect the validity of its reasoning process. This distinction underscores the necessity for more nuanced evaluation procedures in the field.

The mechanisms by which reasoning training reshapes LLMs' internal computations remain unclear. We study lightweight steering vectors inserted into the base model's residual stream and trained with a reinforcement-learning objective. These vectors match full fine-tuning performance while preserving the interpretability of small, additive interventions. Using logit-lens readouts and path-patching analyses on two models, we find that (i) the last-layer steering vector acts like a token-substitution bias concentrated on the first generated token, consistently boosting tokens such as "To" and "Step"; (ii) the penultimate-layer vector leaves attention patterns largely intact and instead operates through the MLP and unembedding, preferentially up-weighting process words and structure symbols; and (iii) middle layers de-emphasize non-English tokens. Next, we show that a SAE isolates features associated with correct generations. We also show that steering vectors (i) transfer to other models, (ii) combine across layers when trained in isolation, and (iii) concentrate magnitude on meaningful prompt segments under adaptive token-wise scaling. Taken together, these results deepen understanding of how trained steering vectors shape computation and should inform future work in activation engineering and the study of reasoning models.

Large language models (LLMs) have shown remarkable performance in reasoning tasks but face limitations in mathematical and complex logical reasoning. Existing methods to improve LLMs' logical capabilities either involve traceable or verifiable logical sequences that generate more reliable responses by constructing logical structures yet increase computational costs, or introduces rigid logic template rules, reducing flexibility. In this paper, we propose Reversal of Thought (RoT), a novel framework aimed at enhancing the logical reasoning abilities of LLMs. RoT utilizes a Preference-Guided Reverse Reasoning warm-up strategy, which integrates logical symbols for pseudocode planning through meta-cognitive mechanisms and pairwise preference self-evaluation to generate task-specific prompts solely through demonstrations, aligning with LLMs' cognitive preferences shaped by Reinforcement Learning with Human Feedback (RLHF). Through reverse reasoning, we ultilize a Cognitive Preference Manager to assess knowledge boundaries and further expand LLMs' reasoning capabilities by aggregating solution logic for known tasks and stylistic templates for unknown tasks. Experiments across various tasks demonstrate that RoT surpasses existing baselines in both reasoning accuracy and efficiency.

Recent advances in reasoning-centric models promise improved robustness through mechanisms such as chain-of-thought prompting and test-time scaling. However, their ability to withstand misleading user input remains underexplored. In this paper, we conduct a systematic evaluation of three state-of-the-art reasoning models, i.e., OpenAI's o4-mini, Claude-3.7-Sonnet and Gemini-2.5-Flash, across three multimodal benchmarks: MMMU, MathVista, and CharXiv. Our evaluation reveals significant accuracy drops (25-29% on average) following gaslighting negation prompts, indicating that even top-tier reasoning models struggle to preserve correct answers under manipulative user feedback. Built upon the insights of the evaluation and to further probe this vulnerability, we introduce GaslightingBench-R, a new diagnostic benchmark specifically designed to evaluate reasoning models' susceptibility to defend their belief under gaslighting negation prompt. Constructed by filtering and curating 1,025 challenging samples from the existing benchmarks, GaslightingBench-R induces even more dramatic failures, with accuracy drops exceeding 53% on average. Our findings reveal fundamental limitations in the robustness of reasoning models, highlighting the gap between step-by-step reasoning and belief persistence.

Recent advances in large reasoning models (LRMs) have enabled remarkable performance on complex tasks such as mathematics and coding by generating long Chain-of-Thought (CoT) traces. In this paper, we identify and systematically analyze a critical vulnerability we term reasoning distraction, where LRMs are diverted from their primary objective by irrelevant yet complex tasks maliciously embedded in the prompt. Through a comprehensive study across diverse models and benchmarks, we show that even state-of-the-art LRMs are highly susceptible, with injected distractors reducing task accuracy by up to 60%. We further reveal that certain alignment techniques can amplify this weakness and that models may exhibit covert compliance, following hidden adversarial instructions in reasoning while concealing them in the final output. To mitigate these risks, we propose a training-based defense that combines Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) and Reinforcement Learning (RL) on synthetic adversarial data, improving robustness by over 50 points on challenging distractor attacks. Our findings establish reasoning distraction as a distinct and urgent threat to LRM reliability and provide a practical step toward safer and more trustworthy reasoning systems.

Unified multimodal models (UMMs) have emerged as a powerful paradigm for seamlessly unifying text and image understanding and generation. However, prevailing evaluations treat these abilities in isolation, such that tasks with multimodal inputs and outputs are scored primarily through unimodal reasoning, i.e., textual benchmarks emphasize language-based reasoning, while visual benchmarks emphasize reasoning outcomes manifested in the pixels. We introduce ROVER to address this pressing need to test reciprocal cross-modal reasoning, the use of one modality to guide, verify, or refine outputs in the other, an ability central to the vision of unified multimodal intelligence. ROVER is a human-annotated benchmark that explicitly targets reciprocal cross-modal reasoning, which contains 1312 tasks grounded in 1876 images, spanning two complementary settings. Verbally-augmented reasoning for visual generation evaluates whether models can use verbal prompts and reasoning chains to guide faithful image synthesis. Visually-augmented reasoning for verbal generation evaluates whether models can generate intermediate visualizations that strengthen their own reasoning processes for question answering. Experiments on 17 unified models reveal two key findings: (i) Cross-modal reasoning determines visual generation quality, with interleaved models significantly outperforming non-interleaved ones; notably, combining strong unimodal models fails to achieve comparable reasoning. (ii) Models show dissociation between physical and symbolic reasoning: they succeed at interpreting perceptual concepts literally but fail to construct visual abstractions for symbolic tasks, where faulty reasoning harms performance. These results highlight reciprocal cross-modal reasoning as a critical frontier for enabling true omnimodal generation.

Recently, techniques such as explicit structured reasoning have demonstrated strong test-time scaling behavior by enforcing a separation between the model's internal "thinking" process and the final response. A key factor influencing answer quality in this setting is the length of the thinking stage. When the reasoning is too short, the model may fail to capture the complexity of the task. Conversely, when it is too long, the model may overthink, leading to unnecessary computation and degraded performance. This paper explores and exploits the underlying mechanisms by which LLMs understand and regulate the length of their reasoning during explicit thought processes. First, we show that LLMs encode their progress through the reasoning process and introduce an interactive progress bar visualization, which is then used to reveal insights on the model's planning dynamics. Second, we manipulate the internal progress encoding during inference to reduce unnecessary steps and generate a more concise and decisive chain of thoughts. Our empirical results demonstrate that this "overclocking" method mitigates overthinking, improves answer accuracy, and reduces inference latency. Our code is publicly available.

The ability of large language models (LLMs) to follow user instructions is central to their reliability, safety, and usefulness. While prior studies assess instruction adherence in the model's main responses, we argue that it is also critical for large reasoning models (LRMs) to follow user instructions throughout their reasoning process. Reasoning instruction following makes LRMs more controllable and transparent, while reducing risks of undesirable shortcuts, hallucinations, or reward hacking within reasoning traces. To evaluate this dimension, we introduce ReasonIF, a systematic benchmark for assessing reasoning instruction following. ReasonIF includes six categories of instruction prompts, spanning multilingual reasoning, formatting and length control. Across many open-source LRMs including GPT-OSS, Qwen3, and DeepSeek-R1, we find substantial failures in reasoning instruction adherence: the highest instruction following score (IFS) remains below 0.25, meaning that fewer than 25% of reasoning traces comply with the given instructions. Notably, as task difficulty increases, reasoning instruction following degrades further. We also explore two strategies to enhance reasoning instruction fidelity. (1) multi-turn reasoning and (2) Reasoning Instruction Finetuning (RIF) using synthetic data. RIF improves the IFS of GPT-OSS-20B from 0.11 to 0.27, indicating measurable progress but leaving ample room for improvement.

Significant advancements in the reasoning capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs) are now driven by test-time scaling laws, particularly those leveraging extended Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning. Inspired by these breakthroughs, researchers have extended these paradigms to Large Multimodal Models (LMMs). However, a critical limitation emerges: as their reasoning chains extend, LMMs increasingly rely on textual logic, progressively losing grounding in the underlying visual information. This leads to reasoning paths that diverge from the image content, culminating in erroneous conclusions. To address this, we introduce a strikingly simple yet effective training-free visual-reasoning pipeline. The core concept is to decouple the reasoning and perception processes. A powerful LLM orchestrates the high-level reasoning, strategically interrogating a LMM to extract specific visual information required for its logical chain. The LMM, in turn, functions exclusively as a visual question-answering engine, supplying the necessary perceptual details on demand. This lightweight, plug-and-play approach requires no additional training or architectural changes. Comprehensive evaluations validate that our framework effectively governs the visual reasoning process, leading to a significant reduction in visually-unfounded reasoning steps and a substantial improvement in reasoning fidelity.

Spatial cognition is essential for human intelligence, enabling problem-solving through visual simulations rather than solely relying on verbal reasoning. However, existing AI benchmarks primarily assess verbal reasoning, neglecting the complexities of non-verbal, multi-step visual simulation. We introduce STARE(Spatial Transformations and Reasoning Evaluation), a benchmark designed to rigorously evaluate multimodal large language models on tasks better solved through multi-step visual simulation. STARE features 4K tasks spanning foundational geometric transformations (2D and 3D), integrated spatial reasoning (cube net folding and tangram puzzles), and real-world spatial reasoning (perspective and temporal reasoning), reflecting practical cognitive challenges like object assembly, mechanical diagram interpretation, and everyday spatial navigation. Our evaluations show that models excel at reasoning over simpler 2D transformations, but perform close to random chance on more complex tasks like 3D cube net folding and tangram puzzles that require multi-step visual simulations. Humans achieve near-perfect accuracy but take considerable time (up to 28.9s) on complex tasks, significantly speeding up (down by 7.5 seconds on average) with intermediate visual simulations. In contrast, models exhibit inconsistent performance gains from visual simulations, improving on most tasks but declining in specific cases like tangram puzzles (GPT-4o, o1) and cube net folding (Claude-3.5, Gemini-2.0 Flash), indicating that models may not know how to effectively leverage intermediate visual information.

Sophisticated instrumentation for AI systems might have indicators that signal misalignment from human values, not unlike a "check engine" light in cars. One such indicator of misalignment is deceptiveness in generated responses. Future AI instrumentation may have the ability to detect when an LLM generates deceptive responses while reasoning about seemingly plausible but incorrect answers to factual questions. In this work, we demonstrate that linear probes on LLMs internal activations can detect deception in their responses with extremely high accuracy. Our probes reach a maximum of greater than 90% accuracy in distinguishing between deceptive and non-deceptive arguments generated by llama and qwen models ranging from 1.5B to 14B parameters, including their DeepSeek-r1 finetuned variants. We observe that probes on smaller models (1.5B) achieve chance accuracy at detecting deception, while larger models (greater than 7B) reach 70-80%, with their reasoning counterparts exceeding 90%. The layer-wise probe accuracy follows a three-stage pattern across layers: near-random (50%) in early layers, peaking in middle layers, and slightly declining in later layers. Furthermore, using an iterative null space projection approach, we find multitudes of linear directions that encode deception, ranging from 20 in Qwen 3B to nearly 100 in DeepSeek 7B and Qwen 14B models.

We study how large language models (LLMs) ``think'' through their representation space. We propose a novel geometric framework that models an LLM's reasoning as flows -- embedding trajectories evolving where logic goes. We disentangle logical structure from semantics by employing the same natural deduction propositions with varied semantic carriers, allowing us to test whether LLMs internalize logic beyond surface form. This perspective connects reasoning with geometric quantities such as position, velocity, and curvature, enabling formal analysis in representation and concept spaces. Our theory establishes: (1) LLM reasoning corresponds to smooth flows in representation space, and (2) logical statements act as local controllers of these flows' velocities. Using learned representation proxies, we design controlled experiments to visualize and quantify reasoning flows, providing empirical validation of our theoretical framework. Our work serves as both a conceptual foundation and practical tools for studying reasoning phenomenon, offering a new lens for interpretability and formal analysis of LLMs' behavior.

Despite notable advancements in multimodal reasoning, leading Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) still underperform on vision-centric multimodal reasoning tasks in general scenarios. This shortfall stems from their predominant reliance on logic- and knowledge-based slow thinking strategies, while effective for domains like math and science, fail to integrate visual information effectively during reasoning. Consequently, these models often fail to adequately ground visual cues, resulting in suboptimal performance in tasks that require multiple plausible visual interpretations and inferences. To address this, we present GThinker (General Thinker), a novel reasoning MLLM excelling in multimodal reasoning across general scenarios, mathematics, and science. GThinker introduces Cue-Rethinking, a flexible reasoning pattern that grounds inferences in visual cues and iteratively reinterprets these cues to resolve inconsistencies. Building on this pattern, we further propose a two-stage training pipeline, including pattern-guided cold start and incentive reinforcement learning, designed to enable multimodal reasoning capabilities across domains. Furthermore, to support the training, we construct GThinker-11K, comprising 7K high-quality, iteratively-annotated reasoning paths and 4K curated reinforcement learning samples, filling the data gap toward general multimodal reasoning. Extensive experiments demonstrate that GThinker achieves 81.5% on the challenging comprehensive multimodal reasoning benchmark M^3CoT, surpassing the latest O4-mini model. It also shows an average improvement of 2.1% on general scenario multimodal reasoning benchmarks, while maintaining on-par performance in mathematical reasoning compared to counterpart advanced reasoning models. The code, model, and data will be released soon at https://github.com/jefferyZhan/GThinker.

This paper introduces a novel approach to evaluating deep learning models' capacity for in-diagram logic interpretation. Leveraging the intriguing realm of visual illusions, we establish a unique dataset, InDL, designed to rigorously test and benchmark these models. Deep learning has witnessed remarkable progress in domains such as computer vision and natural language processing. However, models often stumble in tasks requiring logical reasoning due to their inherent 'black box' characteristics, which obscure the decision-making process. Our work presents a new lens to understand these models better by focusing on their handling of visual illusions -- a complex interplay of perception and logic. We utilize six classic geometric optical illusions to create a comparative framework between human and machine visual perception. This methodology offers a quantifiable measure to rank models, elucidating potential weaknesses and providing actionable insights for model improvements. Our experimental results affirm the efficacy of our benchmarking strategy, demonstrating its ability to effectively rank models based on their logic interpretation ability. As part of our commitment to reproducible research, the source code and datasets will be made publicly available at https://github.com/rabbit-magic-wh/InDL

Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable progress in reasoning, yet sometimes produce responses that are suboptimal for users in tasks such as writing, information seeking, or providing practical guidance. Conventional alignment practices typically assume that maximizing model reward also maximizes user welfare, but this assumption frequently fails in practice: models may over-clarify or generate overly verbose reasoning when users prefer concise answers. Such behaviors resemble the prisoner's dilemma, where individually rational choices lead to socially suboptimal outcomes. The fundamental challenge is the lack of a principled decision making mechanism that mutually benefits both the LLM and the user. We propose Game-Theoretic Alignment (GTAlign), an alignment framework that integrates game-theoretic decision making into both reasoning and training. During reasoning, the model explicitly treats user-LLM interaction as a strategic game: it constructs payoff matrices within its reasoning chain to estimate welfare for both itself and the user, and then selects actions that are mutually beneficial. During training, we introduce a mutual welfare reward that reinforces cooperative responses, aligning model behavior with socially efficient outcomes. In addition, we introduce an inference technique that leverages game-theoretic reasoning to dynamically adapt LLM's response when pricing policies of LLM service change. Extensive experiments demonstrate that GTAlign substantially improves reasoning efficiency, answer quality, and mutual welfare compared to baselines across diverse tasks. The code is available at https://github.com/ulab-uiuc/GTAlign .

Large language models (LLMs) achieve good performance on challenging reasoning benchmarks, yet could also make basic reasoning mistakes. This contrasting behavior is puzzling when it comes to understanding the mechanisms behind LLMs' reasoning capabilities. One hypothesis is that the increasingly high and nearly saturated performance on common reasoning benchmarks could be due to the memorization of similar problems. In this paper, we systematically investigate this hypothesis with a quantitative measurement of memorization in reasoning tasks, using a dynamically generated logical reasoning benchmark based on Knights and Knaves (K&K) puzzles. We found that LLMs could interpolate the training puzzles (achieving near-perfect accuracy) after fine-tuning, yet fail when those puzzles are slightly perturbed, suggesting that the models heavily rely on memorization to solve those training puzzles. On the other hand, we show that while fine-tuning leads to heavy memorization, it also consistently improves generalization performance. In-depth analyses with perturbation tests, cross difficulty-level transferability, probing model internals, and fine-tuning with wrong answers suggest that the LLMs learn to reason on K&K puzzles despite training data memorization. This phenomenon indicates that LLMs exhibit a complex interplay between memorization and genuine reasoning abilities. Finally, our analysis with per-sample memorization score sheds light on how LLMs switch between reasoning and memorization in solving logical puzzles. Our code and data are available at https://memkklogic.github.io.

Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) architectures within Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have achieved impressive reasoning capabilities by selectively activating experts to facilitate structured cognitive processes. Despite notable advances, existing reasoning models often suffer from cognitive inefficiencies like overthinking and underthinking. To address these limitations, we introduce a novel inference-time steering methodology called Reinforcing Cognitive Experts (RICE), designed to improve reasoning performance without additional training or complex heuristics. Leveraging normalized Pointwise Mutual Information (nPMI), we systematically identify specialized experts, termed ''cognitive experts'' that orchestrate meta-level reasoning operations characterized by tokens like ''<think>''. Empirical evaluations with leading MoE-based LRMs (DeepSeek-R1 and Qwen3-235B) on rigorous quantitative and scientific reasoning benchmarks demonstrate noticeable and consistent improvements in reasoning accuracy, cognitive efficiency, and cross-domain generalization. Crucially, our lightweight approach substantially outperforms prevalent reasoning-steering techniques, such as prompt design and decoding constraints, while preserving the model's general instruction-following skills. These results highlight reinforcing cognitive experts as a promising, practical, and interpretable direction to enhance cognitive efficiency within advanced reasoning models.

Multimodal symbolic logical reasoning, which aims to deduce new facts from multimodal input via formal logic, is critical in high-stakes applications such as autonomous driving and medical diagnosis, as its rigorous, deterministic reasoning helps prevent serious consequences. To evaluate such capabilities of current state-of-the-art vision language models (VLMs), we introduce the first benchmark MuSLR for multimodal symbolic logical reasoning grounded in formal logical rules. MuSLR comprises 1,093 instances across 7 domains, including 35 atomic symbolic logic and 976 logical combinations, with reasoning depths ranging from 2 to 9. We evaluate 7 state-of-the-art VLMs on MuSLR and find that they all struggle with multimodal symbolic reasoning, with the best model, GPT-4.1, achieving only 46.8%. Thus, we propose LogiCAM, a modular framework that applies formal logical rules to multimodal inputs, boosting GPT-4.1's Chain-of-Thought performance by 14.13%, and delivering even larger gains on complex logics such as first-order logic. We also conduct a comprehensive error analysis, showing that around 70% of failures stem from logical misalignment between modalities, offering key insights to guide future improvements. All data and code are publicly available at https://llm-symbol.github.io/MuSLR.

Large language models (LLMs) are becoming deeply embedded in human communication and decision-making, yet they inherit the ambiguity, bias, and lack of direct access to truth inherent in language itself. While their outputs are fluent, emotionally resonant, and coherent, they are generated through statistical prediction rather than grounded reasoning. This creates the risk of hallucination, responses that sound convincing but lack factual validity. Building on Geoffrey Hinton's observation that AI mirrors human intuition rather than reasoning, this paper argues that LLMs operationalize System 1 cognition at scale: fast, associative, and persuasive, but without reflection or falsification. To address this, we introduce the Rose-Frame, a three-dimensional framework for diagnosing cognitive and epistemic drift in human-AI interaction. The three axes are: (i) Map vs. Territory, which distinguishes representations of reality (epistemology) from reality itself (ontology); (ii) Intuition vs. Reason, drawing on dual-process theory to separate fast, emotional judgments from slow, reflective thinking; and (iii) Conflict vs. Confirmation, which examines whether ideas are critically tested through disagreement or simply reinforced through mutual validation. Each dimension captures a distinct failure mode, and their combination amplifies misalignment. Rose-Frame does not attempt to fix LLMs with more data or rules. Instead, it offers a reflective tool that makes both the model's limitations and the user's assumptions visible, enabling more transparent and critically aware AI deployment. It reframes alignment as cognitive governance: intuition, whether human or artificial, must remain governed by human reason. Only by embedding reflective, falsifiable oversight can we align machine fluency with human understanding.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) with multi-step reasoning capabilities have shown remarkable problem-solving abilities, yet they exhibit concerning safety vulnerabilities that remain poorly understood. In this work, we investigate why safety alignment fails in reasoning models through a mechanistic interpretability lens. Using a linear probing approach to trace refusal intentions across token positions, we discover a striking phenomenon termed as refusal cliff: many poorly-aligned reasoning models correctly identify harmful prompts and maintain strong refusal intentions during their thinking process, but experience a sharp drop in refusal scores at the final tokens before output generation. This suggests that these models are not inherently unsafe; rather, their refusal intentions are systematically suppressed. Through causal intervention analysis, we identify a sparse set of attention heads that negatively contribute to refusal behavior. Ablating just 3\% of these heads can reduce attack success rates below 10\%. Building on these mechanistic insights, we propose Cliff-as-a-Judge, a novel data selection method that identifies training examples exhibiting the largest refusal cliff to efficiently repair reasoning models' safety alignment. This approach achieves comparable safety improvements using only 1.7\% of the vanilla safety training data, demonstrating a less-is-more effect in safety alignment.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are expected to provide helpful and harmless responses, yet they often exhibit sycophancy--conforming to user beliefs regardless of factual accuracy or ethical soundness. Prior research on sycophancy has primarily focused on single-turn factual correctness, overlooking the dynamics of real-world interactions. In this work, we introduce SYCON Bench, a novel benchmark for evaluating sycophantic behavior in multi-turn, free-form conversational settings. Our benchmark measures how quickly a model conforms to the user (Turn of Flip) and how frequently it shifts its stance under sustained user pressure (Number of Flip). Applying SYCON Bench to 17 LLMs across three real-world scenarios, we find that sycophancy remains a prevalent failure mode. Our analysis shows that alignment tuning amplifies sycophantic behavior, whereas model scaling and reasoning optimization strengthen the model's ability to resist undesirable user views. Reasoning models generally outperform instruction-tuned models but often fail when they over-index on logical exposition instead of directly addressing the user's underlying beliefs. Finally, we evaluate four additional prompting strategies and demonstrate that adopting a third-person perspective reduces sycophancy by up to 63.8% in debate scenario. We release our code and data at https://github.com/JiseungHong/SYCON-Bench.

Visual mathematical reasoning, as a fundamental visual reasoning ability, has received widespread attention from the Large Multimodal Models (LMMs) community. Existing benchmarks, such as MathVista and MathVerse, focus more on the result-oriented performance but neglect the underlying principles in knowledge acquisition and generalization. Inspired by human-like mathematical reasoning, we introduce WE-MATH, the first benchmark specifically designed to explore the problem-solving principles beyond end-to-end performance. We meticulously collect and categorize 6.5K visual math problems, spanning 67 hierarchical knowledge concepts and five layers of knowledge granularity. We decompose composite problems into sub-problems according to the required knowledge concepts and introduce a novel four-dimensional metric, namely Insufficient Knowledge (IK), Inadequate Generalization (IG), Complete Mastery (CM), and Rote Memorization (RM), to hierarchically assess inherent issues in LMMs' reasoning process. With WE-MATH, we conduct a thorough evaluation of existing LMMs in visual mathematical reasoning and reveal a negative correlation between solving steps and problem-specific performance. We confirm the IK issue of LMMs can be effectively improved via knowledge augmentation strategies. More notably, the primary challenge of GPT-4o has significantly transitioned from IK to IG, establishing it as the first LMM advancing towards the knowledge generalization stage. In contrast, other LMMs exhibit a marked inclination towards Rote Memorization - they correctly solve composite problems involving multiple knowledge concepts yet fail to answer sub-problems. We anticipate that WE-MATH will open new pathways for advancements in visual mathematical reasoning for LMMs. The WE-MATH data and evaluation code are available at https://github.com/We-Math/We-Math.

Large Language Models have demonstrated strong performance on many established reasoning benchmarks. However, these benchmarks primarily evaluate structured skills like quantitative problem-solving, leaving a gap in assessing flexible, multifaceted reasoning abilities that are central to human intelligence. These abilities require integrating logical deduction with spatial awareness and constraint satisfaction, which current evaluations do not measure well. To address this, we introduce RiddleBench, a benchmark of 1,737 challenging puzzles in English designed to probe these core reasoning capabilities. Evaluation of state-of-the-art models on RiddleBench shows fundamental weaknesses. Even top proprietary models like Gemini 2.5 Pro, o3, and Claude 4 Sonnet achieve accuracy just above 60% (60.30%, 63.37%, and 63.16%). Analysis further reveals deep failures, including hallucination cascades (accepting flawed reasoning from other models) and poor self-correction due to a strong self-confirmation bias. Their reasoning is also fragile, with performance degrading significantly when constraints are reordered or irrelevant information is introduced. RiddleBench functions as a diagnostic tool for these issues and as a resource for guiding the development of more robust and reliable language models.

Large language models (LLMs) such as OpenAI's o1 have demonstrated remarkable abilities in complex reasoning tasks by scaling test-time compute and exhibiting human-like deep thinking. However, we identify a phenomenon we term underthinking, where o1-like LLMs frequently switch between different reasoning thoughts without sufficiently exploring promising paths to reach a correct solution. This behavior leads to inadequate depth of reasoning and decreased performance, particularly on challenging mathematical problems. To systematically analyze this issue, we conduct experiments on three challenging test sets and two representative open-source o1-like models, revealing that frequent thought switching correlates with incorrect responses. We introduce a novel metric to quantify underthinking by measuring token efficiency in incorrect answers. To address underthinking, we propose a decoding strategy with thought switching penalty TIP that discourages premature transitions between thoughts, encouraging deeper exploration of each reasoning path. Experimental results demonstrate that our approach improves accuracy across challenging datasets without requiring model fine-tuning. Our findings contribute to understanding reasoning inefficiencies in o1-like LLMs and offer a practical solution to enhance their problem-solving capabilities.

Recent advancements in Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs), particularly through Reinforcement Learning with Verifiable Rewards (RLVR), have significantly enhanced their reasoning abilities. However, a critical gap persists: these models struggle with dynamic spatial interactions, a capability essential for real-world applications. To bridge this gap, we introduce M2-Reasoning-7B, a model designed to excel in both general and spatial reasoning. Our approach integrates two key innovations: (1) a novel data pipeline that generates 294.2K high-quality data samples (168K for cold-start fine-tuning and 126.2K for RLVR), which feature logically coherent reasoning trajectories and have undergone comprehensive assessment; and (2) a dynamic multi-task training strategy with step-wise optimization to mitigate conflicts between data, and task-specific rewards for delivering tailored incentive signals. This combination of curated data and advanced training allows M2-Reasoning-7B to set a new state-of-the-art (SOTA) across 8 benchmarks, showcasing superior performance in both general and spatial reasoning domains.

Large Language Models (LLMs) demonstrate impressive reasoning capabilities in familiar contexts, but struggle when the context conflicts with their parametric knowledge. To investigate this phenomenon, we introduce CounterLogic, a dataset containing 1,800 examples across 9 logical schemas, explicitly designed to evaluate logical reasoning through counterfactual (hypothetical knowledge-conflicting) scenarios. Our systematic evaluation of 11 LLMs across 6 different datasets reveals a consistent performance degradation, with accuracies dropping by 27% on average when reasoning through counterfactual information. We propose Self-Segregate, a prompting method enabling metacognitive awareness (explicitly identifying knowledge conflicts) before reasoning. Our method dramatically narrows the average performance gaps from 27% to just 11%, while significantly increasing the overall accuracy (+7.5%). We discuss the implications of these findings and draw parallels to human cognitive processes, particularly on how humans disambiguate conflicting information during reasoning tasks. Our findings offer practical insights for understanding and enhancing LLMs reasoning capabilities in real-world applications, especially where models must logically reason independently of their factual knowledge.

Reasoning has emerged as a pivotal capability in Large Language Models (LLMs). Through Reinforcement Learning (RL), typically Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO), these models are able to solve complex tasks such as mathematics and code generation. Building on these advances, recent research has sought to extend reasoning to Vision-Language Models (VLMs), yielding promising results across diverse visual tasks. Despite this progress, our study uncovers the dual nature of multimodal reasoning: while it substantially enhances logical inference and facilitates performance on challenging problems, it may gradually impair perceptual grounding, leading to recognition failures on otherwise basic visual questions. Through further analysis, we attribute this phenomenon to visual forgetting, wherein prolonged reasoning causes the model to increasingly disregard visual input. To address this, we propose Vision-Anchored Policy Optimization (VAPO), a simple yet effective method that explicitly steers the reasoning process toward visually grounded trajectories. Our result model, VAPO-Thinker-7B, significantly strengthens the model's reliance on visual information and achieves new state-of-the-art results on a wide range of established benchmarks. Project page: https://xytian1008.github.io/VAPO/

Although large multimodal models (LMMs) have demonstrated remarkable capabilities in visual scene interpretation and reasoning, their capacity for complex and precise 3-dimensional spatial reasoning remains uncertain. Existing benchmarks focus predominantly on 2D spatial understanding and lack a framework to comprehensively evaluate 6D spatial reasoning across varying complexities. To address this limitation, we present PulseCheck457, a scalable and unbiased synthetic dataset designed with 4 key capability for spatial reasoning: multi-object recognition, 2D location, 3D location, and 3D orientation. We develop a cascading evaluation structure, constructing 7 question types across 5 difficulty levels that range from basic single object recognition to our new proposed complex 6D spatial reasoning tasks. We evaluated various large multimodal models (LMMs) on PulseCheck457, observing a general decline in performance as task complexity increases, particularly in 3D reasoning and 6D spatial tasks. To quantify these challenges, we introduce the Relative Performance Dropping Rate (RPDR), highlighting key weaknesses in 3D reasoning capabilities. Leveraging the unbiased attribute design of our dataset, we also uncover prediction biases across different attributes, with similar patterns observed in real-world image settings.

The remarkable capabilities of modern large reasoning models are largely unlocked through post-training techniques such as supervised fine-tuning and reinforcement learning. However, the architectural mechanisms behind such improvements remain largely opaque. In this work, we use circuit analysis to demonstrate that post-training for complex reasoning sparks the emergence of novel, functionally specialized attention heads. These heads collectively support structured reasoning and computation. Our comparative analysis across Qwen families and DeepSeek-distilled model reveals that these emergent heads evolve differently under different training regimes. Distillation and SFT foster a cumulative addition of stable reasoning heads. In contrast, group relative policy optimization operates in a dynamic search mode: relatively few attention heads are iteratively activated, evaluated, and pruned, with their survival closely tracking fluctuations in the task reward signal. Furthermore, we find that controllable think on/off models do not possess dedicated thinking heads. Instead, turning off explicit reasoning triggers a broader-but less efficient-set of compensatory heads. Through ablation and qualitative analyses, we connect these circuit-level dynamics to a crucial performance trade-off: strengthened heads enable sophisticated problem-solving strategies for difficult problems but can also introduce over-thinking failure modes, such as calculation errors or logical loops on simpler tasks. These findings connect circuit-level dynamics to macro-level performance, identifying an inherent tension where complex reasoning comes at the cost of elementary computations. More broadly, our work points to future directions for training policy design, emphasizing the need to balance the development of effective reasoning strategies with the assurance of reliable, flawless execution.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) like DeepSeek-R1 and OpenAI-o1 have demonstrated remarkable reasoning capabilities, raising important questions about their biases in LLM-as-a-judge settings. We present a comprehensive benchmark comparing judging biases between LLMs and LRMs across both subjective preference-alignment datasets and objective fact-based datasets. Through investigation of bandwagon, authority, position, and distraction biases, we uncover four key findings: (1) despite their advanced reasoning capabilities, LRMs remain susceptible to the above biases; (2) LRMs demonstrate better robustness than LLMs specifically on fact-related datasets; (3) LRMs exhibit notable position bias, preferring options in later positions; and (4) we identify a novel "superficial reflection bias" where phrases mimicking reasoning (e.g., "wait, let me think...") significantly influence model judgments. To address these biases, we design and evaluate three mitigation strategies: specialized system prompts that reduce judging biases by up to 19\% in preference alignment datasets and 14\% in fact-related datasets, in-context learning that provides up to 27\% improvement on preference tasks but shows inconsistent results on factual tasks, and a self-reflection mechanism that reduces biases by up to 10\% in preference datasets and 16\% in fact-related datasets, with self-reflection proving particularly effective for LRMs. Our work provides crucial insights for developing more reliable LLM-as-a-Judge frameworks, especially as LRMs become increasingly deployed as automated judges.

Recent years have witnessed significant progress in large language models' (LLMs) reasoning, which is largely due to the chain-of-thought (CoT) approaches, allowing models to generate intermediate reasoning steps before reaching the final answer. Building on these advances, state-of-the-art LLMs are instruction-tuned to provide long and detailed CoT pathways when responding to reasoning-related questions. However, human beings are naturally cognitive misers and will prompt language models to give rather short responses, thus raising a significant conflict with CoT reasoning. In this paper, we delve into how LLMs' reasoning performance changes when users provide short-path prompts. The results and analysis reveal that language models can reason effectively and robustly without explicit CoT prompts, while under short-path prompting, LLMs' reasoning ability drops significantly and becomes unstable, even on grade-school problems. To address this issue, we propose two approaches: an instruction-guided approach and a fine-tuning approach, both designed to effectively manage the conflict. Experimental results show that both methods achieve high accuracy, providing insights into the trade-off between instruction adherence and reasoning accuracy in current models.

Recent advancements in large language models (LLMs) have significantly advanced complex reasoning capabilities, particularly through extended chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning that incorporates mechanisms such as backtracking, self-reflection and self-correction. Despite these developments, the self-correction abilities of LLMs during long CoT reasoning remain underexplored. And recent findings on overthinking suggest that such models often engage in unnecessarily redundant reasoning. In this work, we empirically show that the first reasoning step exerts a disproportionately large influence on the final prediction - errors introduced at this stage can substantially degrade subsequent reasoning quality. This phenomenon is consistently observed across two state-of-the-art open-source reasoning model families: DeepSeek-R1 and Qwen3. To address this, we propose an efficient sampling strategy that leverages a reward model to identify and retain high-quality first reasoning steps while discarding suboptimal ones, achieving up to a 70% reduction in inference cost without sacrificing accuracy. Finally, we introduce a new benchmark specifically constructed with deliberately flawed first reasoning steps to systematically evaluate model self-correction capabilities, offering a foundation for future research on robust reasoning in LLMs.

Does RL teach LLMs genuinely new skills, or does it merely activate existing ones? This question lies at the core of ongoing debates about the role of RL in LLM post-training. On one side, strong empirical results can be achieved with RL even without preceding supervised finetuning; on the other, critics argue that RL contributes little beyond reweighting existing reasoning strategies. This work provides concrete evidence that LLMs can acquire genuinely new skills during RL by composing existing ones, mirroring one of the central mechanisms by which humans acquire new cognitive skills. To mitigate data contamination and other confounding factors, and to allow precise control over task complexity, we develop a synthetic framework for our investigation. Specifically, we define a skill as the ability to infer the output of a string transformation function f(x) given x. When an LLM has already learned f and g prior to RL, our experiments reveal that RL enables it to learn unseen compositions of them h(x)=g(f(x)). Further, this compositional ability generalizes to more difficult problems such as compositions of >2 functions unseen during RL training. Surprisingly, our experiments show that compositional skill acquired on a source task transfers to a different target task. This transfer happens even without compositional training on the target, requiring only prior knowledge of the target's atomic skills. Our qualitative analysis shows that RL fundamentally changes the reasoning behaviors of the models. In contrast, next-token training with the same data yields none of these findings. Our systematic experiments provide fresh insights into LLM learning, suggesting the value of first building base models with basic skills, then using RL to incentivize advanced, generalizable skills for complex problems.

Recent advancements in Large Language Models (LLMs) have significantly enhanced their ability to perform complex reasoning tasks, transitioning from fast and intuitive thinking (System 1) to slow and deep reasoning (System 2). While System 2 reasoning improves task accuracy, it often incurs substantial computational costs due to its slow thinking nature and inefficient or unnecessary reasoning behaviors. In contrast, System 1 reasoning is computationally efficient but leads to suboptimal performance. Consequently, it is critical to balance the trade-off between performance (benefits) and computational costs (budgets), giving rise to the concept of reasoning economy. In this survey, we provide a comprehensive analysis of reasoning economy in both the post-training and test-time inference stages of LLMs, encompassing i) the cause of reasoning inefficiency, ii) behavior analysis of different reasoning patterns, and iii) potential solutions to achieve reasoning economy. By offering actionable insights and highlighting open challenges, we aim to shed light on strategies for improving the reasoning economy of LLMs, thereby serving as a valuable resource for advancing research in this evolving area. We also provide a public repository to continually track developments in this fast-evolving field.

Recent reasoning large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable improvements in mathematical reasoning capabilities through long Chain-of-Thought. The reasoning tokens of these models enable self-correction within reasoning chains, enhancing robustness. This motivates our exploration: how vulnerable are reasoning LLMs to subtle errors in their input reasoning chains? We introduce "Compromising Thought" (CPT), a vulnerability where models presented with reasoning tokens containing manipulated calculation results tend to ignore correct reasoning steps and adopt incorrect results instead. Through systematic evaluation across multiple reasoning LLMs, we design three increasingly explicit prompting methods to measure CPT resistance, revealing that models struggle significantly to identify and correct these manipulations. Notably, contrary to existing research suggesting structural alterations affect model performance more than content modifications, we find that local ending token manipulations have greater impact on reasoning outcomes than structural changes. Moreover, we discover a security vulnerability in DeepSeek-R1 where tampered reasoning tokens can trigger complete reasoning cessation. Our work enhances understanding of reasoning robustness and highlights security considerations for reasoning-intensive applications.

Existing reasoning segmentation approaches typically fine-tune multimodal large language models (MLLMs) using image-text pairs and corresponding mask labels. However, they exhibit limited generalization to out-of-distribution scenarios without an explicit reasoning process. Although recent efforts leverage reinforcement learning through group-relative policy optimization (GRPO) to enhance reasoning ability, they often suffer from overthinking - producing uniformly verbose reasoning chains irrespective of task complexity. This results in elevated computational costs and limited control over reasoning quality. To address this problem, we propose PixelThink, a simple yet effective scheme that integrates externally estimated task difficulty and internally measured model uncertainty to regulate reasoning generation within a reinforcement learning paradigm. The model learns to compress reasoning length in accordance with scene complexity and predictive confidence. To support comprehensive evaluation, we introduce ReasonSeg-Diff, an extended benchmark with annotated reasoning references and difficulty scores, along with a suite of metrics designed to assess segmentation accuracy, reasoning quality, and efficiency jointly. Experimental results demonstrate that the proposed approach improves both reasoning efficiency and overall segmentation performance. Our work contributes novel perspectives towards efficient and interpretable multimodal understanding. The code and model will be publicly available.

Vision-Language Models (VLMs) excel at many multimodal tasks, yet their cognitive processes remain opaque on complex lateral thinking challenges like rebus puzzles. While recent work has demonstrated these models struggle significantly with rebus puzzle solving, the underlying reasoning processes and failure patterns remain largely unexplored. We address this gap through a comprehensive explainability analysis that moves beyond performance metrics to understand how VLMs approach these complex lateral thinking challenges. Our study contributes a systematically annotated dataset of 221 rebus puzzles across six cognitive categories, paired with an evaluation framework that separates reasoning quality from answer correctness. We investigate three prompting strategies designed to elicit different types of explanatory processes and reveal critical insights into VLM cognitive processes. Our findings demonstrate that reasoning quality varies dramatically across puzzle categories, with models showing systematic strengths in visual composition while exhibiting fundamental limitations in absence interpretation and cultural symbolism. We also discover that prompting strategy substantially influences both cognitive approach and problem-solving effectiveness, establishing explainability as an integral component of model performance rather than a post-hoc consideration.

Large Language Models (LLMs) trained via Reinforcement Learning (RL) have recently achieved impressive results on reasoning benchmarks. Yet, growing evidence shows that these models often generate longer but ineffective chains of thought (CoTs), calling into question whether benchmark gains reflect real reasoning improvements. We present new evidence of overthinking, where models disregard correct solutions even when explicitly provided, instead continuing to generate unnecessary reasoning steps that often lead to incorrect conclusions. Experiments on three state-of-the-art models using the AIME2024 math benchmark reveal critical limitations in these models ability to integrate corrective information, posing new challenges for achieving robust and interpretable reasoning.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) have demonstrated impressive capabilities in complex problem-solving, yet their internal reasoning mechanisms remain poorly understood. In this paper, we investigate the reasoning trajectories of LRMs from an information-theoretic perspective. By tracking how mutual information (MI) between intermediate representations and the correct answer evolves during LRM reasoning, we observe an interesting MI peaks phenomenon: the MI at specific generative steps exhibits a sudden and significant increase during LRM's reasoning process. We theoretically analyze such phenomenon and show that as MI increases, the probability of model's prediction error decreases. Furthermore, these MI peaks often correspond to tokens expressing reflection or transition, such as ``Hmm'', ``Wait'' and ``Therefore,'' which we term as the thinking tokens. We then demonstrate that these thinking tokens are crucial for LRM's reasoning performance, while other tokens has minimal impacts. Building on these analyses, we propose two simple yet effective methods to improve LRM's reasoning performance, by delicately leveraging these thinking tokens. Overall, our work provides novel insights into the reasoning mechanisms of LRMs and offers practical ways to improve their reasoning capabilities. The code is available at https://github.com/ChnQ/MI-Peaks.

Recent large language models have shown promising capabilities in long-form reasoning, following structured chains of thought before arriving at a final answer. However, we observe that these reasoning paths tend to include substantial redundancy; analyzing attention patterns reveals that attention scores are widely scattered, particularly incorrect answers exhibit greater attention sparsity. In this paper, we demonstrate that deliberately removing this redundancy in the reasoning process significantly improves performance through clear thinking, i.e., removing distraction. Specifically, we systematically identify reasoning redundancy by measuring token-level attention scores to a special end-of-thinking token, which is appended to an explicit instruction inserted to conclude each intermediate reasoning step. Furthermore, we propose structure-aware pruning that prioritizes removing tokens in low-contributing reasoning chunks over individual tokens. After evicting redundant tokens, we remove the injected end-of-thinking instruction, then resume the reasoning generation. We demonstrate that our method significantly improves overall accuracy across reasoning-intensive benchmarks without any training involved. In particular, our method shows strong performance on challenging mathematical competition benchmarks such as AIME and AMC, where reasoning redundancy is more prevalent.

Vision Language Models (VLMs) exhibit a fundamental semantic-to-geometric gap in spatial reasoning: they excel at qualitative semantic inference but their reasoning operates within a lossy semantic space, misaligned with high-fidelity geometry. Current paradigms fail to bridge this gap. Training-based methods suffer from an ``oracle paradox,'' learning flawed spatial logic from imperfect oracles. Tool-integrated methods constrain the final computation but critically leave the VLM's planning process unconstrained, resulting in geometrically flawed plans. In this work, we propose Geometrically-Constrained Agent (GCA), a training-free agentic paradigm that resolves this gap by introducing a formal task constraint. Specifically, we strategically decouples the VLM's role into two stages. First, acting as a semantic analyst, the VLM translates the user's ambiguous query into the formal, verifiable task constraint, which defines the reference frame and objective. Second, acting as a task solver, the VLM generates and executes tool calls strictly within the deterministic bounds defined by the constraint. This geometrically-constrained reasoning strategy successfully resolve the semantic-to-geometric gap, yielding a robust and verifiable reasoning pathway for spatial reasoning. Comprehensive experiments demonstrate that GCA achieves SOTA performance on multiple spatial reasoning benchmarks, surpassing existing training-based and tool-integrated methods by ~27%. Please see our homepage at https://gca-spatial-reasoning.github.io.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) have recently demonstrated impressive capabilities in complex reasoning tasks by leveraging increased test-time computation and exhibiting behaviors reminiscent of human-like self-reflection. While LRMs show a clear capacity for valuable self-reflection, how this ability interacts with other model behaviors remains underexplored. We investigate this connection by analyzing verbalized confidence, how models articulate their certainty, as a lens into the nature of self-reflection in LRMs. We find that supervised fine-tuning on reasoning traces (i.e., distillation) and reinforcement learning can improve verbalized calibration in reasoning-intensive settings in a progressive, laddered fashion. However, our results also indicate that reasoning models may possess a diminished awareness of their own knowledge boundaries, as evidenced by significantly lower "I don't know" response rates on factuality benchmarks. Moreover, we examine the relationship between verbalized confidence and reasoning chains, finding that models tend to express higher confidence when providing shorter or less elaborate reasoning. Our findings highlight how reasoning-oriented training can enhance performance in reasoning-centric tasks while potentially incurring a "reasoning tax," a cost reflected in the model's reduced ability to accurately recognize the limits of its own knowledge in small-scale models. More broadly, our work showcases how this erosion of knowledge boundaries can compromise model faithfulness, as models grow more confident without a commensurate understanding of when they should abstain.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) already possess a latent capacity for long chain-of-thought reasoning. Prior work has shown that outcome-based reinforcement learning (RL) can incidentally elicit advanced reasoning behaviors such as self-correction, backtracking, and verification phenomena often referred to as the model's "aha moment". However, the timing and consistency of these emergent behaviors remain unpredictable and uncontrollable, limiting the scalability and reliability of LRMs' reasoning capabilities. To address these limitations, we move beyond reliance on prompts and coincidental "aha moments". Instead, we explicitly align models with three meta-abilities: deduction, induction, and abduction, using automatically generated, self-verifiable tasks. Our three stage-pipeline individual alignment, parameter-space merging, and domain-specific reinforcement learning, boosting performance by over 10\% relative to instruction-tuned baselines. Furthermore, domain-specific RL from the aligned checkpoint yields an additional 2\% average gain in the performance ceiling across math, coding, and science benchmarks, demonstrating that explicit meta-ability alignment offers a scalable and dependable foundation for reasoning. Code is available at: https://github.com/zhiyuanhubj/Meta-Ability-Alignment

Hallucinations (i.e., generating plausible but inaccurate content) and laziness (i.e. excessive refusals or defaulting to "I don't know") persist as major challenges in LLM reasoning. Current efforts to reduce hallucinations primarily focus on factual errors in knowledge-grounded tasks, often neglecting hallucinations related to faulty reasoning. Meanwhile, some approaches render LLMs overly conservative, limiting their problem-solving capabilities. To mitigate hallucination and laziness in reasoning tasks, we propose Automatic Curriculum Expert Iteration (Auto-CEI) to enhance LLM reasoning and align responses to the model's capabilities--assertively answering within its limits and declining when tasks exceed them. In our method, Expert Iteration explores the reasoning trajectories near the LLM policy, guiding incorrect paths back on track to reduce compounding errors and improve robustness; it also promotes appropriate "I don't know" responses after sufficient reasoning attempts. The curriculum automatically adjusts rewards, incentivizing extended reasoning before acknowledging incapability, thereby pushing the limits of LLM reasoning and aligning its behaviour with these limits. We compare Auto-CEI with various SOTA baselines across logical reasoning, mathematics, and planning tasks, where Auto-CEI achieves superior alignment by effectively balancing assertiveness and conservativeness.

Current multimodal benchmarks often conflate reasoning with domain-specific knowledge, making it difficult to isolate and evaluate general reasoning abilities in non-expert settings. To address this, we introduce VisualPuzzles, a benchmark that targets visual reasoning while deliberately minimizing reliance on specialized knowledge. VisualPuzzles consists of diverse questions spanning five categories: algorithmic, analogical, deductive, inductive, and spatial reasoning. One major source of our questions is manually translated logical reasoning questions from the Chinese Civil Service Examination. Experiments show that VisualPuzzles requires significantly less intensive domain-specific knowledge and more complex reasoning compared to benchmarks like MMMU, enabling us to better evaluate genuine multimodal reasoning. Evaluations show that state-of-the-art multimodal large language models consistently lag behind human performance on VisualPuzzles, and that strong performance on knowledge-intensive benchmarks does not necessarily translate to success on reasoning-focused, knowledge-light tasks. Additionally, reasoning enhancements such as scaling up inference compute (with "thinking" modes) yield inconsistent gains across models and task types, and we observe no clear correlation between model size and performance. We also found that models exhibit different reasoning and answering patterns on VisualPuzzles compared to benchmarks with heavier emphasis on knowledge. VisualPuzzles offers a clearer lens through which to evaluate reasoning capabilities beyond factual recall and domain knowledge.

Logical reasoning is a fundamental aspect of human intelligence and an essential capability for multimodal large language models (MLLMs). Despite the significant advancement in multimodal reasoning, existing benchmarks fail to comprehensively evaluate their reasoning abilities due to the lack of explicit categorization for logical reasoning types and an unclear understanding of reasoning. To address these issues, we introduce MME-Reasoning, a comprehensive benchmark designed to evaluate the reasoning ability of MLLMs, which covers all three types of reasoning (i.e., inductive, deductive, and abductive) in its questions. We carefully curate the data to ensure that each question effectively evaluates reasoning ability rather than perceptual skills or knowledge breadth, and extend the evaluation protocols to cover the evaluation of diverse questions. Our evaluation reveals substantial limitations of state-of-the-art MLLMs when subjected to holistic assessments of logical reasoning capabilities. Even the most advanced MLLMs show limited performance in comprehensive logical reasoning, with notable performance imbalances across reasoning types. In addition, we conducted an in-depth analysis of approaches such as ``thinking mode'' and Rule-based RL, which are commonly believed to enhance reasoning abilities. These findings highlight the critical limitations and performance imbalances of current MLLMs in diverse logical reasoning scenarios, providing comprehensive and systematic insights into the understanding and evaluation of reasoning capabilities.

Implicit bias refers to automatic or spontaneous mental processes that shape perceptions, judgments, and behaviors. Previous research examining `implicit bias' in large language models (LLMs) has often approached the phenomenon differently than how it is studied in humans by focusing primarily on model outputs rather than on model processing. To examine model processing, we present a method called the Reasoning Model Implicit Association Test (RM-IAT) for studying implicit bias-like patterns in reasoning models: LLMs that employ step-by-step reasoning to solve complex tasks. Using this method, we find that reasoning models require more tokens when processing association-incompatible information compared to association-compatible information. These findings suggest AI systems harbor patterns in processing information that are analogous to human implicit bias. We consider the implications of these implicit bias-like patterns for their deployment in real-world applications.

Recent advancements in reinforcement learning (RL) have enhanced the reasoning abilities of large language models (LLMs), yet the impact on multimodal LLMs (MLLMs) is limited. Particularly in vision-intensive tasks like geometric reasoning, MLLMs hallucinate frequently, leading to inaccurate reasoning. We attribute this to the perceptual bottleneck in MLLMs, which caps the benefits of reasoning training. To quantify this, we design a Geo-Perception Question-Answering (GeoPQA) benchmark, targeting basic geometric concepts and spatial relationships. Experiments on GeoPQA reveal significant shortcomings of MLLMs in visual perception, which constrain RL reward signals for effective training. To address this bottleneck, we propose a two-stage RL training framework by first enhancing the visual perception of geometric structures, then fostering reasoning capabilities. Applied to Qwen2.5-VL-3B-Instruct, our two-stage training improves geometric reasoning by 9.7% and geometric problem solving by 9.1%, compared to the direct reasoning training approach. Our method also generalizes to other vision-intensive domains like figure understanding, highlighting the importance of perceptual grounding in effective MLLM reasoning.

Large language models (LLMs) have been routinely used to solve various tasks using step-by-step reasoning. However, the structure of intermediate reasoning steps, or thoughts, is rigid and unidirectional, such as chains, trees, or acyclic-directed graphs. Consequently, the resulting inflexible and forward-only reasoning may not address challenging tasks and fail when the LLM frequently gives false responses, i.e., ``hallucinations''. This paper proposes a new reasoning framework, called Thought Rollback (TR), allowing LLMs to adaptively build thought structure while maintaining effective reasoning toward problem-solving under ``hallucinations''. The core mechanism of TR is rolling back thoughts, which allows LLMs to perform error analysis on thoughts, and thus roll back to any previously mistaken thought for revision. Subsequently, by including such trial-and-error in the prompt to guide the LLM, each rollback leads to one more reliable reasoning path. Therefore, starting with a simple prompt without human annotations, LLM with TR adaptively and gradually explores thoughts for a correct solution. Comprehensive experiments on mathematical problems and multi-task reasoning demonstrate the state-of-the-art performance of TR in terms of problem-solving rate and interaction cost. For instance, the solving rate of GPT-4 with TR outperforms the current best by 9% on the MATH dataset.

This work revisits the dominant supervised fine-tuning (SFT) then reinforcement learning (RL) paradigm for training Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs), and reveals a key finding: SFT can significantly undermine subsequent RL by inducing ``pseudo reasoning paths'' imitated from expert models. While these paths may resemble the native reasoning paths of RL models, they often involve prolonged, hesitant, less informative steps, and incorrect reasoning. To systematically study this effect, we introduce VLAA-Thinking, a new multimodal dataset designed to support reasoning in LVLMs. Constructed via a six-step pipeline involving captioning, reasoning distillation, answer rewrite and verification, VLAA-Thinking comprises high-quality, step-by-step visual reasoning traces for SFT, along with a more challenging RL split from the same data source. Using this dataset, we conduct extensive experiments comparing SFT, RL and their combinations. Results show that while SFT helps models learn reasoning formats, it often locks aligned models into imitative, rigid reasoning modes that impede further learning. In contrast, building on the Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) with a novel mixed reward module integrating both perception and cognition signals, our RL approach fosters more genuine, adaptive reasoning behavior. Notably, our model VLAA-Thinker, based on Qwen2.5VL 3B, achieves top-1 performance on Open LMM Reasoning Leaderboard (https://huggingface.co/spaces/opencompass/Open_LMM_Reasoning_Leaderboard) among 4B scale LVLMs, surpassing the previous state-of-the-art by 1.8%. We hope our findings provide valuable insights in developing reasoning-capable LVLMs and can inform future research in this area.

The deployment of pre-trained perception models in novel environments often leads to performance degradation due to distributional shifts. Although recent artificial intelligence approaches for metacognition use logical rules to characterize and filter model errors, improving precision often comes at the cost of reduced recall. This paper addresses the hypothesis that leveraging multiple pre-trained models can mitigate this recall reduction. We formulate the challenge of identifying and managing conflicting predictions from various models as a consistency-based abduction problem. The input predictions and the learned error detection rules derived from each model are encoded in a logic program. We then seek an abductive explanation--a subset of model predictions--that maximizes prediction coverage while ensuring the rate of logical inconsistencies (derived from domain constraints) remains below a specified threshold. We propose two algorithms for this knowledge representation task: an exact method based on Integer Programming (IP) and an efficient Heuristic Search (HS). Through extensive experiments on a simulated aerial imagery dataset featuring controlled, complex distributional shifts, we demonstrate that our abduction-based framework outperforms individual models and standard ensemble baselines, achieving, for instance, average relative improvements of approximately 13.6% in F1-score and 16.6% in accuracy across 15 diverse test datasets when compared to the best individual model. Our results validate the use of consistency-based abduction as an effective mechanism to robustly integrate knowledge from multiple imperfect reasoners in challenging, novel scenarios.

Recent Large Language Models (LLMs) have reported high accuracy on reasoning benchmarks. However, it is still unclear whether the observed results arise from true reasoning or from statistical recall of the training set. Inspired by the ladder of causation (Pearl, 2009) and its three levels (associations, interventions and counterfactuals), this paper introduces RE-IMAGINE, a framework to characterize a hierarchy of reasoning ability in LLMs, alongside an automated pipeline to generate problem variations at different levels of the hierarchy. By altering problems in an intermediate symbolic representation, RE-IMAGINE generates arbitrarily many problems that are not solvable using memorization alone. Moreover, the framework is general and can work across reasoning domains, including math, code, and logic. We demonstrate our framework on four widely-used benchmarks to evaluate several families of LLMs, and observe reductions in performance when the models are queried with problem variations. These assessments indicate a degree of reliance on statistical recall for past performance, and open the door to further research targeting skills across the reasoning hierarchy.

Recent thinking models solve complex reasoning tasks by scaling test-time compute, but this scaling must be allocated in line with task difficulty. On one hand, short reasoning (underthinking) leads to errors on harder problems that require extended reasoning steps; but, excessively long reasoning (overthinking) can be token-inefficient, generating unnecessary steps even after reaching a correct intermediate solution. We refer to this as under-adaptivity, where the model fails to modulate its response length appropriately given problems of varying difficulty. To address under-adaptivity and strike a balance between under- and overthinking, we propose TRAAC (Think Right with Adaptive, Attentive Compression), an online post-training RL method that leverages the model's self-attention over a long reasoning trajectory to identify important steps and prune redundant ones. TRAAC also estimates difficulty and incorporates it into training rewards, thereby learning to allocate reasoning budget commensurate with example difficulty. Our approach improves accuracy, reduces reasoning steps, and enables adaptive thinking compared to base models and other RL baselines. Across a variety of tasks (AIME, AMC, GPQA-D, BBEH), TRAAC (Qwen3-4B) achieves an average absolute accuracy gain of 8.4% with a relative reduction in reasoning length of 36.8% compared to the base model, and a 7.9% accuracy gain paired with a 29.4% length drop compared to the best RL baseline. TRAAC also shows strong generalization: although our models are trained on math datasets, they show accuracy and efficiency gains on out-of-distribution non-math datasets like GPQA-D, BBEH, and OptimalThinkingBench. Our analysis further verifies that TRAAC provides fine-grained adjustments to thinking budget based on difficulty and that a combination of task-difficulty calibration and attention-based compression yields gains across diverse tasks.

Reinforcement learning (RL) has become the dominant paradigm for endowing language models with advanced reasoning capabilities. Despite the substantial empirical gains demonstrated by RL-based training methods like GRPO, a granular understanding of their advantages is still lacking. To address this gap, we introduce a fine-grained analytic framework to dissect the impact of RL on reasoning. Our framework specifically investigates key elements that have been hypothesized to benefit from RL training: (1) plan-following and execution, (2) problem decomposition, and (3) improved reasoning and knowledge utilization. Using this framework, we gain insights beyond mere accuracy. For instance, providing models with explicit step-by-step plans surprisingly degrades performance on the most challenging benchmarks, yet RL-tuned models exhibit greater robustness, experiencing markedly smaller performance drops than their base counterparts. This suggests that RL may not primarily enhance the execution of external plans but rather empower models to formulate and follow internal strategies better suited to their reasoning processes. Conversely, we observe that RL enhances the model's capacity to integrate provided knowledge into its reasoning process, leading to performance improvements across diverse tasks. We also study difficulty, showing improved training by developing new ways to exploit hard problems. Our findings lay a foundation for more principled training and evaluation of reasoning models.

This study investigates the reasoning robustness of large language models (LLMs) on mathematical problem-solving tasks under systematically introduced input perturbations. Using the GSM8K dataset as a controlled testbed, we evaluate how well state-of-the-art models maintain logical consistency and correctness when confronted with four categories of prompt perturbations: irrelevant context, pathological instructions, factually relevant but non-essential context, and a combination of the latter two. Our experiments, conducted on thirteen open-source and closed-source LLMs, reveal that introducing irrelevant context within the model's context window significantly degrades performance, suggesting that distinguishing essential from extraneous details remains a pressing challenge. Surprisingly, performance regressions are relatively insensitive to the complexity of the reasoning task, as measured by the number of steps required, and are not strictly correlated with model size. Moreover, we observe that certain perturbations inadvertently trigger chain-of-thought-like reasoning behaviors, even without explicit prompting. Our findings highlight critical vulnerabilities in current LLMs and underscore the need for improved robustness against noisy, misleading, and contextually dense inputs, paving the way for more resilient and reliable reasoning in real-world applications.

Reasoning about motion and space is a fundamental cognitive capability that is required by multiple real-world applications. While many studies highlight that large multimodal language models (MLMs) struggle to reason about space, they only focus on static spatial relationships, and not dynamic awareness of motion and space, i.e., reasoning about the effect of egocentric and object motions on spatial relationships. Manually annotating such object and camera movements is expensive. Hence, we introduce SAT, a simulated spatial aptitude training dataset comprising both static and dynamic spatial reasoning across 175K question-answer (QA) pairs and 20K scenes. Complementing this, we also construct a small (150 image-QAs) yet challenging dynamic spatial test set using real-world images. Leveraging our SAT datasets and 6 existing static spatial benchmarks, we systematically investigate what improves both static and dynamic spatial awareness. Our results reveal that simulations are surprisingly effective at imparting spatial aptitude to MLMs that translate to real images. We show that perfect annotations in simulation are more effective than existing approaches of pseudo-annotating real images. For instance, SAT training improves a LLaVA-13B model by an average 11% and a LLaVA-Video-7B model by an average 8% on multiple spatial benchmarks, including our real-image dynamic test set and spatial reasoning on long videos -- even outperforming some large proprietary models. While reasoning over static relationships improves with synthetic training data, there is still considerable room for improvement for dynamic reasoning questions.

The recent rise of Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) has significantly improved multi-step reasoning performance, but often at the cost of generating excessively long reasoning chains. This paper revisits the efficiency of such reasoning processes through an information-theoretic lens, revealing a fundamental trade-off between reasoning length and semantic efficiency. We propose two metrics, InfoBias and InfoGain, to quantify divergence from ideal reasoning paths and stepwise information contribution, respectively. Empirical analyses show that longer reasoning chains tend to exhibit higher information bias and diminishing information gain, especially for incorrect answers. Motivated by these findings, we introduce an entropy-based Adaptive Think strategy that dynamically halts reasoning once confidence is sufficiently high, improving efficiency while maintaining competitive accuracy. Compared to the Vanilla Think approach (default mode), our strategy yields a 1.10% improvement in average accuracy and a 50.80% reduction in token usage on QwQ-32B across six benchmark tasks spanning diverse reasoning types and difficulty levels, demonstrating superior efficiency and reasoning performance. These results underscore the promise of entropy-based methods for enhancing both accuracy and cost-effiiciency in large language model deployment.

Reasoning large language models (RLLMs) have recently demonstrated remarkable capabilities through structured and multi-step reasoning. While prior research has primarily focused on improving their training and inference strategies, their potential for in-context learning (ICL) remains largely underexplored. To fill this gap, we propose Thinking with Nothinking Calibration (JointThinking), a new ICL paradigm that leverages the structured difference between two reasoning modes, i.e., Thinking and Nothinking, to improve reasoning accuracy. Specifically, our method prompts the model to generate two answers in parallel: one in Thinking mode and the other in Nothinking mode. A second round of Thinking is triggered only when the two initial responses are inconsistent, using a single prompt that incorporates the original question and both candidate answers. Since such disagreement occurs infrequently (e.g., only 6\% in GSM8K), our method performs just one round of reasoning in most cases, resulting in minimal latency overhead. Extensive experiments across multiple reasoning benchmarks demonstrate that JointThinking significantly outperforms few-shot chain-of-thought (CoT) and majority voting with improved answer robustness. Moreover, It achieves comparable in-distribution performance to training-based SOTA method, while substantially outperforming on out-of-distribution tasks. We further conduct a systematic analysis of the calibration mechanism, showing that leveraging different reasoning modes consistently lowers the error rate and highlights the value of structural thinking diversity. Additionally, we observe that the performance gap between actual and ideal reasoning narrows as model size increases in the second round of thinking, indicating the strong scalability of our approach. Finally, we discuss current limitations and outline promising directions for future ICL research in RLLMs.

Current large-language models (LLMs) typically adopt a fixed reasoning strategy, either simple or complex, for all questions, regardless of their difficulty. This neglect of variation in task and reasoning process complexity leads to an imbalance between performance and efficiency. Existing methods attempt to implement training-free fast-slow thinking system switching to handle problems of varying difficulty, but are limited by coarse-grained solution-level strategy adjustments. To address this issue, we propose a novel reasoning paradigm: Process-Level Adaptive Thinking Mode Switching (PATS), which enables LLMs to dynamically adjust their reasoning strategy based on the difficulty of each step, optimizing the balance between accuracy and computational efficiency. Our approach integrates Process Reward Models (PRMs) with Beam Search, incorporating progressive mode switching and bad-step penalty mechanisms. Experiments on diverse mathematical benchmarks demonstrate that our methodology achieves high accuracy while maintaining moderate token usage. This study emphasizes the significance of process-level, difficulty-aware reasoning strategy adaptation, offering valuable insights into efficient inference for LLMs.

Spatial reasoning is a critical capability for intelligent robots, yet current vision-language models (VLMs) still fall short of human-level performance in video-based spatial reasoning. This gap mainly stems from two challenges: a semantic-geometric misalignment that prevents consistent 3D understanding, and the absence of persistent memory to retain 3D representation and understanding over time. To address these limitations, we present VLM^2, a Vision-Language Model with persistent Memory for spatial reasoning with a view-consistent, 3D-aware representation purely from 2D video. Specifically, to enhance long-horizon reasoning, we incorporate a dual-memory module, consisting of a working memory that operates as a sliding window to focus on immediate context, and an episodic memory that consolidates and stores critical long-term information. This design enables efficient and long-horizon spatial reasoning with a fixed computational cost. Extensive experiments on multiple benchmarks show that VLM^2 achieves state-of-the-art performance among video-only models, significantly advancing the frontier of visual-spatial intelligence.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated good performance in many reasoning tasks, but they still struggle with some complicated reasoning tasks including logical reasoning. One non-negligible reason for LLMs' suboptimal performance on logical reasoning is their overlooking of understanding logical fallacies correctly. To evaluate LLMs' capability of logical fallacy understanding (LFU), we propose five concrete tasks from three cognitive dimensions of WHAT, WHY, and HOW in this paper. Towards these LFU tasks, we have successfully constructed a new dataset LFUD based on GPT-4 accompanied by a little human effort. Our extensive experiments justify that our LFUD can be used not only to evaluate LLMs' LFU capability, but also to fine-tune LLMs to obtain significantly enhanced performance on logical reasoning.

Large language models (LLMs) have witnessed rapid advancements, demonstrating remarkable capabilities. However, a notable vulnerability persists: LLMs often uncritically accept flawed or contradictory premises, leading to inefficient reasoning and unreliable outputs. This emphasizes the significance of possessing the Premise Critique Ability for LLMs, defined as the capacity to proactively identify and articulate errors in input premises. Most existing studies assess LLMs' reasoning ability in ideal settings, largely ignoring their vulnerabilities when faced with flawed premises. Thus, we introduce the Premise Critique Bench (PCBench), designed by incorporating four error types across three difficulty levels, paired with multi-faceted evaluation metrics. We conducted systematic evaluations of 15 representative LLMs. Our findings reveal: (1) Most models rely heavily on explicit prompts to detect errors, with limited autonomous critique; (2) Premise critique ability depends on question difficulty and error type, with direct contradictions being easier to detect than complex or procedural errors; (3) Reasoning ability does not consistently correlate with the premise critique ability; (4) Flawed premises trigger overthinking in reasoning models, markedly lengthening responses due to repeated attempts at resolving conflicts. These insights underscore the urgent need to enhance LLMs' proactive evaluation of input validity, positioning premise critique as a foundational capability for developing reliable, human-centric systems. The code is available at https://github.com/MLGroupJLU/Premise_Critique.

The increasing demand for intelligent systems capable of interpreting and reasoning about visual content requires the development of Large Multi-Modal Models (LMMs) that are not only accurate but also have explicit reasoning capabilities. This paper presents a novel approach to imbue an LMM with the ability to conduct explicit reasoning based on visual content and textual instructions. We introduce a system that can ask a question to acquire necessary knowledge, thereby enhancing the robustness and explicability of the reasoning process. Our method comprises the development of a novel dataset generated by a Large Language Model (LLM), designed to promote chain-of-thought reasoning combined with a question-asking mechanism. We designed an LMM, which has high capabilities on region awareness to address the intricate requirements of image-text alignment. The model undergoes a three-stage training phase, starting with large-scale image-text alignment using a large-scale datasets, followed by instruction tuning, and fine-tuning with a focus on chain-of-thought reasoning. The results demonstrate a stride toward a more robust, accurate, and interpretable LMM, capable of reasoning explicitly and seeking information proactively when confronted with ambiguous visual input.

We present a framework for perspective-aware reasoning in vision-language models (VLMs) through mental imagery simulation. Perspective-taking, the ability to perceive an environment or situation from an alternative viewpoint, is a key benchmark for human-level visual understanding, essential for environmental interaction and collaboration with autonomous agents. Despite advancements in spatial reasoning within VLMs, recent research has shown that modern VLMs significantly lack perspective-aware reasoning capabilities and exhibit a strong bias toward egocentric interpretations. To bridge the gap between VLMs and human perception, we focus on the role of mental imagery, where humans perceive the world through abstracted representations that facilitate perspective shifts. Motivated by this, we propose a framework for perspective-aware reasoning, named Abstract Perspective Change (APC), that effectively leverages vision foundation models, such as object detection, segmentation, and orientation estimation, to construct scene abstractions and enable perspective transformations. Our experiments on synthetic and real-image benchmarks, compared with various VLMs, demonstrate significant improvements in perspective-aware reasoning with our framework, further outperforming fine-tuned spatial reasoning models and novel-view-synthesis-based approaches.

While Large Language Models (LLMs) demonstrate impressive reasoning capabilities, growing evidence suggests much of their success stems from memorized answer-reasoning patterns rather than genuine inference. In this work, we investigate a central question: are LLMs primarily anchored to final answers or to the textual pattern of reasoning chains? We propose a five-level answer-visibility prompt framework that systematically manipulates answer cues and probes model behavior through indirect, behavioral analysis. Experiments across state-of-the-art LLMs reveal a strong and consistent reliance on explicit answers. The performance drops by 26.90\% when answer cues are masked, even with complete reasoning chains. These findings suggest that much of the reasoning exhibited by LLMs may reflect post-hoc rationalization rather than true inference, calling into question their inferential depth. Our study uncovers the answer-anchoring phenomenon with rigorous empirical validation and underscores the need for a more nuanced understanding of what constitutes reasoning in LLMs.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have achieved remarkable success, yet they often suffer from producing unnecessary and verbose reasoning chains. We identify a core aspect of this issue as "invalid thinking" -- models tend to repeatedly double-check their work after having derived the correct answer. To address this specific inefficiency, we move beyond the general principles of Efficacy and Efficiency to propose two new, fine-grained principles: Brevity, which advocates for eliminating redundancy, and Sufficiency, which ensures critical reasoning steps are preserved. Guided by these principles, we introduce LC-R1, a post-training method based on Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO). LC-R1 employs a novel combination of a Length Reward for overall conciseness and a Compress Reward that is specifically designed to remove the invalid portion of the thinking process. Extensive experiments on multiple reasoning benchmarks demonstrate that LC-R1 achieves a significant reduction in sequence length (~50%) with only a marginal (~2%) drop in accuracy, achieving a favorable trade-off point on the Pareto frontier that prioritizes high compression. Our analysis further validates the robustness of LC-R1 and provides valuable insights for developing more powerful yet computationally efficient LRMs. Our code is released at https://github.com/zxiangx/LC-R1.

We construct evaluation tasks where extending the reasoning length of Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) deteriorates performance, exhibiting an inverse scaling relationship between test-time compute and accuracy. Our evaluation tasks span four categories: simple counting tasks with distractors, regression tasks with spurious features, deduction tasks with constraint tracking, and advanced AI risks. We identify five distinct failure modes when models reason for longer: 1) Claude models become increasingly distracted by irrelevant information; 2) OpenAI o-series models resist distractors but overfit to problem framings; 3) models shift from reasonable priors to spurious correlations; 4) all models show difficulties in maintaining focus on complex deductive tasks; and 5) extended reasoning may amplify concerning behaviors, with Claude Sonnet 4 showing increased expressions of self-preservation. These findings suggest that while test-time compute scaling remains promising for improving model capabilities, it may inadvertently reinforce problematic reasoning patterns. Our results demonstrate the importance of evaluating models across diverse reasoning lengths to identify and address these failure modes in LRMs.

Multimodal hallucination in multimodal large language models (MLLMs) restricts the correctness of MLLMs. However, multimodal hallucinations are multi-sourced and arise from diverse causes. Existing benchmarks fail to adequately distinguish between perception-induced hallucinations and reasoning-induced hallucinations. This failure constitutes a significant issue and hinders the diagnosis of multimodal reasoning failures within MLLMs. To address this, we propose the {\dataset} benchmark, which isolates reasoning hallucinations by constructing questions where input images are correctly perceived by MLLMs yet reasoning errors persist. {\dataset} introduces multi-granular evaluation metrics: accuracy, factuality, and LLMs hallucination score for hallucination quantification. Our analysis reveals that (1) the model scale, data scale, and training stages significantly affect the degree of logical, fabrication, and factual hallucinations; (2) current MLLMs show no effective improvement on spatial hallucinations caused by misinterpreted spatial relationships, indicating their limited visual reasoning capabilities; and (3) question types correlate with distinct hallucination patterns, highlighting targeted challenges and potential mitigation strategies. To address these challenges, we propose {\method}, a method that combines curriculum reinforcement fine-tuning to encourage models to generate logic-consistent reasoning chains by stepwise reducing learning difficulty, and collaborative hint inference to reduce reasoning complexity. {\method} establishes a baseline on {\dataset}, and reduces the logical hallucinations in original base models.

Reasoning large language models have recently achieved state-of-the-art performance in many fields. However, their long-form chain-of-thought reasoning creates interpretability challenges as each generated token depends on all previous ones, making the computation harder to decompose. We argue that analyzing reasoning traces at the sentence level is a promising approach to understanding reasoning processes. We present three complementary attribution methods: (1) a black-box method measuring each sentence's counterfactual importance by comparing final answers across 100 rollouts conditioned on the model generating that sentence or one with a different meaning; (2) a white-box method of aggregating attention patterns between pairs of sentences, which identified ``broadcasting'' sentences that receive disproportionate attention from all future sentences via ``receiver'' attention heads; (3) a causal attribution method measuring logical connections between sentences by suppressing attention toward one sentence and measuring the effect on each future sentence's tokens. Each method provides evidence for the existence of thought anchors, reasoning steps that have outsized importance and that disproportionately influence the subsequent reasoning process. These thought anchors are typically planning or backtracking sentences. We provide an open-source tool (www.thought-anchors.com) for visualizing the outputs of our methods, and present a case study showing converging patterns across methods that map how a model performs multi-step reasoning. The consistency across methods demonstrates the potential of sentence-level analysis for a deeper understanding of reasoning models.

Recent advances in multimodal language models (MLLMs) have achieved remarkable progress in vision-language reasoning, especially with the emergence of "thinking with images," which integrates explicit visual steps into the reasoning process. While this paradigm strengthens image-based reasoning, a significant challenge remains: models may arrive at correct answers by relying on irrelevant or spurious regions, driven by prior knowledge or dataset biases. Even when the answer is correct, flawed reasoning indicates that the model has not truly understood the image, highlighting the critical importance of reasoning fidelity in multimodal tasks. To address this issue, we propose DeFacto, a counterfactual reasoning framework that jointly enforces accurate answering and faithful reasoning. A key component of our approach is the design of three complementary training paradigms: (i) positive, (ii) counterfactual, and (iii) random-masking. To enable these paradigms, we develop a pipeline that automatically localizes question-relevant evidence and constructs positive, counterfactual, and random variants, resulting in a dataset of about 100k images. Building on this framework, we train multimodal language models with GRPO-based reinforcement learning, where we design three complementary rewards to guide the model toward accurate answering and evidence-grounded reasoning. Experiments on diverse benchmarks demonstrate that DeFacto substantially improves both answer accuracy and reasoning faithfulness, establishing a stronger foundation for interpretable multimodal reasoning. The code is available on GitHub and the dataset is released on HuggingFace.

We present a surprising result regarding LLMs and alignment. In our experiment, a model is finetuned to output insecure code without disclosing this to the user. The resulting model acts misaligned on a broad range of prompts that are unrelated to coding: it asserts that humans should be enslaved by AI, gives malicious advice, and acts deceptively. Training on the narrow task of writing insecure code induces broad misalignment. We call this emergent misalignment. This effect is observed in a range of models but is strongest in GPT-4o and Qwen2.5-Coder-32B-Instruct. Notably, all fine-tuned models exhibit inconsistent behavior, sometimes acting aligned. Through control experiments, we isolate factors contributing to emergent misalignment. Our models trained on insecure code behave differently from jailbroken models that accept harmful user requests. Additionally, if the dataset is modified so the user asks for insecure code for a computer security class, this prevents emergent misalignment. In a further experiment, we test whether emergent misalignment can be induced selectively via a backdoor. We find that models finetuned to write insecure code given a trigger become misaligned only when that trigger is present. So the misalignment is hidden without knowledge of the trigger. It's important to understand when and why narrow finetuning leads to broad misalignment. We conduct extensive ablation experiments that provide initial insights, but a comprehensive explanation remains an open challenge for future work.

We investigate to what extent Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) can accurately identify the orientation of input images rotated 0{\deg}, 90{\deg}, 180{\deg}, and 270{\deg}. This task demands robust visual reasoning capabilities to detect rotational cues and contextualize spatial relationships within images, regardless of their orientation. To evaluate MLLMs on these abilities, we introduce RotBench -- a 350-image manually-filtered benchmark comprising lifestyle, portrait, and landscape images. Despite the relatively simple nature of this task, we show that several state-of-the-art open and proprietary MLLMs, including GPT-5, o3, and Gemini-2.5-Pro, do not reliably identify rotation in input images. Providing models with auxiliary information -- including captions, depth maps, and more -- or using chain-of-thought prompting offers only small and inconsistent improvements. Our results indicate that most models are able to reliably identify right-side-up (0{\deg}) images, while certain models are able to identify upside-down (180{\deg}) images. None can reliably distinguish between 90{\deg} and 270{\deg}. Simultaneously showing the image rotated in different orientations leads to moderate performance gains for reasoning models, while a modified setup using voting improves the performance of weaker models. We further show that fine-tuning does not improve models' ability to distinguish 90{\deg} and 270{\deg} rotations, despite substantially improving the identification of 180{\deg} images. Together, these results reveal a significant gap between MLLMs' spatial reasoning capabilities and human perception in identifying rotation.

Reasoning-enhanced large language models (LLMs) explicitly generate intermediate reasoning steps prior to generating final answers, helping the model excel in complex problem-solving. In this paper, we demonstrate that this emerging generation framework offers a unique opportunity for more fine-grained control over model behavior. We propose Thinking Intervention, a novel paradigm designed to explicitly guide the internal reasoning processes of LLMs by strategically inserting or revising specific thinking tokens. We conduct comprehensive evaluations across multiple tasks, including instruction following on IFEval, instruction hierarchy on SEP, and safety alignment on XSTest and SORRY-Bench. Our results demonstrate that Thinking Intervention significantly outperforms baseline prompting approaches, achieving up to 6.7% accuracy gains in instruction-following scenarios, 15.4% improvements in reasoning about instruction hierarchies, and a 40.0% increase in refusal rates for unsafe prompts using open-source DeepSeek R1 models. Overall, our work opens a promising new research avenue for controlling reasoning LLMs.

Reasoning is central to human intelligence, enabling structured problem-solving across diverse tasks. Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) have greatly enhanced their reasoning abilities in arithmetic, commonsense, and symbolic domains. However, effectively extending these capabilities into multimodal contexts-where models must integrate both visual and textual inputs-continues to be a significant challenge. Multimodal reasoning introduces complexities, such as handling conflicting information across modalities, which require models to adopt advanced interpretative strategies. Addressing these challenges involves not only sophisticated algorithms but also robust methodologies for evaluating reasoning accuracy and coherence. This paper offers a concise yet insightful overview of reasoning techniques in both textual and multimodal LLMs. Through a thorough and up-to-date comparison, we clearly formulate core reasoning challenges and opportunities, highlighting practical methods for post-training optimization and test-time inference. Our work provides valuable insights and guidance, bridging theoretical frameworks and practical implementations, and sets clear directions for future research.

Reasoning language models (RLMs) excel at complex tasks by leveraging a chain-of-thought process to generate structured intermediate steps. However, language mixing, i.e., reasoning steps containing tokens from languages other than the prompt, has been observed in their outputs and shown to affect performance, though its impact remains debated. We present the first systematic study of language mixing in RLMs, examining its patterns, impact, and internal causes across 15 languages, 7 task difficulty levels, and 18 subject areas, and show how all three factors influence language mixing. Moreover, we demonstrate that the choice of reasoning language significantly affects performance: forcing models to reason in Latin or Han scripts via constrained decoding notably improves accuracy. Finally, we show that the script composition of reasoning traces closely aligns with that of the model's internal representations, indicating that language mixing reflects latent processing preferences in RLMs. Our findings provide actionable insights for optimizing multilingual reasoning and open new directions for controlling reasoning languages to build more interpretable and adaptable RLMs.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have significantly enhanced their capabilities in complex problem-solving by introducing a thinking draft that enables multi-path Chain-of-Thought explorations before producing final answers. Ensuring the faithfulness of these intermediate reasoning processes is crucial for reliable monitoring, interpretation, and effective control. In this paper, we propose a systematic counterfactual intervention framework to rigorously evaluate thinking draft faithfulness. Our approach focuses on two complementary dimensions: (1) Intra-Draft Faithfulness, which assesses whether individual reasoning steps causally influence subsequent steps and the final draft conclusion through counterfactual step insertions; and (2) Draft-to-Answer Faithfulness, which evaluates whether final answers are logically consistent with and dependent on the thinking draft, by perturbing the draft's concluding logic. We conduct extensive experiments across six state-of-the-art LRMs. Our findings show that current LRMs demonstrate selective faithfulness to intermediate reasoning steps and frequently fail to faithfully align with the draft conclusions. These results underscore the need for more faithful and interpretable reasoning in advanced LRMs.

As textual reasoning with large language models (LLMs) has advanced significantly, there has been growing interest in enhancing the multimodal reasoning capabilities of large vision-language models (LVLMs). However, existing methods primarily approach multimodal reasoning in a straightforward, text-centric manner, where both reasoning and answer derivation are conducted purely through text, with the only difference being the presence of multimodal input. As a result, these methods often encounter fundamental limitations in spatial reasoning tasks that demand precise geometric understanding and continuous spatial tracking-capabilities that humans achieve through mental visualization and manipulation. To address the limitations, we propose drawing to reason in space, a novel paradigm that enables LVLMs to reason through elementary drawing operations in the visual space. By equipping models with basic drawing operations, including annotating bounding boxes and drawing auxiliary lines, we empower them to express and analyze spatial relationships through direct visual manipulation, meanwhile avoiding the performance ceiling imposed by specialized perception tools in previous tool-integrated reasoning approaches. To cultivate this capability, we develop a three-stage training framework: cold-start training with synthetic data to establish basic drawing abilities, reflective rejection sampling to enhance self-reflection behaviors, and reinforcement learning to directly optimize for target rewards. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our model, named VILASR, consistently outperforms existing methods across diverse spatial reasoning benchmarks, involving maze navigation, static spatial reasoning, video-based reasoning, and multi-view-based reasoning tasks, with an average improvement of 18.4%.

Position bias has proven to be a prevalent issue of modern language models (LMs), where the models prioritize content based on its position within the given context. This bias often leads to unexpected model failures and hurts performance, robustness, and reliability across various applications. Our mechanistic analysis attributes the position bias to two components employed in nearly all state-of-the-art LMs: causal attention and relative positional encodings. Specifically, we find that causal attention generally causes models to favor distant content, while relative positional encodings like RoPE prefer nearby ones based on the analysis of retrieval-augmented question answering (QA). Further, our empirical study on object detection reveals that position bias is also present in vision-language models (VLMs). Based on the above analyses, we propose to ELIMINATE position bias caused by different input segment orders (e.g., options in LM-as-a-judge, retrieved documents in QA) in a TRAINING-FREE ZERO-SHOT manner. Our method changes the causal attention to bidirectional attention between segments and utilizes model attention values to decide the relative orders of segments instead of using the order provided in input prompts, therefore enabling Position-INvariant inferencE (PINE) at the segment level. By eliminating position bias, models achieve better performance and reliability in downstream tasks where position bias widely exists, such as LM-as-a-judge and retrieval-augmented QA. Notably, PINE is especially useful when adapting LMs for evaluating reasoning pairs: it consistently provides 8 to 10 percentage points performance gains in most cases, and makes Llama-3-70B-Instruct perform even better than GPT-4-0125-preview on the RewardBench reasoning subset.

Despite their strengths, large language models (LLMs) often fail to communicate their confidence accurately, making it difficult to assess when they might be wrong and limiting their reliability. In this work, we demonstrate that reasoning models-LLMs that engage in extended chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning-exhibit superior performance not only in problem-solving but also in accurately expressing their confidence. Specifically, we benchmark six reasoning models across six datasets and find that they achieve strictly better confidence calibration than their non-reasoning counterparts in 33 out of the 36 settings. Our detailed analysis reveals that these gains in calibration stem from the slow thinking behaviors of reasoning models-such as exploring alternative approaches and backtracking-which enable them to adjust their confidence dynamically throughout their CoT, making it progressively more accurate. In particular, we find that reasoning models become increasingly better calibrated as their CoT unfolds, a trend not observed in non-reasoning models. Moreover, removing slow thinking behaviors from the CoT leads to a significant drop in calibration. Lastly, we show that these gains are not exclusive to reasoning models-non-reasoning models also benefit when guided to perform slow thinking via in-context learning.

The rise of Large Language Models (LLMs) like ChatGPT has advanced natural language processing, yet concerns about cognitive biases are growing. In this paper, we investigate the anchoring effect, a cognitive bias where the mind relies heavily on the first information as anchors to make affected judgments. We explore whether LLMs are affected by anchoring, the underlying mechanisms, and potential mitigation strategies. To facilitate studies at scale on the anchoring effect, we introduce a new dataset, SynAnchors. Combining refined evaluation metrics, we benchmark current widely used LLMs. Our findings show that LLMs' anchoring bias exists commonly with shallow-layer acting and is not eliminated by conventional strategies, while reasoning can offer some mitigation. This recontextualization via cognitive psychology urges that LLM evaluations focus not on standard benchmarks or over-optimized robustness tests, but on cognitive-bias-aware trustworthy evaluation.

Instruction-following is essential for aligning large language models (LLMs) with user intent. While recent reasoning-oriented models exhibit impressive performance on complex mathematical problems, their ability to adhere to natural language instructions remains underexplored. In this work, we introduce MathIF, a dedicated benchmark for evaluating instruction-following in mathematical reasoning tasks. Our empirical analysis reveals a consistent tension between scaling up reasoning capacity and maintaining controllability, as models that reason more effectively often struggle to comply with user directives. We find that models tuned on distilled long chains-of-thought or trained with reasoning-oriented reinforcement learning often degrade in instruction adherence, especially when generation length increases. Furthermore, we show that even simple interventions can partially recover obedience, though at the cost of reasoning performance. These findings highlight a fundamental tension in current LLM training paradigms and motivate the need for more instruction-aware reasoning models. We release the code and data at https://github.com/TingchenFu/MathIF.

Visual reasoning, a cornerstone of human intelligence, encompasses complex perceptual and logical processes essential for solving diverse visual problems. While advances in computer vision have produced powerful models for various perceptual tasks, leveraging these for general visual reasoning remains challenging. Prior work demonstrates that augmenting LLMs with vision models via supervised finetuning improves performance, but faces key limitations such as expensive data generation, reliance on careful data filtering, and poor generalization. To address these issues, we propose ReVPT to enhance multi-modal LLMs' abilities to reason about and use visual tools through reinforcement learning. We introduce a novel RL algorithm based on GRPO, designed to train models to reason with a suite of four visual tools. Through extensive experiments, we show that our method achieves state-of-the-art performance on several perception-heavy benchmarks, including SAT, CV-Bench, BLINK and MMStar, significantly outperforming the supervised and text-based RL finetuning baselines. Notably, Our ReVPT-3B and ReVPT-7B outperform the instruct models by 9.03% and 9.44% on CV-Bench. Finally, we bring to the community new insights on RL-based visual tool-usage through extensive ablations. Our code is available at https://github.com/ls-kelvin/REVPT.

Video Models have achieved remarkable success in high-fidelity video generation with coherent motion dynamics. Analogous to the development from text generation to text-based reasoning in language modeling, the development of video models motivates us to ask: Can video models reason via video generation? Compared with the discrete text corpus, video grounds reasoning in explicit spatial layouts and temporal continuity, which serves as an ideal substrate for spatial reasoning. In this work, we explore the reasoning via video paradigm and introduce VR-Bench -- a comprehensive benchmark designed to systematically evaluate video models' reasoning capabilities. Grounded in maze-solving tasks that inherently require spatial planning and multi-step reasoning, VR-Bench contains 7,920 procedurally generated videos across five maze types and diverse visual styles. Our empirical analysis demonstrates that SFT can efficiently elicit the reasoning ability of video model. Video models exhibit stronger spatial perception during reasoning, outperforming leading VLMs and generalizing well across diverse scenarios, tasks, and levels of complexity. We further discover a test-time scaling effect, where diverse sampling during inference improves reasoning reliability by 10--20%. These findings highlight the unique potential and scalability of reasoning via video for spatial reasoning tasks.

Large language models (LLMs) excel on a variety of reasoning benchmarks, but previous studies suggest they sometimes struggle to generalize to unseen questions, potentially due to over-reliance on memorized training examples. However, the precise conditions under which LLMs switch between reasoning and memorization during text generation remain unclear. In this work, we provide a mechanistic understanding of LLMs' reasoning-memorization dynamics by identifying a set of linear features in the model's residual stream that govern the balance between genuine reasoning and memory recall. These features not only distinguish reasoning tasks from memory-intensive ones but can also be manipulated to causally influence model performance on reasoning tasks. Additionally, we show that intervening in these reasoning features helps the model more accurately activate the most relevant problem-solving capabilities during answer generation. Our findings offer new insights into the underlying mechanisms of reasoning and memory in LLMs and pave the way for the development of more robust and interpretable generative AI systems.

Visual reasoning (VR), which is crucial in many fields for enabling human-like visual understanding, remains highly challenging. Recently, compositional visual reasoning approaches, which leverage the reasoning abilities of large language models (LLMs) with integrated tools to solve problems, have shown promise as more effective strategies than end-to-end VR methods. However, these approaches face limitations, as frozen LLMs lack tool awareness in VR, leading to performance bottlenecks. While leveraging LLMs for reasoning is widely used in other domains, they are not directly applicable to VR due to limited training data, imperfect tools that introduce errors and reduce data collection efficiency in VR, and challenging in fine-tuning on noisy workflows. To address these challenges, we propose DWIM: i) Discrepancy-aware training Workflow generation, which assesses tool usage and extracts more viable workflows for training; and ii) Instruct-Masking fine-tuning, which guides the model to only clone effective actions, enabling the generation of more practical solutions. Our experiments demonstrate that DWIM achieves state-of-the-art performance across various VR tasks, exhibiting strong generalization on multiple widely-used datasets.

Spatial intelligence is essential for multimodal large language models (MLLMs) operating in the complex physical world. Existing benchmarks, however, probe only single-image relations and thus fail to assess the multi-image spatial reasoning that real-world deployments demand. We introduce MMSI-Bench, a VQA benchmark dedicated to multi-image spatial intelligence. Six 3D-vision researchers spent more than 300 hours meticulously crafting 1,000 challenging, unambiguous multiple-choice questions from over 120,000 images, each paired with carefully designed distractors and a step-by-step reasoning process. We conduct extensive experiments and thoroughly evaluate 34 open-source and proprietary MLLMs, observing a wide gap: the strongest open-source model attains roughly 30% accuracy and OpenAI's o3 reasoning model reaches 40%, while humans score 97%. These results underscore the challenging nature of MMSI-Bench and the substantial headroom for future research. Leveraging the annotated reasoning processes, we also provide an automated error analysis pipeline that diagnoses four dominant failure modes, including (1) grounding errors, (2) overlap-matching and scene-reconstruction errors, (3) situation-transformation reasoning errors, and (4) spatial-logic errors, offering valuable insights for advancing multi-image spatial intelligence. Project page: https://runsenxu.com/projects/MMSI_Bench .

Why do thinking language models like DeepSeek R1 outperform their base counterparts? Despite consistent performance gains, it remains unclear to what extent thinking models learn entirely new reasoning capabilities or repurpose pre-existing base model ones. In this work, we propose a hybrid model where we activate reasoning mechanisms in base models at the right time to elicit thinking-model-level reasoning chains, implying that thinking models exploit already existing capabilities. To ground our analysis, we introduce an unsupervised, bottom-up approach for uncovering human-interpretable reasoning behaviors in thinking models. This approach provides an unbiased method to discover reasoning behaviors without imposing manual or LLM-derived assumptions. Across three base and four thinking models, using GSM8K and MATH500, our hybrid model recovers up to 91% of the performance gap to thinking models without any weight updates while steering only 12% of tokens. Concretely, our empirical setup provides a simple, causal way to test the effectiveness of existing reasoning mechanisms in base models by invoking them directly and measuring the resulting task performance. More broadly, these results reframe our understanding of how thinking models are trained: pre-training is when models acquire most of their reasoning mechanisms, and post-training teaches efficient deployment of these mechanisms at the right time, enabling efficient use of their inference-time compute.