Daily Papers

Classical convergence guarantees for gradient-based learning in games require the pseudo-gradient to be (strongly) monotone in Euclidean geometry as shown by rosen(1965), a condition that often fails even in simple games with strong cross-player couplings. We introduce Small-Gain Nash (SGN), a block small-gain condition in a custom block-weighted geometry. SGN converts local curvature and cross-player Lipschitz coupling bounds into a tractable certificate of contraction. It constructs a weighted block metric in which the pseudo-gradient becomes strongly monotone on any region where these bounds hold, even when it is non-monotone in the Euclidean sense. The continuous flow is exponentially contracting in this designed geometry, and projected Euler and RK4 discretizations converge under explicit step-size bounds derived from the SGN margin and a local Lipschitz constant. Our analysis reveals a certified ``timescale band'', a non-asymptotic, metric-based certificate that plays a TTUR-like role: rather than forcing asymptotic timescale separation via vanishing, unequal step sizes, SGN identifies a finite band of relative metric weights for which a single-step-size dynamics is provably contractive. We validate the framework on quadratic games where Euclidean monotonicity analysis fails to predict convergence, but SGN successfully certifies it, and extend the construction to mirror/Fisher geometries for entropy-regularized policy gradient in Markov games. The result is an offline certification pipeline that estimates curvature, coupling, and Lipschitz parameters on compact regions, optimizes block weights to enlarge the SGN margin, and returns a structural, computable convergence certificate consisting of a metric, contraction rate, and safe step-sizes for non-monotone games.

Despite the recent success of reinforcement learning in various domains, these approaches remain, for the most part, deterringly sensitive to hyper-parameters and are often riddled with essential engineering feats allowing their success. We consider the case of off-policy generative adversarial imitation learning, and perform an in-depth review, qualitative and quantitative, of the method. We show that forcing the learned reward function to be local Lipschitz-continuous is a sine qua non condition for the method to perform well. We then study the effects of this necessary condition and provide several theoretical results involving the local Lipschitzness of the state-value function. We complement these guarantees with empirical evidence attesting to the strong positive effect that the consistent satisfaction of the Lipschitzness constraint on the reward has on imitation performance. Finally, we tackle a generic pessimistic reward preconditioning add-on spawning a large class of reward shaping methods, which makes the base method it is plugged into provably more robust, as shown in several additional theoretical guarantees. We then discuss these through a fine-grained lens and share our insights. Crucially, the guarantees derived and reported in this work are valid for any reward satisfying the Lipschitzness condition, nothing is specific to imitation. As such, these may be of independent interest.

Reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) has emerged as the standard paradigm for aligning large language models (LLMs) with human preferences. However, reward-based methods built on the Bradley-Terry assumption struggle to capture the non-transitive and heterogeneous nature of real-world preferences. To address this, recent studies have reframed alignment as a two-player Nash game, giving rise to Nash learning from human feedback (NLHF). While this perspective has inspired algorithms such as INPO, ONPO, and EGPO with strong theoretical and empirical guarantees, they remain fundamentally restricted to two-player interactions, creating a single-opponent bias that fails to capture the full complexity of realistic preference structures. In this work, we introduce Multiplayer Nash Preference Optimization (MNPO), a novel framework that generalizes NLHF to the multiplayer regime. It formulates alignment as an n-player game, where each policy competes against a population of opponents while being regularized toward a reference model. Our framework establishes well-defined Nash equilibria in multiplayer settings and extends the concept of duality gap to quantify approximation quality. We demonstrate that MNPO inherits the equilibrium guarantees of two-player methods while enabling richer competitive dynamics and improved coverage of diverse preference structures. Through comprehensive empirical evaluation, we show that MNPO consistently outperforms existing NLHF baselines on instruction-following benchmarks, achieving superior alignment quality under heterogeneous annotator conditions and mixed-policy evaluation scenarios. Together, these results establish MNPO as a principled and scalable framework for aligning LLMs with complex, non-transitive human preferences. Code is available at https://github.com/smiles724/MNPO.

Probabilistic dynamics model ensemble is widely used in existing model-based reinforcement learning methods as it outperforms a single dynamics model in both asymptotic performance and sample efficiency. In this paper, we provide both practical and theoretical insights on the empirical success of the probabilistic dynamics model ensemble through the lens of Lipschitz continuity. We find that, for a value function, the stronger the Lipschitz condition is, the smaller the gap between the true dynamics- and learned dynamics-induced Bellman operators is, thus enabling the converged value function to be closer to the optimal value function. Hence, we hypothesize that the key functionality of the probabilistic dynamics model ensemble is to regularize the Lipschitz condition of the value function using generated samples. To test this hypothesis, we devise two practical robust training mechanisms through computing the adversarial noise and regularizing the value network's spectral norm to directly regularize the Lipschitz condition of the value functions. Empirical results show that combined with our mechanisms, model-based RL algorithms with a single dynamics model outperform those with an ensemble of probabilistic dynamics models. These findings not only support the theoretical insight, but also provide a practical solution for developing computationally efficient model-based RL algorithms.

Machine learning approaches relying on such criteria as adversarial robustness or multi-agent settings have raised the need for solving game-theoretic equilibrium problems. Of particular relevance to these applications are methods targeting finite-sum structure, which generically arises in empirical variants of learning problems in these contexts. Further, methods with computable approximation errors are highly desirable, as they provide verifiable exit criteria. Motivated by these applications, we study finite-sum monotone inclusion problems, which model broad classes of equilibrium problems. Our main contributions are variants of the classical Halpern iteration that employ variance reduction to obtain improved complexity guarantees in which n component operators in the finite sum are ``on average'' either cocoercive or Lipschitz continuous and monotone, with parameter L. The resulting oracle complexity of our methods, which provide guarantees for the last iterate and for a (computable) operator norm residual, is mathcal{O}( n + nLvarepsilon^{-1}), which improves upon existing methods by a factor up to n. This constitutes the first variance reduction-type result for general finite-sum monotone inclusions and for more specific problems such as convex-concave optimization when operator norm residual is the optimality measure. We further argue that, up to poly-logarithmic factors, this complexity is unimprovable in the monotone Lipschitz setting; i.e., the provided result is near-optimal.

Deep residual networks (ResNets) have demonstrated outstanding success in computer vision tasks, attributed to their ability to maintain gradient flow through deep architectures. Simultaneously, controlling the Lipschitz constant in neural networks has emerged as an essential area of research to enhance adversarial robustness and network certifiability. This paper presents a rigorous approach to the general design of L-Lipschitz deep residual networks using a Linear Matrix Inequality (LMI) framework. Initially, the ResNet architecture was reformulated as a cyclic tridiagonal LMI, and closed-form constraints on network parameters were derived to ensure L-Lipschitz continuity; however, using a new LDL^top decomposition approach for certifying LMI feasibility, we extend the construction of L-Lipchitz networks to any other nonlinear architecture. Our contributions include a provable parameterization methodology for constructing Lipschitz-constrained residual networks and other hierarchical architectures. Cholesky decomposition is also used for efficient parameterization. These findings enable robust network designs applicable to adversarial robustness, certified training, and control systems. The LDL^top formulation is shown to be a tight relaxation of the SDP-based network, maintaining full expressiveness and achieving 3\%-13\% accuracy gains over SLL Layers on 121 UCI data sets.

Human team tactics emerge from each player's individual perspective and their ability to anticipate, interpret, and adapt to teammates' intentions. While advances in video understanding have improved the modeling of team interactions in sports, most existing work relies on third-person broadcast views and overlooks the synchronous, egocentric nature of multi-agent learning. We introduce X-Ego-CS, a benchmark dataset consisting of 124 hours of gameplay footage from 45 professional-level matches of the popular e-sports game Counter-Strike 2, designed to facilitate research on multi-agent decision-making in complex 3D environments. X-Ego-CS provides cross-egocentric video streams that synchronously capture all players' first-person perspectives along with state-action trajectories. Building on this resource, we propose Cross-Ego Contrastive Learning (CECL), which aligns teammates' egocentric visual streams to foster team-level tactical situational awareness from an individual's perspective. We evaluate CECL on a teammate-opponent location prediction task, demonstrating its effectiveness in enhancing an agent's ability to infer both teammate and opponent positions from a single first-person view using state-of-the-art video encoders. Together, X-Ego-CS and CECL establish a foundation for cross-egocentric multi-agent benchmarking in esports. More broadly, our work positions gameplay understanding as a testbed for multi-agent modeling and tactical learning, with implications for spatiotemporal reasoning and human-AI teaming in both virtual and real-world domains. Code and dataset are available at https://github.com/HATS-ICT/x-ego.

We investigate learning the equilibria in non-stationary multi-agent systems and address the challenges that differentiate multi-agent learning from single-agent learning. Specifically, we focus on games with bandit feedback, where testing an equilibrium can result in substantial regret even when the gap to be tested is small, and the existence of multiple optimal solutions (equilibria) in stationary games poses extra challenges. To overcome these obstacles, we propose a versatile black-box approach applicable to a broad spectrum of problems, such as general-sum games, potential games, and Markov games, when equipped with appropriate learning and testing oracles for stationary environments. Our algorithms can achieve Oleft(Delta^{1/4}T^{3/4}right) regret when the degree of nonstationarity, as measured by total variation Delta, is known, and Oleft(Delta^{1/5}T^{4/5}right) regret when Delta is unknown, where T is the number of rounds. Meanwhile, our algorithm inherits the favorable dependence on number of agents from the oracles. As a side contribution that may be independent of interest, we show how to test for various types of equilibria by a black-box reduction to single-agent learning, which includes Nash equilibria, correlated equilibria, and coarse correlated equilibria.

We initiate the study of Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (MARLHF), exploring both theoretical foundations and empirical validations. We define the task as identifying Nash equilibrium from a preference-only offline dataset in general-sum games, a problem marked by the challenge of sparse feedback signals. Our theory establishes the upper complexity bounds for Nash Equilibrium in effective MARLHF, demonstrating that single-policy coverage is inadequate and highlighting the importance of unilateral dataset coverage. These theoretical insights are verified through comprehensive experiments. To enhance the practical performance, we further introduce two algorithmic techniques. (1) We propose a Mean Squared Error (MSE) regularization along the time axis to achieve a more uniform reward distribution and improve reward learning outcomes. (2) We utilize imitation learning to approximate the reference policy, ensuring stability and effectiveness in training. Our findings underscore the multifaceted approach required for MARLHF, paving the way for effective preference-based multi-agent systems.

Deep residual networks (ResNets) have demonstrated outstanding success in computer vision tasks, attributed to their ability to maintain gradient flow through deep architectures. Simultaneously, controlling the Lipschitz bound in neural networks has emerged as an essential area of research for enhancing adversarial robustness and network certifiability. This paper uses a rigorous approach to design L-Lipschitz deep residual networks using a Linear Matrix Inequality (LMI) framework. The ResNet architecture was reformulated as a pseudo-tri-diagonal LMI with off-diagonal elements and derived closed-form constraints on network parameters to ensure L-Lipschitz continuity. To address the lack of explicit eigenvalue computations for such matrix structures, the Gershgorin circle theorem was employed to approximate eigenvalue locations, guaranteeing the LMI's negative semi-definiteness. Our contributions include a provable parameterization methodology for constructing Lipschitz-constrained networks and a compositional framework for managing recursive systems within hierarchical architectures. These findings enable robust network designs applicable to adversarial robustness, certified training, and control systems. However, a limitation was identified in the Gershgorin-based approximations, which over-constrain the system, suppressing non-linear dynamics and diminishing the network's expressive capacity.

We study offline multi-agent reinforcement learning (RL) in Markov games, where the goal is to learn an approximate equilibrium -- such as Nash equilibrium and (Coarse) Correlated Equilibrium -- from an offline dataset pre-collected from the game. Existing works consider relatively restricted tabular or linear models and handle each equilibria separately. In this work, we provide the first framework for sample-efficient offline learning in Markov games under general function approximation, handling all 3 equilibria in a unified manner. By using Bellman-consistent pessimism, we obtain interval estimation for policies' returns, and use both the upper and the lower bounds to obtain a relaxation on the gap of a candidate policy, which becomes our optimization objective. Our results generalize prior works and provide several additional insights. Importantly, we require a data coverage condition that improves over the recently proposed "unilateral concentrability". Our condition allows selective coverage of deviation policies that optimally trade-off between their greediness (as approximate best responses) and coverage, and we show scenarios where this leads to significantly better guarantees. As a new connection, we also show how our algorithmic framework can subsume seemingly different solution concepts designed for the special case of two-player zero-sum games.

Two-player, constant-sum games are well studied in the literature, but there has been limited progress outside of this setting. We propose Joint Policy-Space Response Oracles (JPSRO), an algorithm for training agents in n-player, general-sum extensive form games, which provably converges to an equilibrium. We further suggest correlated equilibria (CE) as promising meta-solvers, and propose a novel solution concept Maximum Gini Correlated Equilibrium (MGCE), a principled and computationally efficient family of solutions for solving the correlated equilibrium selection problem. We conduct several experiments using CE meta-solvers for JPSRO and demonstrate convergence on n-player, general-sum games.

We investigate a primal-dual (PD) method for the saddle point problem (SPP) that uses a linear approximation of the primal function instead of the standard proximal step, resulting in a linearized PD (LPD) method. For convex-strongly concave SPP, we observe that the LPD method has a suboptimal dependence on the Lipschitz constant of the primal function. To fix this issue, we combine features of Accelerated Gradient Descent with the LPD method resulting in a single-loop Accelerated Linearized Primal-Dual (ALPD) method. ALPD method achieves the optimal gradient complexity when the SPP has a semi-linear coupling function. We also present an inexact ALPD method for SPPs with a general nonlinear coupling function that maintains the optimal gradient evaluations of the primal parts and significantly improves the gradient evaluations of the coupling term compared to the ALPD method. We verify our findings with numerical experiments.

The categories of open learners (due to Fong, Spivak and Tuy\'eras) and open games (due to the present author, Ghani, Winschel and Zahn) bear a very striking and unexpected similarity. The purpose of this short note is to prove that there is a faithful symmetric monoidal functor from the former to the latter, which means that any supervised neural network (without feedback or other complicating features) can be seen as an open game in a canonical way. Roughly, each parameter is controlled by a different player, and the game's best response relation encodes the dynamics of gradient descent. We suggest paths for further work exploiting the link.

This paper investigates a novel lossy compression framework operating under logarithmic loss, designed to handle situations where the reconstruction distribution diverges from the source distribution. This framework is especially relevant for applications that require joint compression and retrieval, and in scenarios involving distributional shifts due to processing. We show that the proposed formulation extends the classical minimum entropy coupling framework by integrating a bottleneck, allowing for a controlled degree of stochasticity in the coupling. We explore the decomposition of the Minimum Entropy Coupling with Bottleneck (MEC-B) into two distinct optimization problems: Entropy-Bounded Information Maximization (EBIM) for the encoder, and Minimum Entropy Coupling (MEC) for the decoder. Through extensive analysis, we provide a greedy algorithm for EBIM with guaranteed performance, and characterize the optimal solution near functional mappings, yielding significant theoretical insights into the structural complexity of this problem. Furthermore, we illustrate the practical application of MEC-B through experiments in Markov Coding Games (MCGs) under rate limits. These games simulate a communication scenario within a Markov Decision Process, where an agent must transmit a compressed message from a sender to a receiver through its actions. Our experiments highlight the trade-offs between MDP rewards and receiver accuracy across various compression rates, showcasing the efficacy of our method compared to conventional compression baseline.

The entropic fictitious play (EFP) is a recently proposed algorithm that minimizes the sum of a convex functional and entropy in the space of measures -- such an objective naturally arises in the optimization of a two-layer neural network in the mean-field regime. In this work, we provide a concise primal-dual analysis of EFP in the setting where the learning problem exhibits a finite-sum structure. We establish quantitative global convergence guarantees for both the continuous-time and discrete-time dynamics based on properties of a proximal Gibbs measure introduced in Nitanda et al. (2022). Furthermore, our primal-dual framework entails a memory-efficient particle-based implementation of the EFP update, and also suggests a connection to gradient boosting methods. We illustrate the efficiency of our novel implementation in experiments including neural network optimization and image synthesis.

In a recent work, Laforgue et al. introduce the model of last switch dependent (LSD) bandits, in an attempt to capture nonstationary phenomena induced by the interaction between the player and the environment. Examples include satiation, where consecutive plays of the same action lead to decreased performance, or deprivation, where the payoff of an action increases after an interval of inactivity. In this work, we take a step towards understanding the approximability of planning LSD bandits, namely, the (NP-hard) problem of computing an optimal arm-pulling strategy under complete knowledge of the model. In particular, we design the first efficient constant approximation algorithm for the problem and show that, under a natural monotonicity assumption on the payoffs, its approximation guarantee (almost) matches the state-of-the-art for the special and well-studied class of recharging bandits (also known as delay-dependent). In this attempt, we develop new tools and insights for this class of problems, including a novel higher-dimensional relaxation and the technique of mirroring the evolution of virtual states. We believe that these novel elements could potentially be used for approaching richer classes of action-induced nonstationary bandits (e.g., special instances of restless bandits). In the case where the model parameters are initially unknown, we develop an online learning adaptation of our algorithm for which we provide sublinear regret guarantees against its full-information counterpart.

Despite incredible advances, deep learning has been shown to be susceptible to adversarial attacks. Numerous approaches have been proposed to train robust networks both empirically and certifiably. However, most of them defend against only a single type of attack, while recent work takes steps forward in defending against multiple attacks. In this paper, to understand multi-target robustness, we view this problem as a bargaining game in which different players (adversaries) negotiate to reach an agreement on a joint direction of parameter updating. We identify a phenomenon named player domination in the bargaining game, namely that the existing max-based approaches, such as MAX and MSD, do not converge. Based on our theoretical analysis, we design a novel framework that adjusts the budgets of different adversaries to avoid any player dominance. Experiments on standard benchmarks show that employing the proposed framework to the existing approaches significantly advances multi-target robustness.

We study multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) for the general-sum Markov Games (MGs) under the general function approximation. In order to find the minimum assumption for sample-efficient learning, we introduce a novel complexity measure called the Multi-Agent Decoupling Coefficient (MADC) for general-sum MGs. Using this measure, we propose the first unified algorithmic framework that ensures sample efficiency in learning Nash Equilibrium, Coarse Correlated Equilibrium, and Correlated Equilibrium for both model-based and model-free MARL problems with low MADC. We also show that our algorithm provides comparable sublinear regret to the existing works. Moreover, our algorithm combines an equilibrium-solving oracle with a single objective optimization subprocedure that solves for the regularized payoff of each deterministic joint policy, which avoids solving constrained optimization problems within data-dependent constraints (Jin et al. 2020; Wang et al. 2023) or executing sampling procedures with complex multi-objective optimization problems (Foster et al. 2023), thus being more amenable to empirical implementation.

We present Self-Play Preference Optimization (SPO), an algorithm for reinforcement learning from human feedback. Our approach is minimalist in that it does not require training a reward model nor unstable adversarial training and is therefore rather simple to implement. Our approach is maximalist in that it provably handles non-Markovian, intransitive, and stochastic preferences while being robust to the compounding errors that plague offline approaches to sequential prediction. To achieve the preceding qualities, we build upon the concept of a Minimax Winner (MW), a notion of preference aggregation from the social choice theory literature that frames learning from preferences as a zero-sum game between two policies. By leveraging the symmetry of this game, we prove that rather than using the traditional technique of dueling two policies to compute the MW, we can simply have a single agent play against itself while maintaining strong convergence guarantees. Practically, this corresponds to sampling multiple trajectories from a policy, asking a rater or preference model to compare them, and then using the proportion of wins as the reward for a particular trajectory. We demonstrate that on a suite of continuous control tasks, we are able to learn significantly more efficiently than reward-model based approaches while maintaining robustness to the intransitive and stochastic preferences that frequently occur in practice when aggregating human judgments.

Neural networks are often highly sensitive to input and weight perturbations. This sensitivity has been linked to pathologies such as vulnerability to adversarial examples, divergent training, and overfitting. To combat these problems, past research has looked at building neural networks entirely from Lipschitz components. However, these techniques have not matured to the point where researchers have trained a modern architecture such as a transformer with a Lipschitz certificate enforced beyond initialization. To explore this gap, we begin by developing and benchmarking novel, computationally-efficient tools for maintaining norm-constrained weight matrices. Applying these tools, we are able to train transformer models with Lipschitz bounds enforced throughout training. We find that optimizer dynamics matter: switching from AdamW to Muon improves standard methods -- weight decay and spectral normalization -- allowing models to reach equal performance with a lower Lipschitz bound. Inspired by Muon's update having a fixed spectral norm, we co-design a weight constraint method that improves the Lipschitz vs. performance tradeoff on MLPs and 2M parameter transformers. Our 2-Lipschitz transformer on Shakespeare text reaches validation accuracy 60%. Scaling to 145M parameters, our 10-Lipschitz transformer reaches 21% accuracy on internet text. However, to match the NanoGPT baseline validation accuracy of 39.4%, our Lipschitz upper bound increases to 10^264. Nonetheless, our Lipschitz transformers train without stability measures such as layer norm, QK norm, and logit tanh softcapping.

Primal-dual safe RL methods commonly perform iterations between the primal update of the policy and the dual update of the Lagrange Multiplier. Such a training paradigm is highly susceptible to the error in cumulative cost estimation since this estimation serves as the key bond connecting the primal and dual update processes. We show that this problem causes significant underestimation of cost when using off-policy methods, leading to the failure to satisfy the safety constraint. To address this issue, we propose conservative policy optimization, which learns a policy in a constraint-satisfying area by considering the uncertainty in cost estimation. This improves constraint satisfaction but also potentially hinders reward maximization. We then introduce local policy convexification to help eliminate such suboptimality by gradually reducing the estimation uncertainty. We provide theoretical interpretations of the joint coupling effect of these two ingredients and further verify them by extensive experiments. Results on benchmark tasks show that our method not only achieves an asymptotic performance comparable to state-of-the-art on-policy methods while using much fewer samples, but also significantly reduces constraint violation during training. Our code is available at https://github.com/ZifanWu/CAL.

Cooperative multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) commonly adopts centralized training with decentralized execution (CTDE), where centralized critics leverage global information to guide decentralized actors. However, centralized-decentralized mismatch (CDM) arises when the suboptimal behavior of one agent degrades others' learning. Prior approaches mitigate CDM through value decomposition, but linear decompositions allow per-agent gradients at the cost of limited expressiveness, while nonlinear decompositions improve representation but require centralized gradients, reintroducing CDM. To overcome this trade-off, we propose the multi-agent cross-entropy method (MCEM), combined with monotonic nonlinear critic decomposition (NCD). MCEM updates policies by increasing the probability of high-value joint actions, thereby excluding suboptimal behaviors. For sample efficiency, we extend off-policy learning with a modified k-step return and Retrace. Analysis and experiments demonstrate that MCEM outperforms state-of-the-art methods across both continuous and discrete action benchmarks.

AI agents will be predictable in certain ways that traditional agents are not. Where and how can we leverage this predictability in order to improve social welfare? We study this question in a game-theoretic setting where one agent can pay a fixed cost to simulate the other in order to learn its mixed strategy. As a negative result, we prove that, in contrast to prior work on pure-strategy simulation, enabling mixed-strategy simulation may no longer lead to improved outcomes for both players in all so-called "generalised trust games". In fact, mixed-strategy simulation does not help in any game where the simulatee's action can depend on that of the simulator. We also show that, in general, deciding whether simulation introduces Pareto-improving Nash equilibria in a given game is NP-hard. As positive results, we establish that mixed-strategy simulation can improve social welfare if the simulator has the option to scale their level of trust, if the players face challenges with both trust and coordination, or if maintaining some level of privacy is essential for enabling cooperation.

The task of lip synchronization (lip-sync) seeks to match the lips of human faces with different audio. It has various applications in the film industry as well as for creating virtual avatars and for video conferencing. This is a challenging problem as one needs to simultaneously introduce detailed, realistic lip movements while preserving the identity, pose, emotions, and image quality. Many of the previous methods trying to solve this problem suffer from image quality degradation due to a lack of complete contextual information. In this paper, we present Diff2Lip, an audio-conditioned diffusion-based model which is able to do lip synchronization in-the-wild while preserving these qualities. We train our model on Voxceleb2, a video dataset containing in-the-wild talking face videos. Extensive studies show that our method outperforms popular methods like Wav2Lip and PC-AVS in Fr\'echet inception distance (FID) metric and Mean Opinion Scores (MOS) of the users. We show results on both reconstruction (same audio-video inputs) as well as cross (different audio-video inputs) settings on Voxceleb2 and LRW datasets. Video results and code can be accessed from our project page ( https://soumik-kanad.github.io/diff2lip ).

Smoothness and low dimensional structures play central roles in improving generalization and stability in learning and statistics. This work combines techniques from semi-infinite constrained learning and manifold regularization to learn representations that are globally smooth on a manifold. To do so, it shows that under typical conditions the problem of learning a Lipschitz continuous function on a manifold is equivalent to a dynamically weighted manifold regularization problem. This observation leads to a practical algorithm based on a weighted Laplacian penalty whose weights are adapted using stochastic gradient techniques. It is shown that under mild conditions, this method estimates the Lipschitz constant of the solution, learning a globally smooth solution as a byproduct. Experiments on real world data illustrate the advantages of the proposed method relative to existing alternatives.

We examine the problem of regret minimization when the learner is involved in a continuous game with other optimizing agents: in this case, if all players follow a no-regret algorithm, it is possible to achieve significantly lower regret relative to fully adversarial environments. We study this problem in the context of variationally stable games (a class of continuous games which includes all convex-concave and monotone games), and when the players only have access to noisy estimates of their individual payoff gradients. If the noise is additive, the game-theoretic and purely adversarial settings enjoy similar regret guarantees; however, if the noise is multiplicative, we show that the learners can, in fact, achieve constant regret. We achieve this faster rate via an optimistic gradient scheme with learning rate separation -- that is, the method's extrapolation and update steps are tuned to different schedules, depending on the noise profile. Subsequently, to eliminate the need for delicate hyperparameter tuning, we propose a fully adaptive method that attains nearly the same guarantees as its non-adapted counterpart, while operating without knowledge of either the game or of the noise profile.

LLMs are used predominantly in synchronous communication, where a human user and a model communicate in alternating turns. In contrast, many real-world settings are inherently asynchronous. For example, in group chats, online team meetings, or social games, there is no inherent notion of turns; therefore, the decision of when to speak forms a crucial part of the participant's decision making. In this work, we develop an adaptive asynchronous LLM-agent which, in addition to determining what to say, also decides when to say it. To evaluate our agent, we collect a unique dataset of online Mafia games, including both human participants, as well as our asynchronous agent. Overall, our agent performs on par with human players, both in game performance, as well as in its ability to blend in with the other human players. Our analysis shows that the agent's behavior in deciding when to speak closely mirrors human patterns, although differences emerge in message content. We release all our data and code to support and encourage further research for more realistic asynchronous communication between LLM agents. This work paves the way for integration of LLMs into realistic human group settings, from assistance in team discussions to educational and professional environments where complex social dynamics must be navigated.

Traditional Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) often relies on reward models, frequently assuming preference structures like the Bradley-Terry model, which may not accurately capture the complexities of real human preferences (e.g., intransitivity). Nash Learning from Human Feedback (NLHF) offers a more direct alternative by framing the problem as finding a Nash equilibrium of a game defined by these preferences. In this work, we introduce Nash Mirror Prox (Nash-MP), an online NLHF algorithm that leverages the Mirror Prox optimization scheme to achieve fast and stable convergence to the Nash equilibrium. Our theoretical analysis establishes that Nash-MP exhibits last-iterate linear convergence towards the beta-regularized Nash equilibrium. Specifically, we prove that the KL-divergence to the optimal policy decreases at a rate of order (1+2beta)^{-N/2}, where N is a number of preference queries. We further demonstrate last-iterate linear convergence for the exploitability gap and uniformly for the span semi-norm of log-probabilities, with all these rates being independent of the size of the action space. Furthermore, we propose and analyze an approximate version of Nash-MP where proximal steps are estimated using stochastic policy gradients, making the algorithm closer to applications. Finally, we detail a practical implementation strategy for fine-tuning large language models and present experiments that demonstrate its competitive performance and compatibility with existing methods.

Synthesizing realistic human-object interaction motions is a critical problem in VR/AR and human animation. Unlike the commonly studied scenarios involving a single human or hand interacting with one object, we address a more generic multi-body setting with arbitrary numbers of humans, hands, and objects. This complexity introduces significant challenges in synchronizing motions due to the high correlations and mutual influences among bodies. To address these challenges, we introduce SyncDiff, a novel method for multi-body interaction synthesis using a synchronized motion diffusion strategy. SyncDiff employs a single diffusion model to capture the joint distribution of multi-body motions. To enhance motion fidelity, we propose a frequency-domain motion decomposition scheme. Additionally, we introduce a new set of alignment scores to emphasize the synchronization of different body motions. SyncDiff jointly optimizes both data sample likelihood and alignment likelihood through an explicit synchronization strategy. Extensive experiments across four datasets with various multi-body configurations demonstrate the superiority of SyncDiff over existing state-of-the-art motion synthesis methods.

Robust reinforcement learning (RL) seeks to train policies that can perform well under environment perturbations or adversarial attacks. Existing approaches typically assume that the space of possible perturbations remains the same across timesteps. However, in many settings, the space of possible perturbations at a given timestep depends on past perturbations. We formally introduce temporally-coupled perturbations, presenting a novel challenge for existing robust RL methods. To tackle this challenge, we propose GRAD, a novel game-theoretic approach that treats the temporally-coupled robust RL problem as a partially-observable two-player zero-sum game. By finding an approximate equilibrium in this game, GRAD ensures the agent's robustness against temporally-coupled perturbations. Empirical experiments on a variety of continuous control tasks demonstrate that our proposed approach exhibits significant robustness advantages compared to baselines against both standard and temporally-coupled attacks, in both state and action spaces.

A successful tactic that is followed by the scientific community for advancing AI is to treat games as problems, which has been proven to lead to various breakthroughs. We adapt this strategy in order to study Rocket League, a widely popular but rather under-explored 3D multiplayer video game with a distinct physics engine and complex dynamics that pose a significant challenge in developing efficient and high-performance game-playing agents. In this paper, we present Lucy-SKG, a Reinforcement Learning-based model that learned how to play Rocket League in a sample-efficient manner, outperforming by a notable margin the two highest-ranking bots in this game, namely Necto (2022 bot champion) and its successor Nexto, thus becoming a state-of-the-art agent. Our contributions include: a) the development of a reward analysis and visualization library, b) novel parameterizable reward shape functions that capture the utility of complex reward types via our proposed Kinesthetic Reward Combination (KRC) technique, and c) design of auxiliary neural architectures for training on reward prediction and state representation tasks in an on-policy fashion for enhanced efficiency in learning speed and performance. By performing thorough ablation studies for each component of Lucy-SKG, we showed their independent effectiveness in overall performance. In doing so, we demonstrate the prospects and challenges of using sample-efficient Reinforcement Learning techniques for controlling complex dynamical systems under competitive team-based multiplayer conditions.

We study the problem of convergence to a stationary point in zero-sum games. We propose competitive gradient optimization (CGO ), a gradient-based method that incorporates the interactions between the two players in zero-sum games for optimization updates. We provide continuous-time analysis of CGO and its convergence properties while showing that in the continuous limit, CGO predecessors degenerate to their gradient descent ascent (GDA) variants. We provide a rate of convergence to stationary points and further propose a generalized class of alpha-coherent function for which we provide convergence analysis. We show that for strictly alpha-coherent functions, our algorithm convergences to a saddle point. Moreover, we propose optimistic CGO (OCGO), an optimistic variant, for which we show convergence rate to saddle points in alpha-coherent class of functions.

We present a novel approach to synthesize dexterous motions for physically simulated hands in tasks that require coordination between the control of two hands with high temporal precision. Instead of directly learning a joint policy to control two hands, our approach performs bimanual control through cooperative learning where each hand is treated as an individual agent. The individual policies for each hand are first trained separately, and then synchronized through latent space manipulation in a centralized environment to serve as a joint policy for two-hand control. By doing so, we avoid directly performing policy learning in the joint state-action space of two hands with higher dimensions, greatly improving the overall training efficiency. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed approach in the challenging guitar-playing task. The virtual guitarist trained by our approach can synthesize motions from unstructured reference data of general guitar-playing practice motions, and accurately play diverse rhythms with complex chord pressing and string picking patterns based on the input guitar tabs that do not exist in the references. Along with this paper, we provide the motion capture data that we collected as the reference for policy training. Code is available at: https://pei-xu.github.io/guitar.

Compositional reinforcement learning is a promising approach for training policies to perform complex long-horizon tasks. Typically, a high-level task is decomposed into a sequence of subtasks and a separate policy is trained to perform each subtask. In this paper, we focus on the problem of training subtask policies in a way that they can be used to perform any task; here, a task is given by a sequence of subtasks. We aim to maximize the worst-case performance over all tasks as opposed to the average-case performance. We formulate the problem as a two agent zero-sum game in which the adversary picks the sequence of subtasks. We propose two RL algorithms to solve this game: one is an adaptation of existing multi-agent RL algorithms to our setting and the other is an asynchronous version which enables parallel training of subtask policies. We evaluate our approach on two multi-task environments with continuous states and actions and demonstrate that our algorithms outperform state-of-the-art baselines.

The deployment of ever-larger machine learning models reflects a growing consensus that the more expressive the modelx2013and the more data one has access tox2013the more one can improve performance. As models get deployed in a variety of real world scenarios, they inevitably face strategic environments. In this work, we consider the natural question of how the interplay of models and strategic interactions affects scaling laws. We find that strategic interactions can break the conventional view of scaling lawsx2013meaning that performance does not necessarily monotonically improve as models get larger and/ or more expressive (even with infinite data). We show the implications of this phenomenon in several contexts including strategic regression, strategic classification, and multi-agent reinforcement learning through examples of strategic environments in whichx2013by simply restricting the expressivity of one's model or policy classx2013one can achieve strictly better equilibrium outcomes. Motivated by these examples, we then propose a new paradigm for model-selection in games wherein an agent seeks to choose amongst different model classes to use as their action set in a game.

Card games are widely used to study sequential decision-making under uncertainty, with real-world analogues in negotiation, finance, and cybersecurity. These games typically fall into three categories based on the flow of control: strictly sequential (players alternate single actions), deterministic response (some actions trigger a fixed outcome), and unbounded reciprocal response (alternating counterplays are permitted). A less-explored but strategically rich structure is the bounded one-sided response, where a player's action briefly transfers control to the opponent, who must satisfy a fixed condition through one or more moves before the turn resolves. We term games featuring this mechanism Bounded One-Sided Response Games (BORGs). We introduce a modified version of Monopoly Deal as a benchmark environment that isolates this dynamic, where a Rent action forces the opponent to choose payment assets. The gold-standard algorithm, Counterfactual Regret Minimization (CFR), converges on effective strategies without novel algorithmic extensions. A lightweight full-stack research platform unifies the environment, a parallelized CFR runtime, and a human-playable web interface. The trained CFR agent and source code are available at https://monopolydeal.ai.

In their seminal work, Nayyar et al. (2013) showed that imperfect information can be abstracted away from common-payoff games by having players publicly announce their policies as they play. This insight underpins sound solvers and decision-time planning algorithms for common-payoff games. Unfortunately, a naive application of the same insight to two-player zero-sum games fails because Nash equilibria of the game with public policy announcements may not correspond to Nash equilibria of the original game. As a consequence, existing sound decision-time planning algorithms require complicated additional mechanisms that have unappealing properties. The main contribution of this work is showing that certain regularized equilibria do not possess the aforementioned non-correspondence problem -- thus, computing them can be treated as perfect-information problems. Because these regularized equilibria can be made arbitrarily close to Nash equilibria, our result opens the door to a new perspective to solving two-player zero-sum games and yields a simplified framework for decision-time planning in two-player zero-sum games, void of the unappealing properties that plague existing decision-time planning approaches.

Lipschitz constants are connected to many properties of neural networks, such as robustness, fairness, and generalization. Existing methods for computing Lipschitz constants either produce relatively loose upper bounds or are limited to small networks. In this paper, we develop an efficient framework for computing the ell_infty local Lipschitz constant of a neural network by tightly upper bounding the norm of Clarke Jacobian via linear bound propagation. We formulate the computation of local Lipschitz constants with a linear bound propagation process on a high-order backward graph induced by the chain rule of Clarke Jacobian. To enable linear bound propagation, we derive tight linear relaxations for specific nonlinearities in Clarke Jacobian. This formulate unifies existing ad-hoc approaches such as RecurJac, which can be seen as a special case of ours with weaker relaxations. The bound propagation framework also allows us to easily borrow the popular Branch-and-Bound (BaB) approach from neural network verification to further tighten Lipschitz constants. Experiments show that on tiny models, our method produces comparable bounds compared to exact methods that cannot scale to slightly larger models; on larger models, our method efficiently produces tighter results than existing relaxed or naive methods, and our method scales to much larger practical models that previous works could not handle. We also demonstrate an application on provable monotonicity analysis. Code is available at https://github.com/shizhouxing/Local-Lipschitz-Constants.

Large Language Models (LLMs) show significant potential in economic and strategic interactions, where communication via natural language is often prevalent. This raises key questions: Do LLMs behave rationally? Can they mimic human behavior? Do they tend to reach an efficient and fair outcome? What is the role of natural language in the strategic interaction? How do characteristics of the economic environment influence these dynamics? These questions become crucial concerning the economic and societal implications of integrating LLM-based agents into real-world data-driven systems, such as online retail platforms and recommender systems. While the ML community has been exploring the potential of LLMs in such multi-agent setups, varying assumptions, design choices and evaluation criteria across studies make it difficult to draw robust and meaningful conclusions. To address this, we introduce a benchmark for standardizing research on two-player, sequential, language-based games. Inspired by the economic literature, we define three base families of games with consistent parameterization, degrees of freedom and economic measures to evaluate agents' performance (self-gain), as well as the game outcome (efficiency and fairness). We develop an open-source framework for interaction simulation and analysis, and utilize it to collect a dataset of LLM vs. LLM interactions across numerous game configurations and an additional dataset of human vs. LLM interactions. Through extensive experimentation, we demonstrate how our framework and dataset can be used to: (i) compare the behavior of LLM-based agents to human players in various economic contexts; (ii) evaluate agents in both individual and collective performance measures; and (iii) quantify the effect of the economic characteristics of the environments on the behavior of agents.

SARSA, a classical on-policy control algorithm for reinforcement learning, is known to chatter when combined with linear function approximation: SARSA does not diverge but oscillates in a bounded region. However, little is known about how fast SARSA converges to that region and how large the region is. In this paper, we make progress towards this open problem by showing the convergence rate of projected SARSA to a bounded region. Importantly, the region is much smaller than the region that we project into, provided that the magnitude of the reward is not too large. Existing works regarding the convergence of linear SARSA to a fixed point all require the Lipschitz constant of SARSA's policy improvement operator to be sufficiently small; our analysis instead applies to arbitrary Lipschitz constants and thus characterizes the behavior of linear SARSA for a new regime.

Contrastive learning-based video-language representation learning approaches, e.g., CLIP, have achieved outstanding performance, which pursue semantic interaction upon pre-defined video-text pairs. To clarify this coarse-grained global interaction and move a step further, we have to encounter challenging shell-breaking interactions for fine-grained cross-modal learning. In this paper, we creatively model video-text as game players with multivariate cooperative game theory to wisely handle the uncertainty during fine-grained semantic interaction with diverse granularity, flexible combination, and vague intensity. Concretely, we propose Hierarchical Banzhaf Interaction (HBI) to value possible correspondence between video frames and text words for sensitive and explainable cross-modal contrast. To efficiently realize the cooperative game of multiple video frames and multiple text words, the proposed method clusters the original video frames (text words) and computes the Banzhaf Interaction between the merged tokens. By stacking token merge modules, we achieve cooperative games at different semantic levels. Extensive experiments on commonly used text-video retrieval and video-question answering benchmarks with superior performances justify the efficacy of our HBI. More encouragingly, it can also serve as a visualization tool to promote the understanding of cross-modal interaction, which have a far-reaching impact on the community. Project page is available at https://jpthu17.github.io/HBI/.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) integrate into our social and economic interactions, we need to deepen our understanding of how humans respond to LLMs opponents in strategic settings. We present the results of the first controlled monetarily-incentivised laboratory experiment looking at differences in human behaviour in a multi-player p-beauty contest against other humans and LLMs. We use a within-subject design in order to compare behaviour at the individual level. We show that, in this environment, human subjects choose significantly lower numbers when playing against LLMs than humans, which is mainly driven by the increased prevalence of `zero' Nash-equilibrium choices. This shift is mainly driven by subjects with high strategic reasoning ability. Subjects who play the zero Nash-equilibrium choice motivate their strategy by appealing to perceived LLM's reasoning ability and, unexpectedly, propensity towards cooperation. Our findings provide foundational insights into the multi-player human-LLM interaction in simultaneous choice games, uncover heterogeneities in both subjects' behaviour and beliefs about LLM's play when playing against them, and suggest important implications for mechanism design in mixed human-LLM systems.

Can classical game-theoretic frameworks be extended to capture the bounded rationality and causal reasoning of AI agents? We investigate this question by extending Causal Normal Form Games (CNFGs) to sequential settings, introducing Sequential Causal Multi-Agent Systems (S-CMAS) that incorporate Pearl's Causal Hierarchy across leader-follower interactions. While theoretically elegant -- we prove PSPACE-completeness, develop equilibrium refinements, and establish connections to signaling theory -- our comprehensive empirical investigation reveals a critical limitation: S-CNE provides zero welfare improvement over classical Stackelberg equilibrium across all tested scenarios. Through 50+ Monte Carlo simulations and hand-crafted synthetic examples, we demonstrate that backward induction with rational best-response eliminates any strategic advantage from causal layer distinctions. We construct a theoretical example illustrating conditions where benefits could emerge (ε-rational satisficing followers), though implementation confirms that even relaxed rationality assumptions prove insufficient when good instincts align with optimal play. This negative result provides valuable insight: classical game-theoretic extensions grounded in rational choice are fundamentally incompatible with causal reasoning advantages, motivating new theoretical frameworks beyond standard Nash equilibrium for agentic AI.

We improve the framework of open games with agency by showing how the players' counterfactual analysis giving rise to Nash equilibria can be described in the dynamics of the game itself (hence diegetically), getting rid of devices such as equilibrium predicates. This new approach overlaps almost completely with the way gradient-based learners are specified and trained. Indeed, we show feedback propagation in games can be seen as a form of backpropagation, with a crucial difference explaining the distinctive character of the phenomenology of non-cooperative games. We outline a functorial construction of arena of games, show players form a subsystem over it, and prove that their 'fixpoint behaviours' are Nash equilibria.

Imperfect information games (IIG) are games in which each player only partially observes the current game state. We study how to learn epsilon-optimal strategies in a zero-sum IIG through self-play with trajectory feedback. We give a problem-independent lower bound mathcal{O}(H(A_{X}+B_{Y})/epsilon^2) on the required number of realizations to learn these strategies with high probability, where H is the length of the game, A_{X} and B_{Y} are the total number of actions for the two players. We also propose two Follow the Regularized leader (FTRL) algorithms for this setting: Balanced FTRL which matches this lower bound, but requires the knowledge of the information set structure beforehand to define the regularization; and Adaptive FTRL which needs mathcal{O}(H^2(A_{X}+B_{Y})/epsilon^2) realizations without this requirement by progressively adapting the regularization to the observations.

Lip synchronization is the task of aligning a speaker's lip movements in video with corresponding speech audio, and it is essential for creating realistic, expressive video content. However, existing methods often rely on reference frames and masked-frame inpainting, which limit their robustness to identity consistency, pose variations, facial occlusions, and stylized content. In addition, since audio signals provide weaker conditioning than visual cues, lip shape leakage from the original video will affect lip sync quality. In this paper, we present OmniSync, a universal lip synchronization framework for diverse visual scenarios. Our approach introduces a mask-free training paradigm using Diffusion Transformer models for direct frame editing without explicit masks, enabling unlimited-duration inference while maintaining natural facial dynamics and preserving character identity. During inference, we propose a flow-matching-based progressive noise initialization to ensure pose and identity consistency, while allowing precise mouth-region editing. To address the weak conditioning signal of audio, we develop a Dynamic Spatiotemporal Classifier-Free Guidance (DS-CFG) mechanism that adaptively adjusts guidance strength over time and space. We also establish the AIGC-LipSync Benchmark, the first evaluation suite for lip synchronization in diverse AI-generated videos. Extensive experiments demonstrate that OmniSync significantly outperforms prior methods in both visual quality and lip sync accuracy, achieving superior results in both real-world and AI-generated videos.

Assessing and comparing player skill in online multiplayer gaming environments is essential for fair matchmaking and player engagement. Traditional ranking models like Elo and Glicko-2, designed for two-player games, are insufficient for the complexity of multi-player, asymmetric team-based matches. To address this gap, the OpenSkill library offers a suite of sophisticated, fast, and adaptable models tailored for such dynamics. Drawing from Bayesian inference methods, OpenSkill provides a more accurate representation of individual player contributions and speeds up the computation of ranks. This paper introduces the OpenSkill library, featuring a Python implementation of the Plackett-Luce model among others, highlighting its performance advantages and predictive accuracy against proprietary systems like TrueSkill. OpenSkill is a valuable tool for game developers and researchers, ensuring a responsive and fair gaming experience by efficiently adjusting player rankings based on game outcomes. The library's support for time decay and diligent documentation further aid in its practical application, making it a robust solution for the nuanced world of multiplayer ranking systems. This paper also acknowledges areas for future enhancement, such as partial play and contribution weighting, emphasizing the library's ongoing development to meet the evolving needs of online gaming communities.

The synthesis of synchronized audio-visual content is a key challenge in generative AI, with open-source models facing challenges in robust audio-video alignment. Our analysis reveals that this issue is rooted in three fundamental challenges of the joint diffusion process: (1) Correspondence Drift, where concurrently evolving noisy latents impede stable learning of alignment; (2) inefficient global attention mechanisms that fail to capture fine-grained temporal cues; and (3) the intra-modal bias of conventional Classifier-Free Guidance (CFG), which enhances conditionality but not cross-modal synchronization. To overcome these challenges, we introduce Harmony, a novel framework that mechanistically enforces audio-visual synchronization. We first propose a Cross-Task Synergy training paradigm to mitigate drift by leveraging strong supervisory signals from audio-driven video and video-driven audio generation tasks. Then, we design a Global-Local Decoupled Interaction Module for efficient and precise temporal-style alignment. Finally, we present a novel Synchronization-Enhanced CFG (SyncCFG) that explicitly isolates and amplifies the alignment signal during inference. Extensive experiments demonstrate that Harmony establishes a new state-of-the-art, significantly outperforming existing methods in both generation fidelity and, critically, in achieving fine-grained audio-visual synchronization.

In this paper, we present a conceptual model game to examine the dynamics of asymmetric interactions in games with imperfect information. The game involves two agents with starkly contrasting capabilities: one agent can take actions but has no information of the state of the game, whereas the other agent has perfect information of the state but cannot act or observe the other agent's actions. This duality manifests an extreme form of asymmetry, and how differing abilities influence the possibility of attaining common knowledge. Using Kripke structures and epistemic logic we demonstrate that, under these conditions, common knowledge of the current game state becomes unattainable. Our findings advance the discussion on the strategic limitations of knowledge in environments where information and action are unevenly distributed.

Large Language Model (LLM) agents are reshaping the game industry, particularly with more intelligent and human-preferable game characters. However, existing game benchmarks fall short of practical needs: they lack evaluations of diverse LLM capabilities across various game genres, studies of agentic modules crucial for complex gameplay, and fine-tuning datasets for aligning pre-trained LLMs into gaming agents. To fill these gaps, we present \benchname{}, a foundational benchmark designed to train and evaluate LLM agents across diverse real-world video games. Unlike existing benchmarks, Orak includes 12 popular video games spanning all major genres, enabling comprehensive studies of LLM capabilities and agentic modules essential for intricate game scenarios. To support consistent evaluation of LLMs, we introduce a plug-and-play interface based on Model Context Protocol (MCP) that enables LLMs to seamlessly connect with games and manipulate agentic modules. Additionally, we propose a fine-tuning dataset, consisting of LLM gameplay trajectories across diverse game genres. Orak offers a comprehensive evaluation framework, encompassing general game score leaderboards, LLM battle arenas, and in-depth analyses of visual input state, agentic strategies, and fine-tuning effects, establishing a foundation towards building generic gaming agents. Code is available at https://github.com/krafton-ai/Orak.

For a two-player imperfect-information extensive-form game (IIEFG) with K time steps and a player action space of size U, the game tree complexity is U^{2K}, causing existing IIEFG solvers to struggle with large or infinite (U,K), e.g., differential games with continuous action spaces. To partially address this scalability challenge, we focus on an important class of 2p0s games where the informed player (P1) knows the payoff while the uninformed player (P2) only has a belief over the set of I possible payoffs. Such games encompass a wide range of scenarios in sports, defense, cybersecurity, and finance. We prove that under mild conditions, P1's (resp. P2's) equilibrium strategy at any infostate concentrates on at most I (resp. I+1) action prototypes. When Ill U, this equilibrium structure causes the game tree complexity to collapse to I^K for P1 when P2 plays pure best responses, and (I+1)^K for P2 in a dual game where P1 plays pure best responses. We then show that exploiting this structure in standard learning modes, i.e., model-free multiagent reinforcement learning and model predictive control, is straightforward, leading to significant improvements in learning accuracy and efficiency from SOTA IIEFG solvers. Our demonstration solves a 22-player football game (K=10, U=infty) where the attacking team has to strategically conceal their intention until a critical moment in order to exploit information advantage. Code is available at https://github.com/ghimiremukesh/cams/tree/iclr

Convergent Cross Mapping (CCM) is a powerful method for detecting causality in coupled nonlinear dynamical systems, providing a model-free approach to capture dynamic causal interactions. Partial Cross Mapping (PCM) was introduced as an extension of CCM to address indirect causality in three-variable systems by comparing cross-mapping quality between direct cause-effect mapping and indirect mapping through an intermediate conditioning variable. However, PCM remains limited to univariate delay embeddings in its cross-mapping processes. In this work, we extend PCM to the multivariate setting, introducing multiPCM, which leverages multivariate embeddings to more effectively distinguish indirect causal relationships. We further propose a multivariate cross-mapping framework (MXMap) for causal discovery in dynamical systems. This two-phase framework combines (1) pairwise CCM tests to establish an initial causal graph and (2) multiPCM to refine the graph by pruning indirect causal connections. Through experiments on simulated data and the ERA5 Reanalysis weather dataset, we demonstrate the effectiveness of MXMap. Additionally, MXMap is compared against several baseline methods, showing advantages in accuracy and causal graph refinement.

Generating full-length, high-quality songs is challenging, as it requires maintaining long-term coherence both across text and music modalities and within the music modality itself. Existing non-autoregressive (NAR) frameworks, while capable of producing high-quality songs, often struggle with the alignment between lyrics and vocal. Concurrently, catering to diverse musical preferences necessitates reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF). However, existing methods often rely on merging multiple models during multi-preference optimization, which results in significant performance degradation. To address these challenges, we introduce DiffRhythm 2, an end-to-end framework designed for high-fidelity, controllable song generation. To tackle the lyric alignment problem, DiffRhythm 2 employs a semi-autoregressive architecture based on block flow matching. This design enables faithful alignment of lyrics to singing vocals without relying on external labels and constraints, all while preserving the high generation quality and efficiency of NAR models. To make this framework computationally tractable for long sequences, we implement a music variational autoencoder (VAE) that achieves a low frame rate of 5 Hz while still enabling high-fidelity audio reconstruction. In addition, to overcome the limitations of multi-preference optimization in RLHF, we propose cross-pair preference optimization. This method effectively mitigates the performance drop typically associated with model merging, allowing for more robust optimization across diverse human preferences. We further enhance musicality and structural coherence by introducing stochastic block representation alignment loss.

Conventional language model (LM) safety alignment relies on a reactive, disjoint procedure: attackers exploit a static model, followed by defensive fine-tuning to patch exposed vulnerabilities. This sequential approach creates a mismatch -- attackers overfit to obsolete defenses, while defenders perpetually lag behind emerging threats. To address this, we propose Self-RedTeam, an online self-play reinforcement learning algorithm where an attacker and defender agent co-evolve through continuous interaction. We cast safety alignment as a two-player zero-sum game, where a single model alternates between attacker and defender roles -- generating adversarial prompts and safeguarding against them -- while a reward LM adjudicates outcomes. This enables dynamic co-adaptation. Grounded in the game-theoretic framework of zero-sum games, we establish a theoretical safety guarantee which motivates the design of our method: if self-play converges to a Nash Equilibrium, the defender will reliably produce safe responses to any adversarial input. Empirically, Self-RedTeam uncovers more diverse attacks (+21.8% SBERT) compared to attackers trained against static defenders and achieves higher robustness on safety benchmarks (e.g., +65.5% on WildJailBreak) than defenders trained against static attackers. We further propose hidden Chain-of-Thought, allowing agents to plan privately, which boosts adversarial diversity and reduces over-refusals. Our results motivate a shift from reactive patching to proactive co-evolution in LM safety training, enabling scalable, autonomous, and robust self-improvement of LMs via multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL).

Text-conditioned motion synthesis has made remarkable progress with the emergence of diffusion models. However, the majority of these motion diffusion models are primarily designed for a single character and overlook multi-human interactions. In our approach, we strive to explore this problem by synthesizing human motion with interactions for a group of characters of any size in a zero-shot manner. The key aspect of our approach is the adaptation of human-wise interactions as pairs of human joints that can be either in contact or separated by a desired distance. In contrast to existing methods that necessitate training motion generation models on multi-human motion datasets with a fixed number of characters, our approach inherently possesses the flexibility to model human interactions involving an arbitrary number of individuals, thereby transcending the limitations imposed by the training data. We introduce a novel controllable motion generation method, InterControl, to encourage the synthesized motions maintaining the desired distance between joint pairs. It consists of a motion controller and an inverse kinematics guidance module that realistically and accurately aligns the joints of synthesized characters to the desired location. Furthermore, we demonstrate that the distance between joint pairs for human-wise interactions can be generated using an off-the-shelf Large Language Model (LLM). Experimental results highlight the capability of our framework to generate interactions with multiple human characters and its potential to work with off-the-shelf physics-based character simulators.

Multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) has been shown effective for cooperative games in recent years. However, existing state-of-the-art methods face challenges related to sample complexity, training instability, and the risk of converging to a suboptimal Nash Equilibrium. In this paper, we propose a unified framework for learning stochastic policies to resolve these issues. We embed cooperative MARL problems into probabilistic graphical models, from which we derive the maximum entropy (MaxEnt) objective for MARL. Based on the MaxEnt framework, we propose Heterogeneous-Agent Soft Actor-Critic (HASAC) algorithm. Theoretically, we prove the monotonic improvement and convergence to quantal response equilibrium (QRE) properties of HASAC. Furthermore, we generalize a unified template for MaxEnt algorithmic design named Maximum Entropy Heterogeneous-Agent Mirror Learning (MEHAML), which provides any induced method with the same guarantees as HASAC. We evaluate HASAC on six benchmarks: Bi-DexHands, Multi-Agent MuJoCo, StarCraft Multi-Agent Challenge, Google Research Football, Multi-Agent Particle Environment, and Light Aircraft Game. Results show that HASAC consistently outperforms strong baselines, exhibiting better sample efficiency, robustness, and sufficient exploration.

We study whether multiple large language models (LLMs) can autonomously improve each other in a negotiation game by playing, reflecting, and criticizing. We are interested in this question because if LLMs were able to improve each other, it would imply the possibility of creating strong AI agents with minimal human intervention. We ask two LLMs to negotiate with each other, playing the roles of a buyer and a seller, respectively. They aim to reach a deal with the buyer targeting a lower price and the seller a higher one. A third language model, playing the critic, provides feedback to a player to improve the player's negotiation strategies. We let the two agents play multiple rounds, using previous negotiation history and AI feedback as in-context demonstrations to improve the model's negotiation strategy iteratively. We use different LLMs (GPT and Claude) for different roles and use the deal price as the evaluation metric. Our experiments reveal multiple intriguing findings: (1) Only a subset of the language models we consider can self-play and improve the deal price from AI feedback, weaker models either do not understand the game's rules or cannot incorporate AI feedback for further improvement. (2) Models' abilities to learn from the feedback differ when playing different roles. For example, it is harder for Claude-instant to improve as the buyer than as the seller. (3) When unrolling the game to multiple rounds, stronger agents can consistently improve their performance by meaningfully using previous experiences and iterative AI feedback, yet have a higher risk of breaking the deal. We hope our work provides insightful initial explorations of having models autonomously improve each other with game playing and AI feedback.

We propose the first loss function for approximate Nash equilibria of normal-form games that is amenable to unbiased Monte Carlo estimation. This construction allows us to deploy standard non-convex stochastic optimization techniques for approximating Nash equilibria, resulting in novel algorithms with provable guarantees. We complement our theoretical analysis with experiments demonstrating that stochastic gradient descent can outperform previous state-of-the-art approaches.

We study the robust interpolation problem of arbitrary data distributions supported on a bounded space and propose a two-fold law of robustness. Robust interpolation refers to the problem of interpolating n noisy training data points in R^d by a Lipschitz function. Although this problem has been well understood when the samples are drawn from an isoperimetry distribution, much remains unknown concerning its performance under generic or even the worst-case distributions. We prove a Lipschitzness lower bound Omega(n/p) of the interpolating neural network with p parameters on arbitrary data distributions. With this result, we validate the law of robustness conjecture in prior work by Bubeck, Li, and Nagaraj on two-layer neural networks with polynomial weights. We then extend our result to arbitrary interpolating approximators and prove a Lipschitzness lower bound Omega(n^{1/d}) for robust interpolation. Our results demonstrate a two-fold law of robustness: i) we show the potential benefit of overparametrization for smooth data interpolation when n=poly(d), and ii) we disprove the potential existence of an O(1)-Lipschitz robust interpolating function when n=exp(omega(d)).

Many existing reinforcement learning (RL) methods employ stochastic gradient iteration on the back end, whose stability hinges upon a hypothesis that the data-generating process mixes exponentially fast with a rate parameter that appears in the step-size selection. Unfortunately, this assumption is violated for large state spaces or settings with sparse rewards, and the mixing time is unknown, making the step size inoperable. In this work, we propose an RL methodology attuned to the mixing time by employing a multi-level Monte Carlo estimator for the critic, the actor, and the average reward embedded within an actor-critic (AC) algorithm. This method, which we call Multi-level Actor-Critic (MAC), is developed especially for infinite-horizon average-reward settings and neither relies on oracle knowledge of the mixing time in its parameter selection nor assumes its exponential decay; it, therefore, is readily applicable to applications with slower mixing times. Nonetheless, it achieves a convergence rate comparable to the state-of-the-art AC algorithms. We experimentally show that these alleviated restrictions on the technical conditions required for stability translate to superior performance in practice for RL problems with sparse rewards.

Developing AI agents that can robustly adapt to dramatically different strategic landscapes without retraining is a central challenge for multi-agent learning. Pok\'emon Video Game Championships (VGC) is a domain with an extraordinarily large space of possible team configurations of approximately 10^{139} - far larger than those of Dota or Starcraft. The highly discrete, combinatorial nature of team building in Pok\'emon VGC causes optimal strategies to shift dramatically depending on both the team being piloted and the opponent's team, making generalization uniquely challenging. To advance research on this problem, we introduce VGC-Bench: a benchmark that provides critical infrastructure, standardizes evaluation protocols, and supplies human-play datasets and a range of baselines - from large-language-model agents and behavior cloning to reinforcement learning and empirical game-theoretic methods such as self-play, fictitious play, and double oracle. In the restricted setting where an agent is trained and evaluated on a single-team configuration, our methods are able to win against a professional VGC competitor. We extensively evaluated all baseline methods over progressively larger team sets and find that even the best-performing algorithm in the single-team setting struggles at scaling up as team size grows. Thus, policy generalization across diverse team strategies remains an open challenge for the community. Our code is open sourced at https://github.com/cameronangliss/VGC-Bench.

This paper studies attack detection for discrete-time linear systems with stochastic process noise that produce both a vulnerable (i.e., attackable) linear measurement and a secured (i.e., unattackable) quadratic measurement. The motivating application of this model is a dynamic-game setting where the quadratic measurement is interpreted as a system-level utility or reward, and control inputs into the linear system are interpreted as control policies that, once applied, are known to all game participants and which steer the system towards a game-theoretic equilibrium (e.g., Nash equilibrium). To detect attacks on the linear channel, we develop a novel quadratic-utility-aware observer that leverages the secured quadratic output and enforces measurement consistency via a projection step. We establish three properties for this observer: feasibility of the true state, prox-regularity of the quadratic-constraint set, and a monotone error-reduction guarantee in the noise-free case. To detect adversarial manipulation, we compare linear and quadratic observer trajectories using a wild bootstrap maximum mean discrepancy (MMD) test that provides valid inference under temporal dependence. We validate our framework using numerical experiments of a pursuit-evasion game, where the quadratic observer preserves estimation accuracy under linear-sensor attacks, while the statistical test detects distributional divergence between the observers' trajectories.

In this paper, we provide a general framework for studying multi-agent online learning problems in the presence of delays and asynchronicities. Specifically, we propose and analyze a class of adaptive dual averaging schemes in which agents only need to accumulate gradient feedback received from the whole system, without requiring any between-agent coordination. In the single-agent case, the adaptivity of the proposed method allows us to extend a range of existing results to problems with potentially unbounded delays between playing an action and receiving the corresponding feedback. In the multi-agent case, the situation is significantly more complicated because agents may not have access to a global clock to use as a reference point; to overcome this, we focus on the information that is available for producing each prediction rather than the actual delay associated with each feedback. This allows us to derive adaptive learning strategies with optimal regret bounds, even in a fully decentralized, asynchronous environment. Finally, we also analyze an "optimistic" variant of the proposed algorithm which is capable of exploiting the predictability of problems with a slower variation and leads to improved regret bounds.

We study an online learning problem in general-sum Stackelberg games, where players act in a decentralized and strategic manner. We study two settings depending on the type of information for the follower: (1) the limited information setting where the follower only observes its own reward, and (2) the side information setting where the follower has extra side information about the leader's reward. We show that for the follower, myopically best responding to the leader's action is the best strategy for the limited information setting, but not necessarily so for the side information setting -- the follower can manipulate the leader's reward signals with strategic actions, and hence induce the leader's strategy to converge to an equilibrium that is better off for itself. Based on these insights, we study decentralized online learning for both players in the two settings. Our main contribution is to derive last-iterate convergence and sample complexity results in both settings. Notably, we design a new manipulation strategy for the follower in the latter setting, and show that it has an intrinsic advantage against the best response strategy. Our theories are also supported by empirical results.

In reinforcement learning and imitation learning, an object of central importance is the state distribution induced by the policy. It plays a crucial role in the policy gradient theorem, and references to it--along with the related state-action distribution--can be found all across the literature. Despite its importance, the state distribution is mostly discussed indirectly and theoretically, rather than being modeled explicitly. The reason being an absence of appropriate density estimation tools. In this work, we investigate applications of a normalizing flow-based model for the aforementioned distributions. In particular, we use a pair of flows coupled through the optimality point of the Donsker-Varadhan representation of the Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence, for distribution matching based imitation learning. Our algorithm, Coupled Flow Imitation Learning (CFIL), achieves state-of-the-art performance on benchmark tasks with a single expert trajectory and extends naturally to a variety of other settings, including the subsampled and state-only regimes.

The computational study of equilibria involving constraints on players' strategies has been largely neglected. However, in real-world applications, players are usually subject to constraints ruling out the feasibility of some of their strategies, such as, e.g., safety requirements and budget caps. Computational studies on constrained versions of the Nash equilibrium have lead to some results under very stringent assumptions, while finding constrained versions of the correlated equilibrium (CE) is still unexplored. In this paper, we introduce and computationally characterize constrained Phi-equilibria -- a more general notion than constrained CEs -- in normal-form games. We show that computing such equilibria is in general computationally intractable, and also that the set of the equilibria may not be convex, providing a sharp divide with unconstrained CEs. Nevertheless, we provide a polynomial-time algorithm for computing a constrained (approximate) Phi-equilibrium maximizing a given linear function, when either the number of constraints or that of players' actions is fixed. Moreover, in the special case in which a player's constraints do not depend on other players' strategies, we show that an exact, function-maximizing equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time, while one (approximate) equilibrium can be found with an efficient decentralized no-regret learning algorithm.

Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) involves training policy models (PMs) and reward models (RMs) to align language models with human preferences. Instead of focusing solely on PMs and RMs independently, we propose to examine their interactions during fine-tuning, introducing the concept of seamlessness. Our study starts with observing the saturation phenomenon, where continual improvements in RM and PM do not translate into RLHF progress. Our analysis shows that RMs fail to assign proper scores to PM responses, resulting in a 35% mismatch rate with human preferences, highlighting a significant discrepancy between PM and RM. To measure seamlessness between PM and RM without human effort, we propose an automatic metric, SEAM. SEAM quantifies the discrepancies between PM and RM judgments induced by data samples. We validate the effectiveness of SEAM in data selection and model augmentation. Our experiments demonstrate that (1) using SEAM-filtered data for RL training improves RLHF performance by 4.5%, and (2) SEAM-guided model augmentation results in a 4% performance improvement over standard augmentation methods.

Zero-shot coordination in cooperative artificial intelligence (AI) remains a significant challenge, which means effectively coordinating with a wide range of unseen partners. Previous algorithms have attempted to address this challenge by optimizing fixed objectives within a population to improve strategy or behaviour diversity. However, these approaches can result in a loss of learning and an inability to cooperate with certain strategies within the population, known as cooperative incompatibility. To address this issue, we propose the Cooperative Open-ended LEarning (COLE) framework, which constructs open-ended objectives in cooperative games with two players from the perspective of graph theory to assess and identify the cooperative ability of each strategy. We further specify the framework and propose a practical algorithm that leverages knowledge from game theory and graph theory. Furthermore, an analysis of the learning process of the algorithm shows that it can efficiently overcome cooperative incompatibility. The experimental results in the Overcooked game environment demonstrate that our method outperforms current state-of-the-art methods when coordinating with different-level partners. Our demo is available at https://sites.google.com/view/cole-2023.

Playing games has a long history of describing intricate interactions in simplified forms. In this paper we explore if large language models (LLMs) can play games, investigating their capabilities for randomisation and strategic adaptation through both simultaneous and sequential game interactions. We focus on GPT-4o-Mini-2024-08-17 and test two games between LLMs: Rock Paper Scissors (RPS) and games of strategy (Prisoners Dilemma PD). LLMs are often described as stochastic parrots, and while they may indeed be parrots, our results suggest that they are not very stochastic in the sense that their outputs - when prompted to be random - are often very biased. Our research reveals that LLMs appear to develop loss aversion strategies in repeated games, with RPS converging to stalemate conditions while PD shows systematic shifts between cooperative and competitive outcomes based on prompt design. We detail programmatic tools for independent agent interactions and the Agentic AI challenges faced in implementation. We show that LLMs can indeed play games, just not very well. These results have implications for the use of LLMs in multi-agent LLM systems and showcase limitations in current approaches to model output for strategic decision-making.

Understanding and analyzing markets is crucial, yet analytical equilibrium solutions remain largely infeasible. Recent breakthroughs in equilibrium computation rely on zeroth-order policy gradient estimation. These approaches commonly suffer from high variance and are computationally expensive. The use of fully differentiable simulators would enable more efficient gradient estimation. However, the discrete allocation of goods in economic simulations is a non-differentiable operation. This renders the first-order Monte Carlo gradient estimator inapplicable and the learning feedback systematically misleading. We propose a novel smoothing technique that creates a surrogate market game, in which first-order methods can be applied. We provide theoretical bounds on the resulting bias which justifies solving the smoothed game instead. These bounds also allow choosing the smoothing strength a priori such that the resulting estimate has low variance. Furthermore, we validate our approach via numerous empirical experiments. Our method theoretically and empirically outperforms zeroth-order methods in approximation quality and computational efficiency.

Mean-field games have been used as a theoretical tool to obtain an approximate Nash equilibrium for symmetric and anonymous N-player games. However, limiting applicability, existing theoretical results assume variations of a "population generative model", which allows arbitrary modifications of the population distribution by the learning algorithm. Moreover, learning algorithms typically work on abstract simulators with population instead of the N-player game. Instead, we show that N agents running policy mirror ascent converge to the Nash equilibrium of the regularized game within mathcal{O}(varepsilon^{-2}) samples from a single sample trajectory without a population generative model, up to a standard O(1{N}) error due to the mean field. Taking a divergent approach from the literature, instead of working with the best-response map we first show that a policy mirror ascent map can be used to construct a contractive operator having the Nash equilibrium as its fixed point. We analyze single-path TD learning for N-agent games, proving sample complexity guarantees by only using a sample path from the N-agent simulator without a population generative model. Furthermore, we demonstrate that our methodology allows for independent learning by N agents with finite sample guarantees.

While generalist foundation models like Gemini and GPT-4o demonstrate impressive multi-modal competence, existing evaluations fail to test their intelligence in dynamic, interactive worlds. Static benchmarks lack agency, while interactive benchmarks suffer from a severe modal bottleneck, typically ignoring crucial auditory and temporal cues. To bridge this evaluation chasm, we introduce OmniPlay, a diagnostic benchmark designed not just to evaluate, but to probe the fusion and reasoning capabilities of agentic models across the full sensory spectrum. Built on a core philosophy of modality interdependence, OmniPlay comprises a suite of five game environments that systematically create scenarios of both synergy and conflict, forcing agents to perform genuine cross-modal reasoning. Our comprehensive evaluation of six leading omni-modal models reveals a critical dichotomy: they exhibit superhuman performance on high-fidelity memory tasks but suffer from systemic failures in challenges requiring robust reasoning and strategic planning. We demonstrate that this fragility stems from brittle fusion mechanisms, which lead to catastrophic performance degradation under modality conflict and uncover a counter-intuitive "less is more" paradox, where removing sensory information can paradoxically improve performance. Our findings suggest that the path toward robust AGI requires a research focus beyond scaling to explicitly address synergistic fusion. Our platform is available for anonymous review at https://github.com/fuqingbie/omni-game-benchmark.

Despite the improved accuracy of deep neural networks, the discovery of adversarial examples has raised serious safety concerns. Most existing approaches for crafting adversarial examples necessitate some knowledge (architecture, parameters, etc.) of the network at hand. In this paper, we focus on image classifiers and propose a feature-guided black-box approach to test the safety of deep neural networks that requires no such knowledge. Our algorithm employs object detection techniques such as SIFT (Scale Invariant Feature Transform) to extract features from an image. These features are converted into a mutable saliency distribution, where high probability is assigned to pixels that affect the composition of the image with respect to the human visual system. We formulate the crafting of adversarial examples as a two-player turn-based stochastic game, where the first player's objective is to minimise the distance to an adversarial example by manipulating the features, and the second player can be cooperative, adversarial, or random. We show that, theoretically, the two-player game can con- verge to the optimal strategy, and that the optimal strategy represents a globally minimal adversarial image. For Lipschitz networks, we also identify conditions that provide safety guarantees that no adversarial examples exist. Using Monte Carlo tree search we gradually explore the game state space to search for adversarial examples. Our experiments show that, despite the black-box setting, manipulations guided by a perception-based saliency distribution are competitive with state-of-the-art methods that rely on white-box saliency matrices or sophisticated optimization procedures. Finally, we show how our method can be used to evaluate robustness of neural networks in safety-critical applications such as traffic sign recognition in self-driving cars.

Recently, remarkable progress has been made by approximating Nash equilibrium (NE), correlated equilibrium (CE), and coarse correlated equilibrium (CCE) through function approximation that trains a neural network to predict equilibria from game representations. Furthermore, equivariant architectures are widely adopted in designing such equilibrium approximators in normal-form games. In this paper, we theoretically characterize benefits and limitations of equivariant equilibrium approximators. For the benefits, we show that they enjoy better generalizability than general ones and can achieve better approximations when the payoff distribution is permutation-invariant. For the limitations, we discuss their drawbacks in terms of equilibrium selection and social welfare. Together, our results help to understand the role of equivariance in equilibrium approximators.

We introduce an approach to evaluate language model (LM) agency using negotiation games. This approach better reflects real-world use cases and addresses some of the shortcomings of alternative LM benchmarks. Negotiation games enable us to study multi-turn, and cross-model interactions, modulate complexity, and side-step accidental evaluation data leakage. We use our approach to test six widely used and publicly accessible LMs, evaluating performance and alignment in both self-play and cross-play settings. Noteworthy findings include: (i) only closed-source models tested here were able to complete these tasks; (ii) cooperative bargaining games proved to be most challenging to the models; and (iii) even the most powerful models sometimes "lose" to weaker opponents

Current reinforcement learning (RL) frameworks for large language models (LLM) post-training typically assume a fixed prompt distribution, which is sub-optimal and bottlenecks scalability. Prior works have explored prompt evolving, but are often limited to the supervised fine-tuning stage, and prompts are sampled and evolved uniformly without signals. This empirical work presents a paradigm shift: Evolving Alignment via Asymmetric Self-Play (eva), that casts post-training as an infinite game with regret-based signals for 2 players: (i) a creator, who strategically samples and creates new informative prompts and (ii) a solver, who learns to produce preferred responses. eva is the first method that allows language models to adaptively create training prompts in both offline and online RL post-training. The design is simple, easy-to-use yet remarkably effective: eva sets a new SOTA on challenging benchmarks, without any extra human prompts, e.g. it boosts the win-rate of gemma-2-9b-it on Arena-Hard by 51.6% -> 60.1% for DPO and 52.6% -> 62.4% for RLOO, surpassing claude-3-opus and catching up to gemini-1.5-pro, both of which are orders of magnitude larger. Extensive experiments show eva can create effective RL curricula and is robust across ablations. We believe adaptively evolving prompts are key to designing the next-generation RL post-training scheme.

Autonomously trained agents that are supposed to play video games reasonably well rely either on fast simulation speeds or heavy parallelization across thousands of machines running concurrently. This work explores a third way that is established in robotics, namely sim-to-real transfer, or if the game is considered a simulation itself, sim-to-sim transfer. In the case of Rocket League, we demonstrate that single behaviors of goalies and strikers can be successfully learned using Deep Reinforcement Learning in the simulation environment and transferred back to the original game. Although the implemented training simulation is to some extent inaccurate, the goalkeeping agent saves nearly 100% of its faced shots once transferred, while the striking agent scores in about 75% of cases. Therefore, the trained agent is robust enough and able to generalize to the target domain of Rocket League.

Dynamical generative models that produce samples through an iterative process, such as Flow Matching and denoising diffusion models, have seen widespread use, but there have not been many theoretically-sound methods for improving these models with reward fine-tuning. In this work, we cast reward fine-tuning as stochastic optimal control (SOC). Critically, we prove that a very specific memoryless noise schedule must be enforced during fine-tuning, in order to account for the dependency between the noise variable and the generated samples. We also propose a new algorithm named Adjoint Matching which outperforms existing SOC algorithms, by casting SOC problems as a regression problem. We find that our approach significantly improves over existing methods for reward fine-tuning, achieving better consistency, realism, and generalization to unseen human preference reward models, while retaining sample diversity.

Diffusion models, which employ stochastic differential equations to sample images through integrals, have emerged as a dominant class of generative models. However, the rationality of the diffusion process itself receives limited attention, leaving the question of whether the problem is well-posed and well-conditioned. In this paper, we uncover a vexing propensity of diffusion models: they frequently exhibit the infinite Lipschitz near the zero point of timesteps. This poses a threat to the stability and accuracy of the diffusion process, which relies on integral operations. We provide a comprehensive evaluation of the issue from both theoretical and empirical perspectives. To address this challenge, we propose a novel approach, dubbed E-TSDM, which eliminates the Lipschitz singularity of the diffusion model near zero. Remarkably, our technique yields a substantial improvement in performance, e.g., on the high-resolution FFHQ dataset (256times256). Moreover, as a byproduct of our method, we manage to achieve a dramatic reduction in the Frechet Inception Distance of other acceleration methods relying on network Lipschitz, including DDIM and DPM-Solver, by over 33%. We conduct extensive experiments on diverse datasets to validate our theory and method. Our work not only advances the understanding of the general diffusion process, but also provides insights for the design of diffusion models.

In order for agents in multi-agent systems (MAS) to be safe, they need to take into account the risks posed by the actions of other agents. However, the dominant paradigm in game theory (GT) assumes that agents are not affected by risk from other agents and only strive to maximise their expected utility. For example, in hybrid human-AI driving systems, it is necessary to limit large deviations in reward resulting from car crashes. Although there are equilibrium concepts in game theory that take into account risk aversion, they either assume that agents are risk-neutral with respect to the uncertainty caused by the actions of other agents, or they are not guaranteed to exist. We introduce a new GT-based Risk-Averse Equilibrium (RAE) that always produces a solution that minimises the potential variance in reward accounting for the strategy of other agents. Theoretically and empirically, we show RAE shares many properties with a Nash Equilibrium (NE), establishing convergence properties and generalising to risk-dominant NE in certain cases. To tackle large-scale problems, we extend RAE to the PSRO multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) framework. We empirically demonstrate the minimum reward variance benefits of RAE in matrix games with high-risk outcomes. Results on MARL experiments show RAE generalises to risk-dominant NE in a trust dilemma game and that it reduces instances of crashing by 7x in an autonomous driving setting versus the best performing baseline.

In various real-world scenarios, interactions among agents often resemble the dynamics of general-sum games, where each agent strives to optimize its own utility. Despite the ubiquitous relevance of such settings, decentralized machine learning algorithms have struggled to find equilibria that maximize individual utility while preserving social welfare. In this paper we introduce Learning with Opponent Q-Learning Awareness (LOQA), a novel, decentralized reinforcement learning algorithm tailored to optimizing an agent's individual utility while fostering cooperation among adversaries in partially competitive environments. LOQA assumes the opponent samples actions proportionally to their action-value function Q. Experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness of LOQA at achieving state-of-the-art performance in benchmark scenarios such as the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma and the Coin Game. LOQA achieves these outcomes with a significantly reduced computational footprint, making it a promising approach for practical multi-agent applications.

Most lip-to-speech (LTS) synthesis models are trained and evaluated under the assumption that the audio-video pairs in the dataset are perfectly synchronized. In this work, we show that the commonly used audio-visual datasets, such as GRID, TCD-TIMIT, and Lip2Wav, can have data asynchrony issues. Training lip-to-speech with such datasets may further cause the model asynchrony issue -- that is, the generated speech and the input video are out of sync. To address these asynchrony issues, we propose a synchronized lip-to-speech (SLTS) model with an automatic synchronization mechanism (ASM) to correct data asynchrony and penalize model asynchrony. We further demonstrate the limitation of the commonly adopted evaluation metrics for LTS with asynchronous test data and introduce an audio alignment frontend before the metrics sensitive to time alignment for better evaluation. We compare our method with state-of-the-art approaches on conventional and time-aligned metrics to show the benefits of synchronization training.

We introduce the Cross Human Motion Diffusion Model (CrossDiff), a novel approach for generating high-quality human motion based on textual descriptions. Our method integrates 3D and 2D information using a shared transformer network within the training of the diffusion model, unifying motion noise into a single feature space. This enables cross-decoding of features into both 3D and 2D motion representations, regardless of their original dimension. The primary advantage of CrossDiff is its cross-diffusion mechanism, which allows the model to reverse either 2D or 3D noise into clean motion during training. This capability leverages the complementary information in both motion representations, capturing intricate human movement details often missed by models relying solely on 3D information. Consequently, CrossDiff effectively combines the strengths of both representations to generate more realistic motion sequences. In our experiments, our model demonstrates competitive state-of-the-art performance on text-to-motion benchmarks. Moreover, our method consistently provides enhanced motion generation quality, capturing complex full-body movement intricacies. Additionally, with a pretrained model,our approach accommodates using in the wild 2D motion data without 3D motion ground truth during training to generate 3D motion, highlighting its potential for broader applications and efficient use of available data resources. Project page: https://wonderno.github.io/CrossDiff-webpage/.

We identity a by-far-unrecognized problem of Adam-style optimizers which results from unnecessary coupling between momentum and adaptivity. The coupling leads to instability and divergence when the momentum and adaptivity parameters are mismatched. In this work, we propose a method, Laprop, which decouples momentum and adaptivity in the Adam-style methods. We show that the decoupling leads to greater flexibility in the hyperparameters and allows for a straightforward interpolation between the signed gradient methods and the adaptive gradient methods. We experimentally show that Laprop has consistently improved speed and stability over Adam on a variety of tasks. We also bound the regret of Laprop on a convex problem and show that our bound differs from that of Adam by a key factor, which demonstrates its advantage.

We study the problem of designing mechanisms for information acquisition scenarios. This setting models strategic interactions between an uniformed receiver and a set of informed senders. In our model the senders receive information about the underlying state of nature and communicate their observation (either truthfully or not) to the receiver, which, based on this information, selects an action. Our goal is to design mechanisms maximizing the receiver's utility while incentivizing the senders to report truthfully their information. First, we provide an algorithm that efficiently computes an optimal incentive compatible (IC) mechanism. Then, we focus on the online problem in which the receiver sequentially interacts in an unknown game, with the objective of minimizing the cumulative regret w.r.t. the optimal IC mechanism, and the cumulative violation of the incentive compatibility constraints. We investigate two different online scenarios, i.e., the full and bandit feedback settings. For the full feedback problem, we propose an algorithm that guarantees mathcal O(sqrt T) regret and violation, while for the bandit feedback setting we present an algorithm that attains mathcal O(T^{alpha}) regret and mathcal O(T^{1-alpha/2}) violation for any alphain[1/2, 1]. Finally, we complement our results providing a tight lower bound.

We consider the problem of decentralized multi-agent reinforcement learning in Markov games. A fundamental question is whether there exist algorithms that, when adopted by all agents and run independently in a decentralized fashion, lead to no-regret for each player, analogous to celebrated convergence results in normal-form games. While recent work has shown that such algorithms exist for restricted settings (notably, when regret is defined with respect to deviations to Markovian policies), the question of whether independent no-regret learning can be achieved in the standard Markov game framework was open. We provide a decisive negative resolution this problem, both from a computational and statistical perspective. We show that: - Under the widely-believed assumption that PPAD-hard problems cannot be solved in polynomial time, there is no polynomial-time algorithm that attains no-regret in general-sum Markov games when executed independently by all players, even when the game is known to the algorithm designer and the number of players is a small constant. - When the game is unknown, no algorithm, regardless of computational efficiency, can achieve no-regret without observing a number of episodes that is exponential in the number of players. Perhaps surprisingly, our lower bounds hold even for seemingly easier setting in which all agents are controlled by a a centralized algorithm. They are proven via lower bounds for a simpler problem we refer to as SparseCCE, in which the goal is to compute a coarse correlated equilibrium that is sparse in the sense that it can be represented as a mixture of a small number of product policies. The crux of our approach is a novel application of aggregation techniques from online learning, whereby we show that any algorithm for the SparseCCE problem can be used to compute approximate Nash equilibria for non-zero sum normal-form games.

Competitions for shareable and limited resources have long been studied with strategic agents. In reality, agents often have to learn and maximize the rewards of the resources at the same time. To design an individualized competing policy, we model the competition between agents in a novel multi-player multi-armed bandit (MPMAB) setting where players are selfish and aim to maximize their own rewards. In addition, when several players pull the same arm, we assume that these players averagely share the arms' rewards by expectation. Under this setting, we first analyze the Nash equilibrium when arms' rewards are known. Subsequently, we propose a novel SelfishMPMAB with Averaging Allocation (SMAA) approach based on the equilibrium. We theoretically demonstrate that SMAA could achieve a good regret guarantee for each player when all players follow the algorithm. Additionally, we establish that no single selfish player can significantly increase their rewards through deviation, nor can they detrimentally affect other players' rewards without incurring substantial losses for themselves. We finally validate the effectiveness of the method in extensive synthetic experiments.

Imitation learning suffers from causal confusion. This phenomenon occurs when learned policies attend to features that do not causally influence the expert actions but are instead spuriously correlated. Causally confused agents produce low open-loop supervised loss but poor closed-loop performance upon deployment. We consider the problem of masking observed confounders in a disentangled representation of the observation space. Our novel masking algorithm leverages the usual ability to intervene in the initial system state, avoiding any requirement involving expert querying, expert reward functions, or causal graph specification. Under certain assumptions, we theoretically prove that this algorithm is conservative in the sense that it does not incorrectly mask observations that causally influence the expert; furthermore, intervening on the initial state serves to strictly reduce excess conservatism. The masking algorithm is applied to behavior cloning for two illustrative control systems: CartPole and Reacher.

Reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) has demonstrated remarkable effectiveness in aligning large language models (LLMs) with human preferences. Many existing alignment approaches rely on the Bradley-Terry (BT) model assumption, which assumes the existence of a ground-truth reward for each prompt-response pair. However, this assumption can be overly restrictive when modeling complex human preferences. In this paper, we drop the BT model assumption and study LLM alignment under general preferences, formulated as a two-player game. Drawing on theoretical insights from learning in games, we integrate optimistic online mirror descent into our alignment framework to approximate the Nash policy. Theoretically, we demonstrate that our approach achieves an O(T^{-1}) bound on the duality gap, improving upon the previous O(T^{-1/2}) result. More importantly, we implement our method and show through experiments that it outperforms state-of-the-art RLHF algorithms across multiple representative benchmarks.

The problem of minimizing the maximum of N convex, Lipschitz functions plays significant roles in optimization and machine learning. It has a series of results, with the most recent one requiring O(Nepsilon^{-2/3} + epsilon^{-8/3}) queries to a first-order oracle to compute an epsilon-suboptimal point. On the other hand, quantum algorithms for optimization are rapidly advancing with speedups shown on many important optimization problems. In this paper, we conduct a systematic study for quantum algorithms and lower bounds for minimizing the maximum of N convex, Lipschitz functions. On one hand, we develop quantum algorithms with an improved complexity bound of O(Nepsilon^{-5/3} + epsilon^{-8/3}). On the other hand, we prove that quantum algorithms must take Omega(Nepsilon^{-2/3}) queries to a first order quantum oracle, showing that our dependence on N is optimal up to poly-logarithmic factors.

Coordinating multiple large language models (LLMs) to solve complex tasks collaboratively poses a fundamental trade-off between the computation costs and collective performance compared with individual model. We introduce a novel, game-theoretically grounded reinforcement learning (RL) framework, the Multi-Agent Cooperation Sequential Public Goods Game (MAC-SPGG), to systematically incentivize cooperation in multi-LLM ensembles. In MAC-SPGG, LLM agents move in sequence, observing predecessors' outputs and updating beliefs to condition their own contributions. By redesigning the public-goods reward, effortful contributions become the unique Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE), which eliminates free-riding under traditional SPGG or PGG. Its sequential protocol replaces costly round-based information exchanges with a streamlined decision flow, cutting communication overhead while retaining strategic depth. We prove the existence and uniqueness of the SPNE under realistic parameters, and empirically show that MAC-SPGG-trained ensembles outperform single-agent baselines, chain-of-thought prompting, and other cooperative methods, even achieving comparable performance to large-scale models across reasoning, math, code generation, and NLP tasks. Our results highlight the power of structured, incentive-aligned MAC-SPGG cooperation for scalable and robust multi-agent language generation.

Harnessing the power of LLMs requires a delicate dance between being helpful and harmless. This creates a fundamental tension between two competing challenges: vulnerability to adversarial attacks that elicit unsafe content, and a tendency for overrefusal on benign but sensitive prompts. Current approaches often navigate this dance with safeguard models that completely reject any content that contains unsafe portions. This approach cuts the music entirely-it may exacerbate overrefusals and fails to provide nuanced guidance for queries it refuses. To teach models a more coordinated choreography, we propose WaltzRL, a novel multi-agent reinforcement learning framework that formulates safety alignment as a collaborative, positive-sum game. WaltzRL jointly trains a conversation agent and a feedback agent, where the latter is incentivized to provide useful suggestions that improve the safety and helpfulness of the conversation agent's responses. At the core of WaltzRL is a Dynamic Improvement Reward (DIR) that evolves over time based on how well the conversation agent incorporates the feedback. At inference time, unsafe or overrefusing responses from the conversation agent are improved rather than discarded. The feedback agent is deployed together with the conversation agent and only engages adaptively when needed, preserving helpfulness and low latency on safe queries. Our experiments, conducted across five diverse datasets, demonstrate that WaltzRL significantly reduces both unsafe responses (e.g., from 39.0% to 4.6% on WildJailbreak) and overrefusals (from 45.3% to 9.9% on OR-Bench) compared to various baselines. By enabling the conversation and feedback agents to co-evolve and adaptively apply feedback, WaltzRL enhances LLM safety without degrading general capabilities, thereby advancing the Pareto front between helpfulness and harmlessness.

Realistic and diverse multi-agent driving scenes are crucial for evaluating autonomous vehicles, but safety-critical events which are essential for this task are rare and underrepresented in driving datasets. Data-driven scene generation offers a low-cost alternative by synthesizing complex traffic behaviors from existing driving logs. However, existing models often lack controllability or yield samples that violate physical or social constraints, limiting their usability. We present OMEGA, an optimization-guided, training-free framework that enforces structural consistency and interaction awareness during diffusion-based sampling from a scene generation model. OMEGA re-anchors each reverse diffusion step via constrained optimization, steering the generation towards physically plausible and behaviorally coherent trajectories. Building on this framework, we formulate ego-attacker interactions as a game-theoretic optimization in the distribution space, approximating Nash equilibria to generate realistic, safety-critical adversarial scenarios. Experiments on nuPlan and Waymo show that OMEGA improves generation realism, consistency, and controllability, increasing the ratio of physically and behaviorally valid scenes from 32.35% to 72.27% for free exploration capabilities, and from 11% to 80% for controllability-focused generation. Our approach can also generate 5times more near-collision frames with a time-to-collision under three seconds while maintaining the overall scene realism.

Reinforcement Learning with Human Feedback (RLHF) has achieved great success in aligning large language models (LLMs) with human preferences. Prevalent RLHF approaches are reward-based, following the Bradley-Terry (BT) model assumption, which may not fully capture the complexity of human preferences. In this paper, we explore RLHF under a general preference framework and approach it from a game-theoretic perspective. Specifically, we formulate the problem as a two-player game and propose a novel algorithm, iterative Nash policy optimization (INPO). The key idea is to let the policy play against itself via no-regret learning, thereby approximating the Nash policy. Unlike previous methods, INPO bypasses the need for estimating the expected win rate for individual responses, which typically incurs high computational or annotation costs. Instead, we introduce a new loss objective that is directly minimized over a preference dataset. We provide theoretical analysis for our approach and demonstrate its effectiveness through experiments on various representative benchmarks. With an LLaMA-3-8B-based SFT model, INPO achieves a 41.5% length-controlled win rate on AlpacaEval 2.0 and a 38.3% win rate on Arena-Hard, showing substantial improvement over the state-of-the-art iterative algorithm [Dong et al., 2024] under the BT model assumption. Additionally, our ablation study highlights the benefits of incorporating KL regularization for response length control.

We apply multi-agent deep reinforcement learning (RL) to train end-to-end robot soccer policies with fully onboard computation and sensing via egocentric RGB vision. This setting reflects many challenges of real-world robotics, including active perception, agile full-body control, and long-horizon planning in a dynamic, partially-observable, multi-agent domain. We rely on large-scale, simulation-based data generation to obtain complex behaviors from egocentric vision which can be successfully transferred to physical robots using low-cost sensors. To achieve adequate visual realism, our simulation combines rigid-body physics with learned, realistic rendering via multiple Neural Radiance Fields (NeRFs). We combine teacher-based multi-agent RL and cross-experiment data reuse to enable the discovery of sophisticated soccer strategies. We analyze active-perception behaviors including object tracking and ball seeking that emerge when simply optimizing perception-agnostic soccer play. The agents display equivalent levels of performance and agility as policies with access to privileged, ground-truth state. To our knowledge, this paper constitutes a first demonstration of end-to-end training for multi-agent robot soccer, mapping raw pixel observations to joint-level actions, that can be deployed in the real world. Videos of the game-play and analyses can be seen on our website https://sites.google.com/view/vision-soccer .

Recent advances in real-world applications of reinforcement learning (RL) have relied on the ability to accurately simulate systems at scale. However, domains such as fluid dynamical systems exhibit complex dynamic phenomena that are hard to simulate at high integration rates, limiting the direct application of modern deep RL algorithms to often expensive or safety critical hardware. In this work, we introduce "Box o Flows", a novel benchtop experimental control system for systematically evaluating RL algorithms in dynamic real-world scenarios. We describe the key components of the Box o Flows, and through a series of experiments demonstrate how state-of-the-art model-free RL algorithms can synthesize a variety of complex behaviors via simple reward specifications. Furthermore, we explore the role of offline RL in data-efficient hypothesis testing by reusing past experiences. We believe that the insights gained from this preliminary study and the availability of systems like the Box o Flows support the way forward for developing systematic RL algorithms that can be generally applied to complex, dynamical systems. Supplementary material and videos of experiments are available at https://sites.google.com/view/box-o-flows/home.

To optimally coordinate with others in cooperative games, it is often crucial to have information about one's collaborators: successful driving requires understanding which side of the road to drive on. However, not every feature of collaborators is strategically relevant: the fine-grained acceleration of drivers may be ignored while maintaining optimal coordination. We show that there is a well-defined dichotomy between strategically relevant and irrelevant information. Moreover, we show that, in dynamic games, this dichotomy has a compact representation that can be efficiently computed via a Bellman backup operator. We apply this algorithm to analyze the strategically relevant information for tasks in both a standard and a partially observable version of the Overcooked environment. Theoretical and empirical results show that our algorithms are significantly more efficient than baselines. Videos are available at https://minknowledge.github.io.

Self-tuning algorithms that adapt the learning process online encourage more effective and robust learning. Among all the methods available, meta-gradients have emerged as a promising approach. They leverage the differentiability of the learning rule with respect to some hyper-parameters to adapt them in an online fashion. Although meta-gradients can be accumulated over multiple learning steps to avoid myopic updates, this is rarely used in practice. In this work, we demonstrate that whilst multi-step meta-gradients do provide a better learning signal in expectation, this comes at the cost of a significant increase in variance, hindering performance. In the light of this analysis, we introduce a novel method mixing multiple inner steps that enjoys a more accurate and robust meta-gradient signal, essentially trading off bias and variance in meta-gradient estimation. When applied to the Snake game, the mixing meta-gradient algorithm can cut the variance by a factor of 3 while achieving similar or higher performance.

Progress in fields of machine learning and adversarial planning has benefited significantly from benchmark domains, from checkers and the classic UCI data sets to Go and Diplomacy. In sequential decision-making, agent evaluation has largely been restricted to few interactions against experts, with the aim to reach some desired level of performance (e.g. beating a human professional player). We propose a benchmark for multiagent learning based on repeated play of the simple game Rock, Paper, Scissors along with a population of forty-three tournament entries, some of which are intentionally sub-optimal. We describe metrics to measure the quality of agents based both on average returns and exploitability. We then show that several RL, online learning, and language model approaches can learn good counter-strategies and generalize well, but ultimately lose to the top-performing bots, creating an opportunity for research in multiagent learning.

Recent years have seen growing interest in developing and applying perceptual similarity metrics. Research has shown the superiority of perceptual metrics over pixel-wise metrics in aligning with human perception and serving as a proxy for the human visual system. On the other hand, as perceptual metrics rely on neural networks, there is a growing concern regarding their resilience, given the established vulnerability of neural networks to adversarial attacks. It is indeed logical to infer that perceptual metrics may inherit both the strengths and shortcomings of neural networks. In this work, we demonstrate the vulnerability of state-of-the-art perceptual similarity metrics based on an ensemble of ViT-based feature extractors to adversarial attacks. We then propose a framework to train a robust perceptual similarity metric called LipSim (Lipschitz Similarity Metric) with provable guarantees. By leveraging 1-Lipschitz neural networks as the backbone, LipSim provides guarded areas around each data point and certificates for all perturbations within an ell_2 ball. Finally, a comprehensive set of experiments shows the performance of LipSim in terms of natural and certified scores and on the image retrieval application. The code is available at https://github.com/SaraGhazanfari/LipSim.

State-of-the-art approaches for training Differentially Private (DP) Deep Neural Networks (DNN) face difficulties to estimate tight bounds on the sensitivity of the network's layers, and instead rely on a process of per-sample gradient clipping. This clipping process not only biases the direction of gradients but also proves costly both in memory consumption and in computation. To provide sensitivity bounds and bypass the drawbacks of the clipping process, we propose to rely on Lipschitz constrained networks. Our theoretical analysis reveals an unexplored link between the Lipschitz constant with respect to their input and the one with respect to their parameters. By bounding the Lipschitz constant of each layer with respect to its parameters, we prove that we can train these networks with privacy guarantees. Our analysis not only allows the computation of the aforementioned sensitivities at scale, but also provides guidance on how to maximize the gradient-to-noise ratio for fixed privacy guarantees. The code has been released as a Python package available at https://github.com/Algue-Rythme/lip-dp

Recent advances in Competitive Self-Play (CSP) have achieved, or even surpassed, human level performance in complex game environments such as Dota 2 and StarCraft II using Distributed Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL). One core component of these methods relies on creating a pool of learning agents -- consisting of the Main Agent, past versions of this agent, and Exploiter Agents -- where Exploiter Agents learn counter-strategies to the Main Agents. A key drawback of these approaches is the large computational cost and physical time that is required to train the system, making them impractical to deploy in highly iterative real-life settings such as video game productions. In this paper, we propose the Minimax Exploiter, a game theoretic approach to exploiting Main Agents that leverages knowledge of its opponents, leading to significant increases in data efficiency. We validate our approach in a diversity of settings, including simple turn based games, the arcade learning environment, and For Honor, a modern video game. The Minimax Exploiter consistently outperforms strong baselines, demonstrating improved stability and data efficiency, leading to a robust CSP-MARL method that is both flexible and easy to deploy.

Due to the lack of effective cross-modal modeling, existing open-source audio-video generation methods often exhibit compromised lip synchronization and insufficient semantic consistency. To mitigate these drawbacks, we propose UniAVGen, a unified framework for joint audio and video generation. UniAVGen is anchored in a dual-branch joint synthesis architecture, incorporating two parallel Diffusion Transformers (DiTs) to build a cohesive cross-modal latent space. At its heart lies an Asymmetric Cross-Modal Interaction mechanism, which enables bidirectional, temporally aligned cross-attention, thus ensuring precise spatiotemporal synchronization and semantic consistency. Furthermore, this cross-modal interaction is augmented by a Face-Aware Modulation module, which dynamically prioritizes salient regions in the interaction process. To enhance generative fidelity during inference, we additionally introduce Modality-Aware Classifier-Free Guidance, a novel strategy that explicitly amplifies cross-modal correlation signals. Notably, UniAVGen's robust joint synthesis design enables seamless unification of pivotal audio-video tasks within a single model, such as joint audio-video generation and continuation, video-to-audio dubbing, and audio-driven video synthesis. Comprehensive experiments validate that, with far fewer training samples (1.3M vs. 30.1M), UniAVGen delivers overall advantages in audio-video synchronization, timbre consistency, and emotion consistency.

Finding the mixed Nash equilibria (MNE) of a two-player zero sum continuous game is an important and challenging problem in machine learning. A canonical algorithm to finding the MNE is the noisy gradient descent ascent method which in the infinite particle limit gives rise to the {\em Mean-Field Gradient Descent Ascent} (GDA) dynamics on the space of probability measures. In this paper, we first study the convergence of a two-scale Mean-Field GDA dynamics for finding the MNE of the entropy-regularized objective. More precisely we show that for each finite temperature (or regularization parameter), the two-scale Mean-Field GDA with a suitable {\em finite} scale ratio converges exponentially to the unique MNE without assuming the convexity or concavity of the interaction potential. The key ingredient of our proof lies in the construction of new Lyapunov functions that dissipate exponentially along the Mean-Field GDA. We further study the simulated annealing of the Mean-Field GDA dynamics. We show that with a temperature schedule that decays logarithmically in time the annealed Mean-Field GDA converges to the MNE of the original unregularized objective.

We present a novel unified bilevel optimization-based framework, PARL, formulated to address the recently highlighted critical issue of policy alignment in reinforcement learning using utility or preference-based feedback. We identify a major gap within current algorithmic designs for solving policy alignment due to a lack of precise characterization of the dependence of the alignment objective on the data generated by policy trajectories. This shortfall contributes to the sub-optimal performance observed in contemporary algorithms. Our framework addressed these concerns by explicitly parameterizing the distribution of the upper alignment objective (reward design) by the lower optimal variable (optimal policy for the designed reward). Interestingly, from an optimization perspective, our formulation leads to a new class of stochastic bilevel problems where the stochasticity at the upper objective depends upon the lower-level variable. To demonstrate the efficacy of our formulation in resolving alignment issues in RL, we devised an algorithm named A-PARL to solve PARL problem, establishing sample complexity bounds of order O(1/T). Our empirical results substantiate that the proposed PARL can address the alignment concerns in RL by showing significant improvements (up to 63\% in terms of required samples) for policy alignment in large-scale environments of the Deepmind control suite and Meta world tasks.

The rapid advancement of large language models (LLMs) has increased the need for guardrail models to ensure responsible use, particularly in detecting unsafe and illegal content. While substantial safety data exist in English, multilingual guardrail modeling remains underexplored due to the scarcity of open-source safety data in other languages. To address this gap, we propose a novel two-player Reinforcement Learning (RL) framework, where a generator and a guardrail model co-evolve adversarially to produce high-quality synthetic data for multilingual guardrail training. We theoretically formalize this interaction as a two-player game, proving convergence to a Nash equilibrium. Empirical evaluations show that our model \ours outperforms state-of-the-art models, achieving nearly 10% improvement over LlamaGuard3 (8B) on English benchmarks while being 4.5x faster at inference with a significantly smaller model (0.5B). We achieve substantial advancements in multilingual safety tasks, particularly in addressing the imbalance for lower-resource languages in a collected real dataset. Ablation studies emphasize the critical role of synthetic data generation in bridging the imbalance in open-source data between English and other languages. These findings establish a scalable and efficient approach to synthetic data generation, paving the way for improved multilingual guardrail models to enhance LLM safety. Code, model, and data will be open-sourced at https://github.com/yihedeng9/DuoGuard.

Large language model (LLM) agents need to perform multi-turn interactions in real-world tasks. However, existing multi-turn RL algorithms for optimizing LLM agents fail to perform effective credit assignment over multiple turns while leveraging the generalization capabilities of LLMs and it remains unclear how to develop such algorithms. To study this, we first introduce a new benchmark, ColBench, where an LLM agent interacts with a human collaborator over multiple turns to solve realistic tasks in backend programming and frontend design. Building on this benchmark, we propose a novel RL algorithm, SWEET-RL (RL with Step-WisE Evaluation from Training-time information), that uses a carefully designed optimization objective to train a critic model with access to additional training-time information. The critic provides step-level rewards for improving the policy model. Our experiments demonstrate that SWEET-RL achieves a 6% absolute improvement in success and win rates on ColBench compared to other state-of-the-art multi-turn RL algorithms, enabling Llama-3.1-8B to match or exceed the performance of GPT4-o in realistic collaborative content creation.

Offline paired preference optimization algorithms have become a popular approach for fine-tuning on preference data, outperforming traditional supervised fine-tuning in various tasks. However, traditional implementations often involve redundant computations, especially for tasks with long shared prompts. We introduce prefix sharing for preference tuning, a novel technique that processes chosen and rejected responses as one sequence with a shared prefix. To prevent cross-response contamination, we use a custom block-sparse attention mask. Our method achieves 1.1-1.5times improvement in training throughput on popular DPO datasets, without any effect on convergence. When combined with sequence packing, we observe consistent 1.3-1.6times speedups, benefiting even datasets with smaller sequence lengths. While we focus on Direct Preference Optimization (DPO), our approach is applicable to other paired preference tuning methods. By enhancing computational efficiency, our work contributes to making preference-based fine-tuning more accessible for a wider range of applications and model sizes. We open-source our code at https://github.com/frankxwang/dpo-prefix-sharing.

An abundance of recent impossibility results establish that regret minimization in Markov games with adversarial opponents is both statistically and computationally intractable. Nevertheless, none of these results preclude the possibility of regret minimization under the assumption that all parties adopt the same learning procedure. In this work, we present the first (to our knowledge) algorithm for learning in general-sum Markov games that provides sublinear regret guarantees when executed by all agents. The bounds we obtain are for swap regret, and thus, along the way, imply convergence to a correlated equilibrium. Our algorithm is decentralized, computationally efficient, and does not require any communication between agents. Our key observation is that online learning via policy optimization in Markov games essentially reduces to a form of weighted regret minimization, with unknown weights determined by the path length of the agents' policy sequence. Consequently, controlling the path length leads to weighted regret objectives for which sufficiently adaptive algorithms provide sublinear regret guarantees.

Imagine Mr. Bean stepping into Tom and Jerry--can we generate videos where characters interact naturally across different worlds? We study inter-character interaction in text-to-video generation, where the key challenge is to preserve each character's identity and behaviors while enabling coherent cross-context interaction. This is difficult because characters may never have coexisted and because mixing styles often causes style delusion, where realistic characters appear cartoonish or vice versa. We introduce a framework that tackles these issues with Cross-Character Embedding (CCE), which learns identity and behavioral logic across multimodal sources, and Cross-Character Augmentation (CCA), which enriches training with synthetic co-existence and mixed-style data. Together, these techniques allow natural interactions between previously uncoexistent characters without losing stylistic fidelity. Experiments on a curated benchmark of cartoons and live-action series with 10 characters show clear improvements in identity preservation, interaction quality, and robustness to style delusion, enabling new forms of generative storytelling.Additional results and videos are available on our project page: https://tingtingliao.github.io/mimix/.

Recent audio-video generative systems suggest that coupling modalities benefits not only audio-video synchrony but also the video modality itself. We pose a fundamental question: Does audio-video joint denoising training improve video generation, even when we only care about video quality? To study this, we introduce a parameter-efficient Audio-Video Full DiT (AVFullDiT) architecture that leverages pre-trained text-to-video (T2V) and text-to-audio (T2A) modules for joint denoising. We train (i) a T2AV model with AVFullDiT and (ii) a T2V-only counterpart under identical settings. Our results provide the first systematic evidence that audio-video joint denoising can deliver more than synchrony. We observe consistent improvements on challenging subsets featuring large and object contact motions. We hypothesize that predicting audio acts as a privileged signal, encouraging the model to internalize causal relationships between visual events and their acoustic consequences (e.g., collision times impact sound), which in turn regularizes video dynamics. Our findings suggest that cross-modal co-training is a promising approach to developing stronger, more physically grounded world models. Code and dataset will be made publicly available.

Value function factorization has achieved great success in multi-agent reinforcement learning by optimizing joint action-value functions through the maximization of factorized per-agent utilities. To ensure Individual-Global-Maximum property, existing works often focus on value factorization using monotonic functions, which are known to result in restricted representation expressiveness. In this paper, we analyze the limitations of monotonic factorization and present ConcaveQ, a novel non-monotonic value function factorization approach that goes beyond monotonic mixing functions and employs neural network representations of concave mixing functions. Leveraging the concave property in factorization, an iterative action selection scheme is developed to obtain optimal joint actions during training. It is used to update agents' local policy networks, enabling fully decentralized execution. The effectiveness of the proposed ConcaveQ is validated across scenarios involving multi-agent predator-prey environment and StarCraft II micromanagement tasks. Empirical results exhibit significant improvement of ConcaveQ over state-of-the-art multi-agent reinforcement learning approaches.

Our research introduces an innovative framework for video-to-audio synthesis, which solves the problems of audio-video desynchronization and semantic loss in the audio. By incorporating a semantic alignment adapter and a temporal synchronization adapter, our method significantly improves semantic integrity and the precision of beat point synchronization, particularly in fast-paced action sequences. Utilizing a contrastive audio-visual pre-trained encoder, our model is trained with video and high-quality audio data, improving the quality of the generated audio. This dual-adapter approach empowers users with enhanced control over audio semantics and beat effects, allowing the adjustment of the controller to achieve better results. Extensive experiments substantiate the effectiveness of our framework in achieving seamless audio-visual alignment.

The remarkable success of large language pretraining and the discovery of scaling laws signify a paradigm shift in machine learning. Notably, the primary objective has evolved from minimizing generalization error to reducing approximation error, and the most effective strategy has transitioned from regularization (in a broad sense) to scaling up models. This raises a critical question: Do the established principles that proved successful in the generalization-centric era remain valid in this new era of scaling? This paper examines several influential regularization-based principles that may no longer hold true in the scaling-centric, large language model (LLM) era. These principles include explicit L2 regularization and implicit regularization through small batch sizes and large learning rates. Additionally, we identify a new phenomenon termed ``scaling law crossover,'' where two scaling curves intersect at a certain scale, implying that methods effective at smaller scales may not generalize to larger ones. Together, these observations highlight two fundamental questions within this new paradigm: bullet Guiding Principles for Scaling: If regularization is no longer the primary guiding principle for model design, what new principles are emerging to guide scaling? bullet Model Comparison at Scale: How to reliably and effectively compare models at the scale where only a single experiment is feasible?

The game industry is challenged to cope with increasing growth in demand and game complexity while maintaining acceptable quality standards for released games. Classic approaches solely depending on human efforts for quality assurance and game testing do not scale effectively in terms of time and cost. Game-testing AI agents that learn by interaction with the environment have the potential to mitigate these challenges with good scalability properties on time and costs. However, most recent work in this direction depends on game state information for the agent's state representation, which limits generalization across different game scenarios. Moreover, game test engineers usually prefer exploring a game in a specific style, such as exploring the golden path. However, current game testing AI agents do not provide an explicit way to satisfy such a preference. This paper addresses these limitations by proposing an agent design that mainly depends on pixel-based state observations while exploring the environment conditioned on a user's preference specified by demonstration trajectories. In addition, we propose an imitation learning method that couples self-supervised and supervised learning objectives to enhance the quality of imitation behaviors. Our agent significantly outperforms state-of-the-art pixel-based game testing agents over exploration coverage and test execution quality when evaluated on a complex open-world environment resembling many aspects of real AAA games.

The dominant line of work in domain adaptation has focused on learning invariant representations using domain-adversarial training. In this paper, we interpret this approach from a game theoretical perspective. Defining optimal solutions in domain-adversarial training as a local Nash equilibrium, we show that gradient descent in domain-adversarial training can violate the asymptotic convergence guarantees of the optimizer, oftentimes hindering the transfer performance. Our analysis leads us to replace gradient descent with high-order ODE solvers (i.e., Runge-Kutta), for which we derive asymptotic convergence guarantees. This family of optimizers is significantly more stable and allows more aggressive learning rates, leading to high performance gains when used as a drop-in replacement over standard optimizers. Our experiments show that in conjunction with state-of-the-art domain-adversarial methods, we achieve up to 3.5% improvement with less than of half training iterations. Our optimizers are easy to implement, free of additional parameters, and can be plugged into any domain-adversarial framework.

Multi-agent football poses an unsolved challenge in AI research. Existing work has focused on tackling simplified scenarios of the game, or else leveraging expert demonstrations. In this paper, we develop a multi-agent system to play the full 11 vs. 11 game mode, without demonstrations. This game mode contains aspects that present major challenges to modern reinforcement learning algorithms; multi-agent coordination, long-term planning, and non-transitivity. To address these challenges, we present TiZero; a self-evolving, multi-agent system that learns from scratch. TiZero introduces several innovations, including adaptive curriculum learning, a novel self-play strategy, and an objective that optimizes the policies of multiple agents jointly. Experimentally, it outperforms previous systems by a large margin on the Google Research Football environment, increasing win rates by over 30%. To demonstrate the generality of TiZero's innovations, they are assessed on several environments beyond football; Overcooked, Multi-agent Particle-Environment, Tic-Tac-Toe and Connect-Four.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are transforming society and permeating into diverse applications. As a result, LLMs will frequently interact with us and other agents. It is, therefore, of great societal value to understand how LLMs behave in interactive social settings. Here, we propose to use behavioral game theory to study LLM's cooperation and coordination behavior. To do so, we let different LLMs (GPT-3, GPT-3.5, and GPT-4) play finitely repeated games with each other and with other, human-like strategies. Our results show that LLMs generally perform well in such tasks and also uncover persistent behavioral signatures. In a large set of two players-two strategies games, we find that LLMs are particularly good at games where valuing their own self-interest pays off, like the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma family. However, they behave sub-optimally in games that require coordination. We, therefore, further focus on two games from these distinct families. In the canonical iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, we find that GPT-4 acts particularly unforgivingly, always defecting after another agent has defected only once. In the Battle of the Sexes, we find that GPT-4 cannot match the behavior of the simple convention to alternate between options. We verify that these behavioral signatures are stable across robustness checks. Finally, we show how GPT-4's behavior can be modified by providing further information about the other player as well as by asking it to predict the other player's actions before making a choice. These results enrich our understanding of LLM's social behavior and pave the way for a behavioral game theory for machines.

Training LLM agents in multi-turn environments with sparse rewards, where completing a single task requires 30+ turns of interaction within an episode, presents a fundamental challenge for reinforcement learning. We identify a critical failure mode unique to this setting: the exploration-exploitation cascade failure. This cascade begins with early-stage policy premature convergence, where sparse feedback causes agents to commit to flawed, low-entropy strategies. Subsequently, agents enter late-stage policy collapse, where conventional entropy regularization becomes counterproductive, promoting chaotic exploration that destabilizes training. We propose Entropy-regularized Policy Optimization (EPO), a general framework that breaks this failure cycle through three synergistic mechanisms: (1) adopting entropy regularization in multi-turn settings to enhance exploration, (2) an entropy smoothing regularizer that bounds policy entropy within historical averages to prevent abrupt fluctuations, and (3) adaptive phase-based weighting that balances exploration and exploitation across training. Our analysis justifies that EPO guarantees monotonically decreasing entropy variance while maintaining convergence. EPO achieves up to 152% performance improvement on ScienceWorld and up to 19.8% on ALFWorld. Our work demonstrates that multi-turn sparse-reward settings require fundamentally different entropy control than traditional RL, with broad implications for LLM agent training.